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TITLE OF THESIS ..... THE PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL .....  
..... LEADERS .....  
.....

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED ..... Ph. D. ....

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED ..... 1978 .....

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
THE PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL LEADERS

by



STEVEN DONALD BROWN

A THESIS  
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1978





THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and  
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research,  
for acceptance, a thesis entitled .....  
Political Leaders".....  
submitted by .....Steven D. Brown.....  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.



## ABSTRACT

In the extant literature, students of voting behaviour have frequently identified the leader or candidate factor as a potent source of short-term variation in voting. In this thesis, we attempt to examine some of the dynamics of this impact. We conceive of candidate image formation as an instance of impression formation, and apply the Jones and Davis model of naive attribution processes to the context of political perception. Thus we suggest that the behaviour of the leader or candidate will permit the perceiver to make useful character inferences only when the behaviour is not consistent with the perceiver's expectations.

To examine the usefulness of this application, we report a series of experiments in which subjects' expectations were manipulated, and their impressions of the political actor were measured. The data provides some tentative support for the application. Subjects tended to make stronger inferences from the behaviour of a nonpolitical actor than they did from the behaviour of a political actor. The latter's behaviour, however, was not entirely discounted as a source of character information. Similarly, subjects tended to make stronger inferences from the out-of-role behaviour of a political leader than they did from his in-role





behaviour. Contrary to expectations, the manipulation of a leader's political or nonpolitical achievements failed to yield systematic differences in subjects' impressions.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of completing an enterprise of this nature, one acquires many debts of gratitude. It is impossible to acknowledge each of these explicitly, but I cannot fail to thank Professor Paul Johnston whose help, guidance and exacting standards as my supervisor have made this a better thesis. In addition, I must acknowledge my debt to Dr. Brendan Rule, Professor Elwood Murray, Dr. Christopher Knapper and Dr. Peter Meekison, all of whom provided valuable comments and advice on earlier drafts.

I would like to thank in particular my wife, Joan, for her encouragement, her patience, and her thoughtfulness while my life and hers were consumed with this work.



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## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

In election situations, most observers would agree that political leadership candidates constitute relevant, if not focal stimuli for the voter (1). In particular, leadership personality concerns seem to represent in most campaigns a common conversational currency, an apparent distillate of the myriad of campaign factors impinging on the voter.

Even so, our understanding of the role of this personality factor in elections is rather poorly developed. In many instances, personal image content seems to represent little more than a cognitive justification for partisan positions held long before the candidate first made an appearance on the backpages of the newspaper. Certainly, there is much evidence to support this view.

On the other hand, there are enough apparent exceptions to this pattern to persuade us that the situation is somewhat more complex. The successes of an Eisenhower in U. S. politics, of a De Gaulle in France, and of a Diefenbaker and perhaps even a Trudeau in Canadian political affairs represent only the most visible testimonials to the potential of a leader's





suggest that much of the leader's personal impact upon the individual voter has been masked in our analyses of the aggregate event.

Students of voting behaviour seem to know little about the nature or the dynamics of this appeal. In general, they have treated the factor as idiosyncratic or episodic in nature. Typically, researchers have attributed to the factor that proportion of variance in behaviour that remains when all known variables have entered the equation. Occasionally, they have identified a personal quality, such as the arrogance, sincerity or "father image" of the candidate as pivotal in accounting for the anomalous impact of a particular leader.

In this thesis, we propose to address the issue of candidate image directly. That is, we propose to re-examine the theoretical perspective that informs our study of candidate image formation, and to suggest an alternate approach that appears more appropriate for understanding the phenomenon. We propose as well to present an empirical argument bearing on the tenability and usefulness of our alternate theoretical framework.

In brief, we contend that prevailing models of political information processing are ill-equipped to account for much of the personal content comprising



voters' images of the leadership candidates. In particular, we cannot account adequately for voter attributions of dispositional qualities that are apparently unrelated to the candidates' established socio-political or demographic properties. Because these perceptions appear on occasion to have considerable motivational significance, this theoretical blindspot is a shortcoming worthy of our attention.

We suggest as an alternative approach that researchers conceive of candidate image formation as a problem in person perception. That is, it may be useful to examine how people generally form impressions of the underlying dispositional qualities of others, and to apply these perceptual principles to our understanding of political phenomena. Several theoretical traditions within the person perception literature appear relevant in this respect.

Drawing on these theoretical contributions, we will propose a rudimentary account of candidate image formation. Our account conceives of the voter as a rational political actor who seeks sufficient information to understand the causal structure of his environment. As an object with recognized causal significance in the political system, the character of



the leadership candidate is of particular interest to the voter. However, we contend that the political arena is a particularly difficult context within which to make useful inferences about the character of the leadership candidate. It is difficult primarily because the basic datum for such an inference - the behaviour of the leader - is ordinarily quite explicable in terms of causal forces that are external to the leader, or that are at least not unique to him. In short, the normative pressure to succeed in elective politics is seen to be sufficiently strong to constitute a plausible explanation for most leader actions. As a consequence, voters must discount as a useful basis for character inferences most of the voluminous behavioural data that are associated with leaders. Not surprisingly, character inferences tend to be based on the indisputable political characteristics that our traditional voting models have identified.

The value of this theoretical approach is not simply that it suggests an explanation for the often observed perceiver-basis of some image content. More importantly, perhaps, it suggests by implication an explanation for the content that is not so based. That is, by specifying the conditions which ordinarily act to confound the voter's analysis of candidate





behaviour, it suggests as well the circumstances under which behaviour might prove to be more informative.

We will attempt here to provide evidence bearing on some of the more critical implications of this proposal. Given the exploratory level of the investigation, and given the nature of the independent variables, we have chosen to simulate various political conditions in the controlled atmosphere of the laboratory, rather than to rely on the ex post facto examination of natural phenomena.

We are concerned with the processes of candidate image formation in the interests of developing an adequate explanation of voting behaviour. Nevertheless, we will limit the scope of our treatment in this thesis to the image formation step alone. The second step linking trait attribution to voting behaviour is itself a major and contentious research question involving quite different theoretical perspectives than those which inform our efforts here. Primarily for this reason, we choose to leave consideration of this problem to another time.

The format of this thesis proceeds from a theoretical discussion in the earlier chapters to an empirical argument that consumes the later ones. In





Chapter II, we will review and examine the treatment of the candidate factor in the voting literature. As noted above, we will attempt to show that certain features of the image are well understood, but that there still remains much personal image content that is inadequately explained.

Chapter III provides a brief introduction to the person perception area. In this chapter, we discuss theories of stereotyping, trait implication and attribution as possibly relevant to the resolution of our problem.

In Chapter IV, we propose an account of candidate image formation that draws upon basic principles of attribution and person perception. We attempt to demonstrate that this account is not inconsistent with some of the more recent theories and findings in the political literature.

Chapters V, VI, and VII report the results of a research programme comprised of five experimental simulations. These experiments were designed to test a number of predictions implied in our particular application of attribution principles to the voter's analysis of candidate behaviour.

Finally, Chapter VIII provides a summary and draws some conclusions based on the empirical analysis.



Notes

1. Through most of this thesis, the term "candidate" will refer to a candidate for a leadership office (President, Prime Minister). This does not mean that the principles of candidate formation discussed in this work have no application at the local level. Rather, the practise has been adopted here in deference to the prevailing orientation in the political literature, and is adopted primarily to avoid unnecessary confusion.



## Chapter II

### A Review of the Literature

The central question underlying our investigation in this thesis concerns the role of the political candidate in the voter's decision calculus. Ultimately, we wish to understand better the circumstances under which candidate factors assume a position of importance in determining voting behaviour.

Some of the issues pertinent to this question are "well-thumbed" in the literature. Voting researchers have traditionally concerned themselves with the determinants of voting behaviour and with the causal priorities among those determinants. As a focal stimulus in election campaigns, the leader or candidate factor has not been neglected. Indeed we will argue and attempt to demonstrate in this chapter that much useful information bearing on our concerns is available in the extant literature.

Even the most cursory glance at the literature, however, would serve to indicate that the candidate, as such, is not the conceptual element with which most researchers work. The theoretical framework adopted almost universally by voting analysts focuses on the subjective perspective of the voter. Within the





context of political research, development of this approach can be traced most directly to the work of Angus Campbell and his associates at the Michigan Survey Research Center. Their emphasis on the subjective perspective is evident in some of their earliest publications:

Additional information regarding the dynamics of voting behavior can be obtained by an approach at the level of attitudes, expectations, and group loyalties, the psychological variables that intervene between the external events of the voter's world and his ultimate behavior (Campbell et al., 1952, p. 86).

In The American Voter (1960), these same researchers argue that an adequate account of the voting act must include as a central feature the relationships among psychological constructs - constructs that "enjoy a subjective reality for the individual at a given point in time" (Campbell et al., 1960, p.27). The conceptual status of these personal conditions is clearly differentiated in their model from those conditions that are "external" to the individual's awareness.





By and large we shall consider external conditions as exogenous to our theoretical system. We want to understand the individual's response to politics by exploring the way in which he perceives the objects and events of the political world. Our approach is in the main dependent on the point of view of the actor. We assume that most events or conditions that bear directly upon behavior are perceived in some form or other by the individual prior to the determined behavior, and that much of behavior consists of reactions to these perceptions (Campbell et al., 1960, p.27).

Thus voting analysts tend to regard as their raw data the voters' images of the candidate or their measurement of those images rather than the candidate stimulus itself. The influence of the S.R.C. research team is again obvious in the conceptual development of the image construct. The candidate image variable is conventionally treated as an attitude construct. As such, it is thought to include both the voter's set of beliefs about the candidate and his affective reaction to the candidate.

A substantial body of literature focuses on the belief aspect or the cognitive content of the image. Although content classifications are not uniform within this literature, most researchers have used some variation of the typology suggested in The American Voter (1960). This typology is based on responses to



open-ended questions about the American presidential candidates (1). It involves the grouping of image content under four headings: partisan attributes, issue attributes, group interest attributes, and personal attributes. Some researchers have collapsed this typology into personal and political content (Sigel, 1964; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Anderson and Bass, 1969; Williams et al., 1976). Others have expanded the classification to distinguish personality attributes from references to candidate qualifications and abilities (Stokes, Campbell and Miller, 1959; Converse and Dupeux, 1966).

With few exceptions, researchers report that personal content tends to dominate the cognitive images of leadership candidates. The authors of The American Voter (1960), for example, report that Eisenhower's public image shifts between the elections of 1952 and 1956 from an emphasis on his leadership record and experience to more personal attributes such as his integrity, his sincerity, and his general likeability. In both years, however, these vague leadership virtues and personal qualities outnumber all other references by a wide margin (Campbell et al., 1960, p.24).

The tendency is even more clearly reflected in the public image of Charles de Gaulle held by the





French electorate in 1958. Converse and Dupeux (1966) report that less than 7% of the references to de Gaulle concern his policy positions or his group affiliations. Almost 45% of those references identify positive or negative personal attributes of the leader; an additional 16% of the content refers to the General's leadership capabilities. Comparing the Eisenhower and de Gaulle images, Converse and Dupeux note:

The general color of the French reactions to de Gaulle were, at an intuitive level, so similar to those gathered in the United States concerning Eisenhower that it was rather simple to establish coding which would lend itself to cross-national comparisons. . . . In both countries evaluations turn much more frequently on the personal image created by the two generals than on more political themes. Although policy positions taken by the leader bulk larger in negative references than in positive responses on both sides, it is true that these stands on issues were rarely evoked in either country (Converse and Dupeux, 1966, p.298) (2).

Similarly Butler and Stokes (1969) report in their analysis of British leader images that references to personal characteristics comprise between 79% and 87% of all positive and negative comments about the Labour or Conservative leaders (Butler and Stokes, 1969, p.222). Other research reports dealing with



images of Kennedy, Nixon, Johnson, Goldwater, and McGovern in the United States (Campbell, 1966b; Wright, 1974; Pomper, 1975) and with images of Trudeau and Stanfield in Canada (Winham and Cunningham, 1969) record a similar pattern of descriptive content.

For the most part, political investigators have presented these cognitive content analyses to round out our picture of the voter's world, and perhaps to reveal clues about the motivation for his behaviour. For predictive and explanatory purposes, however, researchers have focused on the affective content of the image. Consistent with conventional attitude theory, the strength of the voter's positive or negative affect regarding the candidate object is thought to bear the closest relationship to his behavioural intention. Thus assessment of this attitudinal property is usually more central to analyses of voting behaviour than measurement of the voter's beliefs about the candidate.

Measurement of candidate orientation or attitude has typically involved rather simple techniques. In general, the attitude has been measured either by subtracting negative from positive references about a candidate (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954; Stokes, Campbell and Miller, 1959; Campbell, Converse,





Miller and Stokes, 1960; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Winham and Cunningham, 1970) or by eliciting the voter's direct reaction to the leadership candidate on a "feeling thermometer." The usage of more formal models of attitude assessment, such as the Semantic Differential or Fishbein's AB model, are as yet quite restricted (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957; Stricker, 1963; Warr and Knapper, 1968; Fishbein and Coombs, 1974; Reynolds, 1974; Williams et al., 1976).

The importance of the candidate factor to the voting decision has been defined and assessed in a number of quite different ways. On the one hand, candidate importance has been defined in terms of the significance explicitly assigned the factor by the voter. Voters may be asked to identify the most and perhaps the least important of a number of factors to their vote. Alternatively, they may be asked whether changes in their evaluations of particular objects would alter their overall decision.

In studies of voters in the U.S. political system, the importance attributed to the candidate in elections appears to be considerable. Given that the presidential candidate is comparatively independent of his party in that system, and that the voter casts his ballot directly for the candidate in most states, the



salience of the candidate is perhaps understandable. Thus Campbell and his associates (1954) report from their examination of the 1952 election that a large majority of their respondents would not vote for a candidate of their own party if they didn't like or agree with him. Even among "strong" identifiers, over 60% indicated that their decision would alter under such circumstances (Campbell et al., 1954, pp. 94-95).

For more recent American elections, Okeefe, Mendelsohn and Liu (1976) also found that the candidate was an important concern to voters. These researchers asked respondents to indicate which of party, personal candidate attributes or issue concerns was most important to their vote in the 1972 presidential election and later in the 1974 gubernatorial or senatorial elections. In this somewhat stricter test of candidate importance, they found that 28% listed candidate personality attributes as most important in the 1972 election. This proportion increased to 40% for the lower level elections two years later (Okeefe, Mendelsohn and Liu, 1976, p.324).

There is some limited evidence to suggest that this focus of public attention on the leadership candidates is not simply an artifact of American institutions and politics. Data collected by Pammett



and his associates (1975) from voters in the 1974 Canadian General Election indicate that the salience of leaders to voters is apparent within a parliamentary system as well. When given a choice among party, party leaders and local candidates, fully one third of the sample selected the party leaders, despite the fact that leader names did not appear on the ballot. The investigators observe that this proportion indicating leader importance is 9% lower than an earlier estimate based on data collected after the 1968 General Election (Pammett et al., 1975, p.34).

While these findings suggest that leadership figures are highly significant to many voters, and to the electoral outcome, there would seem to be sound methodological and theoretical reasons for seeking other means of assessment. Methodologically, if findings regarding voting turnout reports are relevant here, it is likely that self-reported estimates of importance are contaminated by social desirability response dispositions of the voter and by problems of recall (Clausen, 1968). The precise nature and magnitude of these problems, however, remain unknown.

Perhaps more importantly, the theoretical context within which most researchers approach the voting act conceives of explanation in terms of





identifying the causal roots of proximal psychological elements that bear directly on the behaviour. From this perspective, the basic datum of analysis is the direction and intensity of affect associated with the candidate object. This affective component is thought to have potential causal significance to the extent that it cannot be traced to more general response dispositions of the voter. Not surprisingly, the research process of identifying the causal antecedents of candidate evaluation has been shaped by prevailing theories of attitude formation and information processing.

In political science, much of the theoretical foundation for subsequent investigation of these matters can be traced to the work of Berelson and his associates, and to the published research of investigators at the S.R.C.

In The People's Choice (1944), Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet attempt to develop an explanation for the observed stability of electoral choices in the American presidential elections of the early 1940's. In their account of these phenomena, the individual's social milieu is seen as the central agent of political stability. Specifically, their analysis of panel data for the 1940 U.S. election reveals that social





demographic group characteristics serve to distinguish supporters of one party from those of the other. Consequently, they advance the argument that "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference" (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, p.27).

The processes linking these social characteristics to political preference are only roughly described in this initial work. Two such processes seem to be important here. The first is social in nature and involves environmental pressures or forces that are said to shape or mould the content of one's attitudes toward political objects. These so-called "molecular pressures" of social groups can take a number of different forms, but all have the effect of enhancing the political homogeneity of group members' attitudes. The two-step flow of communication is suggested as one effective element of social influence (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, pp 151-152).

In addition to these external social influences on the individual, Lazarsfeld and his associates suggest that the psychological process of "selective attention" substantially affects the intake of political information or propaganda.



. . .there is also an effect caused by the still-unconscious psychological predispositions of the voter himself. From his many past experiences shared with others in his economic, religious, and community groups, he has a readiness to attend to some things more than others. . . . Voters somehow decide to select out of the passing stream of stimuli those by which they are more inclined to be persuaded. (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, p.82)

A subsequent report by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee develops further the main ideas introduced in The People's Choice. Voting (1954) reports the results of a study of the 1948 American presidential election in Elmira, New York. In its theoretical treatment, the study retains an emphasis on the social and psychological forces contributing to the maintenance of stability in the "standing decision" of the electorate. Thus the researchers give considerable attention to the voter's interpersonal environment. Social processes operating at the primary group level are thought to be largely responsible for the high level of group consensus on campaign matters.

The process of "selective attention" is more fully examined in this volume. In 1948 as in 1940, the investigators observed a systematic tendency on the part of voters to distort their perceptions of campaign stimuli (Berelson et al., 1954, p.230ff). The



implication of this finding for the development of a causal theory of voting is scarcely veiled: the processes of political perception seriously attenuate the impact of the "real" campaign on the voter's decision calculus. As the authors conclude,

. . . the voters manage to use the materials of politics, even of a presidential campaign, for their own psychological protection - for the avoidance of some inconsistencies in their beliefs that otherwise would be manifest (Berelson et al., 1954, p.230).

Extending their treatment of this process, the researchers suggest a principle that relates the phenomenon to more established psychological theory. Thus they infer from their analysis that information is processed in such a manner as to reduce or avoid inconsistency and tension.

. . . perceptual selection must serve a definite psychological function for the individual voter. As in other spheres of activity, so in the political: one function must be to avoid potential stress. . . . The voter tends to oversee or invent what is favorable to himself and to distort or to deny much of what is unfavorable. This must leave him fewer internal conflicts to resolve - with, so to speak, a favorable balance of perception (Berelson et al., 1954, p.230).

In The American Voter (1960), Campbell,







Converse, Miller and Stokes adopt a similar theoretical strategy in that they advance dual psychological and social models of attitude formation. First, they assume that an individual seeks to impose an order or coherence on the constellation of related political objects that he deems to be pertinent to his vote. As a means to this end, the individual transfers or generalizes the cognitive or affective properties of one object to other objects manifestly related to it. "A candidate is the nominee of his party; party and candidate are oriented to the same issues or groups, and so forth" (Campbell et al., 1960, p.59, emphasis in original). The direction of the transfer is held to be a function of relative percept longevity and attitudinal intensity.

The most enduring objects of the political environment are of course the Republican and Democratic Parties, and the relative permanence of our major parties has two main consequences for the dynamics of popular attitude. First, the novel objects of presidential politics may receive a marked coloration by reason of their association with one or the other of the parties. . . . Second, perceptions and feelings that were initially associated with other objects may survive in the image of the parties after the elements from which they arose have left the political environment (Campbell et al., 1960, p.60).



A second method of linkage pertains to the influence of reference groups on the formation of partisan attitudes. Reference groups are secondary groupings in society toward which individuals may feel a psychological association or membership. Voter identifications with such groups are regarded as psychological constructs with potential causal significance.

These groups are thought to exert influence over opinion formation primarily through the transmission of group standards to members - standards that serve as cues in the processing of information incoming from the distant and complex political environment. The impact of the group on the member is thought to vary with the strength of the member's identification, with the clarity of the group's political standards, and with the perceived legitimacy of the group's involvement in politics.

Although this reference group theory is general in the sense that it is intended to account for the impact of any secondary grouping on partisan preference, the authors of The American Voter clearly confer exceptional status on the reference group impact of the political party. From their empirical analysis,



for example, they conclude that

. . . no single datum can tell us more about the attitude and behavior of the individual as presidential elector than his location on a dimension of psychological identification extending between the two great parties (Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 142-143).

While the precise role of party identification is not very carefully explicated in this account, the factor appears to represent a potent affective force providing simple unequivocal and unchanging standards or cues for the evaluation of partisan political objects. The pervasive effect of this factor is reflected in the "partisan coherence" and "internal consistency" that seems to characterize the individual's attitudinal field (Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 132-133).

In large part, efforts to isolate the sources of candidate affect have been guided by these models of information processing. Almost certainly in response to The American Voter findings, investigators have focused on the nature and strength of the relationship between a respondent's prior party dispositions and the images he has formed of the parties' candidates.

Evidence presented in The American Voter suggests that prior party dispositions constitute





consistently important determinants of candidate evaluation. The data provided in this volume reveal a high level of affective consistency between the two attitudes, and a frequent cognitive association as well. The investigators conclude on this point:

In the elections described by our data party identification could not account for all aspects of the image formed by the public of the elements of national politics; but it gives to this image a central partisan coherence. The dimensions of attitude we have considered were bound together by the common influence of identification with party (Campbell et al., 1960, p.132).

Thus the principle of perceptual balance or consistency in attitude formation is applied to political phenomena explicitly in the Berelson et al. research and implicitly in The American Voter.

However, the usefulness of this principle as an explanation of candidate image content is tested directly in a study reported by McGrath and McGrath (1962). These investigators proposed to test the tenability of the "balance" as opposed to the "image" thesis of candidate perception. Thus, if the former is tenable, voters should form their images of the candidates in such a manner that balance or consistency is maintained with pre-existing partisan attitudes.





The perceptual balance principle . . . holds that people prefer one candidate over the other because of his party affiliation, his stand on issues, or any of a variety of essentially personal reasons. Having made a preference judgement, they then perceive the deeds and words of both candidates in selective and distortive manner, so that their chosen candidate has highly desirable attributes and the opponent has undesirable attributes (McGrath and McGrath, 1962, pp. 237-238).

In contrast to this theory, the researchers propose a second theory that locates the locus of causality in the appearance, actions and deeds of the stimulus itself.

The logic of the image thesis is as follows: Candidates and their agents create a certain public image of the man, either by natural expression or by deliberate intent. The electorate responds differentially to the images of the opposing candidates, selecting one and rejecting the other. The candidate who casts the most popular image gets the most votes and wins the election. . . (McGrath and McGrath, 1962, p.237).

To compare these theories, the investigators asked groups of Young Democrats and Young Republicans to describe their images of Nixon and Kennedy. The researchers used as a rating instrument a set of fifty non-evaluative scales. The poles of each scale reflected opposite traits. They hypothesized that the



partisan groups should agree on their descriptions of each candidate if the image theory is operative here. However, the groups should systematically disagree in their perceptions of the candidates if the image is perceiver-determined.

The researchers found that twenty-nine of the traits satisfied the condition of stimulus determination while the remaining twenty-one traits appeared to be perceiver-determined. Although they did not perform a factor analysis of these ratings, they noted that the former group of traits seemed to correspond to Osgood's "activity" dimension of meaning while the latter group of traits appeared to reflect the "potency" dimension (3).

In a subsequent study, Sigel (1964) questioned the appropriateness of the test used by McGrath and McGrath. She suggested that balance considerations should not be expected to affect all aspects of the candidate's image. Rather, balance or consistency factors should affect only those aspects of the image that are regarded by voters as essential attributes of a president. Such aspects would be political, not personal, in nature. Thus she argued that the important vote-related part of the image would be perceiver-determined.



In support of this argument, Sigel presented several different findings from a survey undertaken in Detroit in 1960. First, she reported that both Democrats and Republicans rated their respective preferred candidates high on "job crucial attributes" while the respective opponent suffered by comparison. On personal (nonpolitical) attributes, however, the strain toward partisan congruence was not nearly as apparent. Thus Sigel concluded that candidate perception was at least partially a function of party, and that the distortion pertained particularly to "political" attributes.

Secondly, Sigel noted a marked similarity between the perceived assets of the candidates and those attributes generally ascribed to their respective parties.

The candidates' images (in their political aspects) were almost identical to the images the public customarily has of the candidate's own party . . . . Our data suggest that the different images of the two parties are deeply engraved on the perception of voters and influence their candidate perception more than do the candidates themselves (Sigel, 1964, p.493).

Thirdly, Sigel reported that respondents tended to possess evaluatively consistent images of the candidates. Democrats tended to cite only positive





traits of Kennedy and only negative traits of Nixon, while Republicans exhibited the opposite pattern. Moreover the voter's propensity for asymmetric evaluation varied in the expected direction when identifiers were compared with nonidentifiers: voters who were not identified with either party displayed a greater capacity to attribute both positive and negative traits to either candidate.

Sigel fails to provide an adequate conceptual distinction between "personal" and "political" traits. Nevertheless the major thrust of her argument regarding the roots of evaluative candidate judgements and their importance for behaviour is consistent with that advanced in The American Voter, and finds ample support elsewhere as well. Stokes (1966), for example, provides evidence from national survey data for the same 1960 election that indicates a substantial partisan impact on the images formed of Kennedy despite the salience of the religious factor in that election. Other studies document similar relationships in other American elections (Campbell and Miller, 1958; Shapiro, 1969; Sherrod, 1971; Shulman and Pomper, 1975; Declerq et al., 1976).

The report cited previously by Converse and Dupeux (1966) reveals a marked partisan effect in voter



perceptions of Eisenhower and de Gaulle. These investigators note that Eisenhower's public image prior to his adoption of the Republican party was highly favourable and unfettered by partisan or social group associations (4). Thus the sharply partisan evaluation of the man observed after his Republican nomination suggests to them the potency of the partisan variable in affecting perception.

. . . it seems indisputable that with very few exceptions, partisanship antedated and profoundly modified the reactions to Eisenhower. In other words, had Eisenhower chosen instead the Democratic Party, we may assume the relationship would have rotated in the opposing direction: strong Republicans would have decided they disliked Eisenhower (Converse and Dupeux, 1966, p.325).

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence on this point has been provided by Weisberg and Rusk (1970, 1972). These researchers analysed 1968 and 1970 national survey data concerning evaluations of possible U.S. presidential nominees. Using multi-dimensional scaling, they found that in each election year the respondents' candidate space involved a prominent partisan dimension that usefully distinguished clusters of candidates. A secondary analysis using multiple regression techniques permitted the researchers to



compare the relative effects on candidate ratings of party identification, attitude toward urban unrest and attitude toward Vietnam. For both election years, they concluded that "party is the major determinant of candidate ratings for a large majority of the candidates" (Rusk and Weisberg, 1972, p.103).

Each of the studies discussed to this point has involved a data base drawn from the U.S. system. Although most of the research on this question has been conducted in the American context, available findings from other western political systems would seem to indicate that the relationship between party identification and candidate image exists elsewhere as well. Specifically, supportive evidence for the hypothesis has been documented for Canada in studies of the 1968 General Election (Winham and Cunningham, 1970; Irvine, 1975), for Great Britain in studies of electoral change in the early 1960's (Butler and Stokes, 1969), and for France in a study of de Gaulle's political image during the mid-1950's (Converse and Dupeux, 1966). In each of these studies, the researchers have explicitly acknowledged the theoretical and empirical parallels between their efforts and the published research of their colleagues in the United States. Thus it would appear that the processes linking these two





variables are not unique to the American political system, but maintain their efficacy or salience under widely varying institutional, historical and political conditions.

While most of the candidate-related research has focused on this partisan aspect of candidate image, a second research emphasis in recent years has attempted to identify salient nonpartisan sources of image content and affect. The primary stimulation for this research has derived from the inadequacy of the party disposition factor as an explanation of short-term changes in voting preference, and from the apparent significance of candidate-related factors as sources of these changes. That is, researchers have found that perceived attributes of the candidate tend often to account for deviation from "normal" partisan behaviour.

Stokes (1966) provides perhaps the most elegant account of these processes. He suggests that candidate image develops from the interplay of stimulus properties, communication processes and the perceiver's response dispositions. (Stokes, 1966, p56). While communications factors may obviously affect the voter's awareness of stimulus properties, the explanatory focus of this model is upon the relationship between





candidate attributes and perceiver dispositions toward those attributes. Of course, the candidate's political party affiliation is his most consistently visible political attribute. As we have seen, this attribute tends to elicit strong dispositional responses.

However Stokes suggests that deviant voting behaviour may be the result of even stronger dispositional reactions to other properties of the stimulus. Unlike party affiliation and party identification, these properties and their corresponding perceiver dispositions will vary across elections with the emergence of new candidates and new circumstances. Thus the impact of these nonpartisan dispositions varies in magnitude from election to election, and constitutes the short-term component of the vote.

Stokes' discussion of these short-term elements is not limited to candidate-related attributes. He refers only to a "turnover of objects" as the major source of voting change. Nevertheless, Stokes and other researchers appear to grant empirical pre-eminence to the turnover of leadership candidate objects in their discussion of recent American elections. As Stokes concludes, "it is . . . evident



that the dynamism of popular attitude is peculiarly tied to the emergence of new candidates for the Presidency" (Stokes, 1966, p.27).

Kirkpatrick and associates (1975) adopt a similar composite view of the candidate factor. These investigators dichotomize voter responses to the S.R.C. open-ended questions into two variables corresponding to longer-term party-related concerns and shorter-term references associated more with the candidate. In their analysis of the comparative impact of these variables on American voting over six presidential elections, they found considerable variation in the importance of candidate-related concerns across elections. They concluded, however, that



attitudes grounded in candidate images, irrespective of various candidate differences from year to year have nearly doubled in their explanatory power as measured by the standardized regression coefficient and that attitudes oriented toward the political parties have been cut by more than one-half over six electoral contests. In addition, the greatest decrease in predictive power of party images is from 1968 to 1972, which is also the period characterized by the next highest increase in the predictive capability of candidate images. While this broad incorporation of total party and candidate attitudes enables us to say little about policy at this point, it is obviously a striking finding in support of what others have said about the power of candidate images and, incidently, their increasing short-term character (Kirkpatrick et al., 1975, pp. 50-51).

In attempting to specify the origins of these short-term candidate attitudes, researchers have implicitly partitioned candidate properties into two general classes. On the one hand, they have focused on those properties for which voter dispositions are distinct and readily identifiable. That is, they have focused on the electoral impact of the candidate's key social group and issue associations.

Both Converse (1966) and Stokes (1966), for example, document the impact of the religious variable in the 1960 American presidential election. Kennedy's





Roman Catholic religious affiliation is seen to elicit strong dispositional responses from both Catholic and Protestant voters - a reaction similar in form to that observed with the party identification variable. Indeed, Converse describes the relationship between the party and religious variables as one of potential competition:

If the nonparty group becomes politically salient in any particular election, then loyalties to the nonparty will be in competition with loyalties to a party, where the two are in conflict. Given the notorious lack of attention paid by group members to public debate, even on the more complex issues that directly affect the group, most members most of the time will not have a strong sense of the political relevance of the nonparty group. . . . When, however, circumstances arise that make this nonparty group politically relevant and that are so obvious that no member can fail to see them or to assign them portent, then the nonparty loyalties are going to compete with party loyalties with some visible effect. This is the case in 1960 (Converse, 1966, p.99).

Similarly, a number of researchers have documented the impact of issues on candidate perception. Studies by Benham (1965, pp. 191-192), by Repass (1971), and by Converse, Clausen and Miller (1965) report clear issue dimensions in the 1964 image of Goldwater. His positions on the issues of nuclear



war, social security and civil rights appear to be salient features of the candidate's image for those voters who held strong dispositions on these matters. In their examination of candidate images in the off-year 1970 elections, Rusk and Weisberg (1972) report that social group and issue dimensions help significantly in defining the nature of evaluative differences among possible contenders for the presidency in 1972.

Finally, in a study described previously, Kirkpatrick and his associates (1976) trace the ebb and flow of candidate-related issue concerns over six presidential elections. Among their findings, they note in particular a shift in the strength of the foreign policy and domestic issue components as explanatory factors of the vote. These candidate-related components appear to approach the explanatory power of the party identification variable for the 1972 American presidential election (5).

Although research interest has centred on the electoral impact of party, social group and issue associations of the candidate, researchers have consistently recognised the inability of these variables to account adequately for voting behaviour or even to account adequately for the voter's affective



orientation to the leadership candidate. (Stokes, Campbell and Miller, 1958; Blumler and McQuail, 1968; Shapiro, 1969; Kirkpatrick et al., 1976). That is, most of the attitude component studies cited above acknowledge the explanatory significance of an affective component traceable only to the candidate's personal qualities. Indeed, within the S.R.C. conceptual framework that has been adopted in most of these analyses, the candidate factor as such becomes that residue of attitudinal content and affect associated with the candidate that cannot be traced to a theoretically relevant set of causal roots. Stokes, Campbell and Miller (1958), for example, note in describing the electoral swing between 1948 and 1952 that

the Republican proportion of the two-party vote increased between 1948 and 1952 among strong Republicans, weak Republicans, Independents, weak Democrats, and strong Democrats alike. Clearly neither social characteristics nor fixed party loyalties can account for the general movement toward the Republican standard between these two years. But the movement can be explained quite easily if we accord genuine motivational significance to attitudes towards the candidates and issues, and observe that the popular response to the Republican candidate and to the configuration of issues salient in the campaign was far more favorable to the Republicans in 1952 than in 1948 (Stokes et al., 1958, emphasis added).





The impact of this independent personality component on voting behaviour is, of course, variable in magnitude from election to election. Its effects, however, seldom appear insignificant. Comparisons over time in the U.S. context suggest that the candidate personality component was the most important contributor to the outcome in two elections (1956, 1972) and was second in importance to party identification on three of the other four occasions (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976) (6). Although comparable estimates are not available for other political systems, it is suggested by students of Canadian (Winham and Cunningham, 1969; Pammett et al., 1975) and British voting behaviour (Butler and Stokes, 1969) that the personal qualities of leaders in these systems also have a demonstrable independent impact on their respective voters.

Despite the recognition by researchers that leader personality concerns are significant independent contributors to the voting decision, relatively little attention has been given to the processes leading to the formation of this independent affective component. Clearly the prevailing political models of information processing or attitude formation are inadequate here.



That is, the independence of this component from the identifiable objects of the political landscape would seem to rule out perceptual balance or screening processes as adequate explanations of the content.

Conceptually, Stokes (1966) extends our understanding of this phenomenon simply by subsuming it under the existing S.R.C. theoretical framework. Thus he explains the impact of these "personality factors" in a fashion identical to his treatment of social group and issue affiliations:

The point is simply that "attractive" implies more than something about the candidate himself; it also implies something about the response dispositions of the electorate. Given the dominant values of contemporary American society, Eisenhower was enormously appealing. But we can at least imagine his having done very badly before an electorate less resonant to the military conqueror and less susceptible to the charm of a supremely other-directed personality who nevertheless evoked many of the traditional virtues (Stokes, 1966, pp. 55-56).

In effect, Stokes is suggesting that voters bring to each election situation a set of dispositions pertaining to personal attributes, socio-political group attributes and issue attributes. If electoral stimuli activate any of these dispositions, they may have sufficient strength to deflect the voter's normal



partisan behaviour. In these cases, either the personal response disposition or the corresponding stimulus property is considered to be a source of short-term variation in voting.

By implication, a number of researchers have contributed to the explanatory process by isolating the personal candidate properties about which voters seem to have strong response dispositions. Sigel (1964), for example, asked respondents to indicate the qualities they considered most essential to presidential candidates. She reports that honesty, intelligence and independence in that order were the three most frequently mentioned attributes. In another study, Williams et al. (1976) found that honesty and leadership capabilities were mentioned most frequently by their American sample while Blumler and McQuail (1969) reported that straightforwardness, diligence and sincerity were cited most often by their British respondents. Using personality assessment techniques, Gordon (1972) reports that leader benevolence and humility in that order appear to be most strongly associated with the subject's voting behaviour. Finally, Popkin et al. (1976) argue that competence and trust were the two major dimensions of candidate evaluation in the U.S. presidential election of 1972.





However revealing this approach to the problem may be, its explanatory power is inherently limited. For these personal qualities, unlike socio-political attributes and perhaps even candidates' issue positions, are inferred properties of the stimulus. Their presence or the basis for inferring their presence cannot be taken for granted. Nevertheless little attention has been directed toward investigating the basis for such inferences.

For example, the studies discussed previously by McGrath and McGrath (1962) and by Sigel (1964) seek explicitly to test the relative validity of the "image" as opposed to the "balance" thesis of image content. While the "balance" thesis is rather adequately described with appropriate references in these works, the "image" thesis is presented as a common sense theory or "institutional wisdom". Thus candidate images may be created by the candidates or their agents "either by natural expression or by deliberate intent." (McGrath and McGrath, 1962, p.237) The only recent academic reference cited for this "theory" in either study is The American Voter (1960).

Certainly the authors of The American Voter subscribe in part to an image thesis of candidate perception. "Perceptions are not free-floating



creations of the individual voter or of the small social groupings of which they are shared. They are tied in fundamental ways to the properties of the stimulus objects that are perceived." (Campbell et al., 1960, p.43) However the S.R.C. researchers, in this volume, and indeed in their subsequent work as well, provide little in the way of explication of these "fundamental ways". Stokes (1966) comments, for example, that

Certainly it would be grossly wrong to suppose that the properties of "stimulus objects" are somehow immediately and directly impressed on the electorate's response. The relation of stimulus and response is remarkably complex, involving an interplay of several quite different factors (Stokes, 1966, p.23).

Elsewhere, he suggests possible stimulus properties to which voters may respond:

Other properties have to do with appearance, behavior and personal style - the candidate's smile, the timbre of his voice, his smoothness in dealing with the teleprompter, his willingness to suffer fools gladly - knowledge of which can reach the electorate in numberless ways (Stokes, 1966, p.23).

Rusk and Weisberg (1972) provide a similar cursory treatment of these perceptual processes.



One important qualification must be added to this discussion of the impact of public attitudes on candidate perceptions. The combined impact of party and issues is only moderate at best. Much of the variation in candidate ratings is due to individual response differences among those interviewed which have not been controlled, to unclear public images of some of these figures, and to candidate personality factors which go beyond parties and issues (such as charisma) (Rusk and Weisberg, 1972, p.104).

A study by Sellers (1965) represents one of the few exceptions to this pattern. In his examination of the circumstances surrounding "deviating" elections in U.S. history, Sellers found that the victorious candidates in each case shared a common illustrious background in the military. He noted that they "were 'popular hero' candidates who were widely revered for their military achievements and personal characteristics before entering politics" (Sellers, 1965, p.22).

Research reported by Popkin and his associates (1976) is also relevant here. In discussing the attribution of competence to candidates, these investigators suggest a number of criteria that might form the basis for such an inference. Thus they suggest that incumbent presidents can be evaluated on their





past performance. For newcomers, on the other hand,

public estimates of competence must be based on less substantial criteria, such as how he talks, how he looks, and how he campaigns. And these criteria are susceptible to more varied interpretation than the actual job performance of an incumbent (Popkin et al., 1976, p.794).

While these researchers go no further in providing an explication of such processes, they do at least recognize the need to pursue this line of research. In their conclusion, they ask a number of questions "whose answers are critical to the analysis of candidate strategy and voter behaviour."

To what extent is the competence component of candidate evaluation independent of issue position and what is the nature of the interaction? . . . Clearly there will be an interaction between the positions that a candidate takes on issues and the voter's evaluations of his competence, but equally clearly, this is not all. What else goes into the evaluation of competence? The ability to handle hecklers? Reporters? Looks? Reputation? Success in business? Has this changed with television? How substantial is the "halo" effect, where competence is ascribed to the candidate with acceptable positions and denied to the candidate with unacceptable ones? What is the relation between trust and competence (Popkin et al., 1976, p.804)?



Williams and his colleagues (1976) echo these concerns in concluding their investigation of voter decision making.

. . . it seems that how voters generate attributions pertaining to personal qualifications of candidates may be a question of general import. While voters may agree or disagree with a candidate on a specific issue or set of issues, attributions of personal qualifications collectively may imply a rather basic evaluation of the candidate's likely position or performance across a host of situations. Perhaps voters approach candidate selection from an abstract perspective, making greatest use of such general attributions . . . . How these attributions are generated and how they impact candidate selection remains poorly understood (Williams et al., 1976, p.48).

In summarizing this review of the literature, voting researchers have generally conceived of the voting act as a product of attitudinal forces toward the cluster of relevant political objects. In this regard, it is clear that leadership candidate objects constitute highly relevant stimuli for voters in both presidential and parliamentary political systems.

The question of the candidate's importance to voting behaviour has been addressed from a number of theoretical perspectives. One approach in the



literature defines the candidate contribution relative to the contributions of other proximal political stimuli such as issues, parties and perhaps local candidates.

A more common approach, however, seeks to explain the voting act by accounting for the direction and intensity of affect comprising the voter's proximal attitudes. That is, researchers attempt to identify the general and enduring response dispositions that seem to shape the voter's affective reaction to the stimuli of a particular electoral situation. From this perspective, the candidate is treated as a package of socio-political and personal properties to which voters may respond. Besides the pervasive partisan affiliation of the candidate, researchers have identified a number of social group and issue attributes of candidates that have helped to explain specific electoral decisions.

In such cases, however, the candidate is treated conceptually as a "carrier" of salient political properties. Theoretical interest focuses more appropriately on the property and the origins of the corresponding response disposition than on the candidate as the agent of causation. In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, for example, theoretical interest focuses on the property of Roman Catholicism





and on the strength of the voter's reaction to this property as a source of short-term variation in voting. Kennedy's candidacy is simply the vehicle for activating these forces.

Within this theoretical perspective, then, the candidate factor as such is limited to that residue of affect that cannot be traced to or "explained" by other political response dispositions of the voter.

The treatment of this candidate factor in the literature has been cursory at best. There is implicit in the treatment an assumption that the voter is responding to his perception of the candidate's personal qualities. Certainly, prevailing theories of attitude formation can account for the impact of perceived personal qualities on the total image and indeed on voting behaviour.

However these theories cannot account for the origins of the perceptions themselves. And unlike partisan affiliations, or class and religious associations, the origins of beliefs about the abstract dispositional qualities of a candidate are not usually self-evident nor are they usually a matter of public record. The candidate factor, then, emerges in the literature as a source of short-term variation in voting, the dynamics of which remain unexplored.



### Notes

1. The standard questions developed and used in the major S.R.C. surveys take the following form: "Is there anything in particular that you like/don't like about the Democratic/Republican candidate that might make you want to vote for/against him?"

2. Kessel (1972) suggests that the instrument used here to elicit cognitive image content (see footnote 1) would tend to underestimate the importance of issue attributes. However Williams and his colleagues (1976), using a very different kind of measure, provide evidence that strongly supports the conclusions drawn by Converse and Dupeux.

3. The dimensions of meaning discussed by Osgood and his colleagues (1957) are described below. See p.110.

4. Although Converse and Dupeux (1966) present no data to support this assertion, an examination of early post-war Gallup Polls by Hyman and Sheatsley (1953) clearly supports such a conclusion.

5. These findings are consistent with a growing body of literature published in the past decade documenting the increase in issue voting in recent American elections (cf. Kessel, 1972). Following the conceptual approach proposed by Stokes (1966), however, Kirkpatrick and his associates conceive of the candidate as the agent of change in this case.

6. These estimates of importance are based on the magnitude of beta weights in the multiple regression of vote (represented as a dummy variable) on the various alleged electoral components. Although Declerq and his associates (1976) use a slightly different analytical technique, their estimates of candidate significance are quite similar to those indicated here.



### CHAPTER III

#### Introduction to the Person Perception Literature

From the previous chapter, it should be clear that political scientists do not fully understand the processes by which candidates come to affect voting behaviour. Specifically, we have no adequate explanatory framework within which to account for the varying significance of "personal" candidate attributes to the voting decision.

It is apparent from the literature that strong affective reactions to perceived properties of the candidate may account for the direction of the voter's preference. Researchers have marshalled considerable evidence to the effect that a candidate's socio-political group associations, his issue positions and his personal qualities may serve to activate response dispositions. These response dispositions may have a significant impact on the voter's overall partisan attitude. In their investigation of these matters, political scientists have focused on the development of explanatory frameworks designed to account for the political salience of dispositions associated with particular properties, to account for the impact of prior dispositions on subsequent





information processing, and to account for the dynamics of interaction among competing dispositions.

While such frameworks are certainly relevant to an understanding of candidate image formation and candidate image significance, they leave a number of questions unanswered. Specifically they fail to deal adequately with the processes surrounding the voter's recognition or perception of stimulus properties.

These perceptual processes are not of great theoretical interest when the properties in question are relatively indisputable group associations or matters of public record. For example, we are not ordinarily concerned as researchers with the processes leading to the voter's association of Roman Catholicism with the candidate John Kennedy. The more intriguing questions here concern the voter's assignment of political significance to these associations, or the voter's propensity to ignore or distort such information.

In the perception of dispositional properties, however, the situation is effectively reversed. That is, the perception of abstract personal qualities like sincerity, competence and trustworthiness would seem to leave a great deal of room for perceiver distortion. While there is much evidence of partisan coloration in



the images examined in the literature, not all of the personal content can be explained in this way. How is it, for example, that many liberal Democrats came to see George McGovern as an incompetent candidate for the presidency in 1972 (Popkin et al., 1976). Despite the motivational significance accorded such perceptions in the literature, we appear to have an inadequate conceptual grasp of the processes involved here.

Our understanding of these matters may benefit from the adoption of a different theoretical perspective - one borrowing from the social psychological literature and focusing on the processes of person perception. That is, if voter reactions appear to originate in perceptions of the candidates' personal qualities, it may be useful to investigate the bases for such perceptions. Some recent theoretical and empirical advances in the person perception literature would seem to bear directly on this issue. On the following pages, therefore, we will explore this body of literature to provide a basis for subsequent application to political phenomena.

The term "person perception", as used by Warr and Knapper (1968) refers



to the processes involved in knowing the external and internal states of other people . . . . Person perception not only involves the judgements we make about people as objects (tall, bald, wearing brown shoes, etc.) but is primarily concerned with the impression we form of people as people (impulsive, religious, tired, happy, anxious and so on) (Warr and Knapper, 1968, pp. 2-3).

We might regard the candidate image, then, as a product of such perceptual processes. It is a constellation or configuration of judgements concerning the physical traits, socio-political affiliations and internal states possessed by a candidate object. We are concerned primarily with the ways in which these judgements are made.

Certainly no one theory of systematically deduced principles exists to inform us in these matters. The study of trait attribution processes has proceeded over the past half century along a number of disparate lines. Nevertheless it is possible to distinguish two general approaches to the subject corresponding to two quite different aspects of attribution phenomena.

First, social psychologists have devoted considerable attention to the processes by which perceivers, given only isolated trait information about





a target person, are able to generate a relatively complete and coherent impression of that person. Interest here has centred largely on the identification of relevant trait cues, and on the nature of corresponding inference structures.

Thus a substantial body of published research pertains to the process of impression formation through the use of social stereotypes. Studies using ethnic, religious and racial group associations (Katz and Braly, 1958; Erlich, 1962; Karlins, Coffman and Walters, 1969), social class associations (Davidson, Ressman and Myers, 1962), occupations (Brown, 1962; Ulrich, Hecklich and Roeber, 1966), and conventional social roles (Sarbin, 1954; Warr and Knapper, 1968) have demonstrated consistently that such social cues permit the perceiver to attribute entire complexes of traits to target persons identified with these groups.

Similar attribution patterns have been observed when personality characteristics are used as cue traits. These findings have stimulated the investigation of perceptual inference structures described generally as "implicit personality theories." Briefly, the notion of an implicit theory of personality, as developed by Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) among others, refers to the perceiver's naive



preconception of what traits tend to occur together in the personalities of others. This "theory" of trait associations is thought to provide the perceiver with a basis for inferring the presence of "unobserved" traits in another person from information about traits that he has "observed" in one form or another. Thus given the information that an actor is cunning, a perceiver might use his implicit theory of personality to infer that the actor is intelligent, resourceful, and devious as well. While people may vary in terms of the trait implications comprising their individual personality theories, researchers have noted that a person's chosen inference structure is applied without substantial alteration to judgements of a wide variety of stimulus categories (Koltuv, 1962; Secord and Bersheid, 1963; Passini and Norman, 1966; Norman and Goldberg, 1966; Warr and Knapper, 1968).

It would seem to involve only a short step conceptually to treat the notion of social stereotype as a constituent of one's implicit personality theory. Along these lines, a number of researchers have demonstrated that stereotype inferences exhibit the patterns of inter-relationship that we would expect if group cues were simply another set of character traits (Secord, Bevan and Katz, 1956; Secord, 1959; Thurlow,



1962; Secord and Bersheid, 1963; Tajfel, Sheikh and Gardner, 1964).

Clearly these conceptual and empirical threads are relevant to our understanding of candidate image formation. Indeed, given the limited information usually available about political candidates, and given the apparent organization of image content around selected social and political attributes of the candidate, this model would seem to be highly appropriate to such an understanding.

Nevertheless the approach is not by itself sufficient for our purposes for it fails to address one of the key issues raised in this and the previous chapter. It fails to provide a model of the processes through which cue or stimulus trait information is acquired. It deals solely with the processes that are subsequent to the acquisition of such information. This failing would seem to pose little problem when we are investigating trait inferences from social categorical information such as the sex, ethnicity, religion or party affiliation of the candidate. This information is usually a matter of public record and is rarely in dispute.

As we have seen, however, a problem arises because these social categorical variables do not





adequately account for the image of the candidates. In some cases, the voter appears to be responding to his independent perception of the candidate's personal qualities. Since these qualities are not apparently inferred from known categoric information, and are rarely directly observable, we are led to ask on what basis is their presence inferred?

The attribution approach to person perception may provide a possible answer to this question. Attribution theory represents the second major theoretical emphasis in the person perception literature. In terms of our interests here, it concerns the processes by which a perceiver makes inferences about the internal states of another person through the analysis of his behaviour.

In general, however, attribution theorists approach the phenomena from a different direction. The conceptual foundation of the attribution approach is a motivational assumption concerning man's need or desire to explain, predict and control his environment. In effect, it assumes that man is motivated to seek a common sense understanding of the factors affecting himself and his surroundings. The assumption can be traced most directly to Heider's early work on "phenomenal causality" (1944). In that work, Heider



suggested that perceivers are motivated to make causal assignments from events in order to stabilize or render meaningful changes in their environment.

Subsequent theorists of attribution phenomena have made this a central tenet in their development of the theory. Thus H. H. Kelley points out that attribution theory "describes processes that operate as if the individual were motivated to attain a cognitive mastery of the causal structure of his environment" (Kelley, 1967, p.193, emphasis in original). Similarly, the contributors to a recent volume of readings in attribution research state in their Introduction:

Attribution theory begins with man's motivation to understand the cause and effect relations that underlie and give stable meaning to the shifting surface of events. It assumes the need to have a veridical understanding of these relations (a reality orientation to the world) and a need to predict and apply them (a control orientation) (Jones et al., 1971, p.xi, emphasis in original).

As a major implication of this assumption, the attribution approach conceives of cognitive activity in terms of information seeking. It assumes that social perception is directed toward the acquisition of information sufficient to explain and to predict events in one's surroundings. Understanding is the goal of



this activity (Jones et al., 1971, p.xi). Understanding in this sense entails an appreciation of the causal inter-relationships between events or actions and stable features of the environment. As Heider suggests, these stable features refer to the dispositional properties of the environment, the relatively invariant concepts that serve to explain the occurrence of a specific event.

The causal structure of the environment, both as the scientist describes it, and as the naive person apprehends it, is such that we are usually in contact only with what may be called the offshoots or manifestations of underlying core-processes or core structures. For example, if I find sand on my desk, I shall want to find out the underlying reason for this circumstance. I make this enquiry, not because of idle curiosity, but because only if I refer this relatively insignificant offshoot event to an underlying core event will I attain a stable environment and have the possibility of controlling it. Should I find that the sand comes from a crack in the ceiling and that this crack appeared because of the weakness in one of the walls, then I have reached the layer of underlying conditions which is of vital importance to me. The sand on my desk is merely a symptom, a manifestation that remains ambiguous until it becomes anchored to dispositional properties - cracks and stresses in this case (Heider, 1958, p.80).





Person perception phenomena may be understood within the context of this global explanatory process. That is, it is generally accepted within western cultures that an actor's personal characteristics can and often do provide a sufficient reason for his behaviour. To lay observers, for example, it is comprehensible that a person has acted in a particular manner because he is strong-willed or because he is kind-hearted. These properties are recognized as possible dispositions of actors; they can serve to explain and predict behaviour in much the same way that Heider's cracks and stresses can serve to explain and predict the presence of sand on his desk.

This approach, then, treats the processes of person perception as functionally equivalent to our cognitive analyses of the physical world. Both involve the analysis of information in order to discover the dispositional agents of causation.

In their explication of correspondent inference theory, Jones and Davis propose a rudimentary model to describe how a perceiver might use behavioural data to discover an actor's dispositions (Jones and Davis, 1965). They introduce the term "correspondence" to denote a quality of the perceived relationship between an act and a potential causal attribute of the



actor. It is simply the perceiver's level of certainty that the relationship between the two elements is a causal one - that is, that the inference from act to disposition is valid.

When the perceiver infers personal characteristics as a way of accounting for action, these personal characteristics may vary in the degree to which they correspond with the behavior they are intended to explain. Correspondence refers to the extent that the act and the underlying characteristic or attribute are similarly described by the inference (Jones and Davis, 1965, p.223).

Jones and Davis suggest that the degree of correspondence associated with an inference is related logically to the kind of attribution that is made. In effect, they argue that a correspondent inference will necessarily involve perceiver confidence that the actor is distinguished from his peers on the attribute dimension in question. The relationship between correspondence and confidence of attribution is a relatively straight forward implication of the "certainty" interpretation offered above. The relationship between correspondence and actor distinctiveness, however, is less apparent. Jones and Davis do not make explicit the logic behind this linkage. Presumably, however, behaviour that can be



accounted for by common attributes possessed by most people will not yield correspondent inferences, for the perceiver can never be certain that the actor is not simply conforming to the demand characteristics of the situation (1).

In a sense, then, correspondence has implications for the quality of information about an actor that is conveyed through his behaviour. It follows that conditions that affect the correspondence of an inference will affect the information value of the act.

Jones and Davis (1965) have developed a rather complex general theory to describe the parameters affecting the correspondent inference process. The basis of their model, however, has been captured with parsimony by H. H. Kelley in his discussion of the "discounting principle" of attribution. As he states, "the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes are also present" (Kelley, 1971, p.8, emphasis in original omitted). We might restate the principle in its positive form as follows: a causal inference is strengthened to the extent that other possible causes of the behaviour can be eliminated as implausible. This principle of attribution would seem to describe the





general condition necessary to make correspondent inferences. As Kelley notes, the key to applying this condition lies in specifying the perceiver's criteria for distinguishing plausible from implausible reasons for an action (Kelley, 1971, p.10). Jones and Davis have made their most substantial contribution in this regard.

Following Heider, Jones and Davis (1965) center their account of the causal analysis process around the intention of the actor. On the one hand, intentions are regarded as momentary reflections of the stable underlying character of the actor. That is, stable dispositions give rise to intentions. On the other hand, intentions are related to behaviour through the effects of behaviour. As Jones and Davis point out, our explanation of an act is phrased first in terms of the intended effect of the action and then in terms of the underlying causal disposition. As an initial screening condition, it follows that only the effects of an action that could reasonably have been intended would qualify as plausible reasons for the action.

Jones and Davis suggest a number of principles or assumptions that seem to guide the perceiver in this initial stage of separating intended from unintended



effects. First they suggest that foreknowledge of consequences is a precondition for the assignment of intention. Thus effects that the actor could not reasonably foresee would be treated by the perceiver as unintended.

Secondly the perceiver must make a judgement that the actor is capable of creating the effect in question before linking it causally to a specific intention. For example, my achievement of a perfect archery score without prior practice would probably not be attributed to my intention to do well simply because most people would regard this particular effect as being beyond my capabilities.

Thirdly, Jones and Davis suggest that effects having negative implications for the actor are also regarded as unintended. That is, an actor is assumed to take an action only for its positive consequences, although he may be aware of some concomitant negative side-effects.

Finally the authors assume that effects common to alternative courses of action have no intentional significance. That is, they assume that action is analysed within a situational context that implies a number of action alternatives. Presumably, effects that are common to these alternatives are seen as constants



that will result regardless of his intentional action choice.

In summary, then, Jones and Davis argue that plausible reasons for an action are restricted at this initial stage of the process to intended effects. Person X acted in a particular manner because he wanted to accomplish Y. Intentionality implies jointly that the effect is foreseeable, that it is within the actor's capability to achieve, that it has positive implications for the actor, and that it is not a common feature of other action choices available to the actor. In their basic model, therefore, the strength of the inference to an intention and subsequently to a disposition is contingent on the number of effects that satisfy these conditions of plausibility. A correspondent inference implies a situation where only one plausible reason exists for the action.

Empirical support for this account of the inference process is in most respects persuasive. Clearly the key to correspondence lies in the perceiver's ability to eliminate possible "causes" of behaviour that are inherent in the situation or context. Much of the research pertaining to the theory attempts to test this proposition by examining the variations observed in correspondence when the presence





or efficacy of such situational causes is systematically manipulated. In their initial theoretical proposal, Jones and Davis (1965) cite the findings of an earlier study by Jones, Davis and Gergen (1961) to illustrate this aspect of the theory.

In that study, the investigators exposed subjects to a videotaped job interview situation involving two confederates. During the interview, subjects heard the interviewer describe the personal qualities that would best complement the job in question. For half the subjects, the job interview was for a submariner and the complementary qualities appeared to describe an other-directed person. For the remaining subjects, the job interview was for an astronaut and the complementary qualities appeared to describe an inner-directed person. Half the subjects in each interview situation heard the applicant describe himself in terms consistent with the character demands of the job (as other-directed for the submariner position or as inner-directed for the astronaut position). The other half of the subjects heard the applicant describe himself in terms obviously inconsistent with the character demands of the job. All subjects were then asked to record their impressions of the applicant on 16 bi-polar adjective scales and to



assess their confidence in making these judgements on adjacent confidence scales.

The experimenters found that subjects exposed to the nonconforming applicants - those describing themselves as inner-directed when the job demanded an other-directed person, or as other-directed when the job demanded an inner-directed person - gave the applicant extreme ratings on the subsequent character assessment and did so with confidence. Subjects exposed to the conforming applicant, however, gave him only moderate or neutral ratings on the trait assessment, and expressed little confidence in these judgements.

The investigators offer the interpretation that behaviour that conforms to the apparent role requirements of the situation masks the actor's true characteristics. "On the other hand, one who rejects or ignores pressures to play a defined role is considered to reflect his true disposition and is perceived with confidence (Jones et al., 1961, p.309).

Jones and Davis (1965) reinterpret these findings in terms of correspondent inference theory. They suggest that the conforming in-role behaviour produced a number of culturally desirable consequences besides the substantive effect of telling the truth.



Most people want to avoid embarrassing others by not meeting their expectations, most people want to gain the rewards implicit in approval from authority figures, most people wish to manifest their intelligence by showing that they understand what is required of them, and so each of these effects is a "plausible" reason for in-role behavior in the experiment just described (Jones and Davis, 1965, p.236).

They suggest, however that these factors can be ruled out in the analysis of the deviant out-of-role behaviour. Indeed, there are almost no other desirable consequences of this latter behaviour besides the actor's satisfaction at telling the truth. Thus there is little ambiguity in determining the actor's motivation in this case, and the perceiver is able to make highly correspondent inferences about the character of the nonconformist.

Other researchers report similar findings in replications and variations of this experimental paradigm. Thus Mills and Jellison (1967), Chaikin and Cooper (1973), Trope and Burnstein (1975), and Katz and Burnstein (1975) have each manipulated the congruence between behaviour and social normative expectations. In each replication, findings conformed with predictions from correspondent inference theory.





Messick and Reeder (1972,1974) varied this basic procedure slightly. They predicted as a logical implication of the attribution model that conforming in-role behaviour would be less informative than out-of-role behaviour only when subjects believe that the applicant wants the job. If subjects believe that the applicant wants to avoid the job, correspondent inference theory would lead us to expect a reverse pattern of results. That is, when applicant intention is consistent with out-of-role behaviour (he desires to avoid the job), in-role behaviour should be more informative to subjects.

While a number of design problems confounded the interpretation of their results (Calder, 1974), Messick and Reeder regard their data as supportive of the Jones and Davis framework. They found strong support for the hypothesis when using a self-described introvert as the job applicant, but negative results when the applicant described himself as an extrovert. They attributed the negative findings in the latter case to problems peculiar to the perception of extroverted behaviour.

Enzle, Hansen and Lowe (1975) have proposed a conceptualization of the internal attribution process in terms of the "facilitory" or "inhibitory" nature of



environmental forces. Thus they imply that role expectations constitute environmental forces that may be seen as "facilitory" if the actor conforms to those expectations, or as "inhibitory" if the actor does not conform. Consistent with the Jones and Davis framework, they predicted strong personal attribution when environmental forces are seen as "inhibitory". They suggested, however, that environmental attribution should exceed personal attribution when the former is seen as "facilitory". On this point, they argued that when internal and external causes are both plausible, the latter will tend to be used because it is "observable" while internal causes must be inferred. Using a mixed-motive game situation, the investigators found strong support for both hypotheses.

In almost all of the research discussed to this point, researchers have manipulated the congruence of behaviour with prior normative expectations. Incongruent or out-of-role behaviour is thought to be more informative for the perceiver.

A second approach to the testing of this theory focuses on the predicted implications for internal attribution of varying the strength, efficacy or plausibility of external causes. In the basic correspondent inference model, the actor's perceived



freedom to choose an action is an important precondition for the assignment of internal causality. Presumably, actions for which there is no apparent option may be explained either by the presence of a coercive external force or by the actor's internal disposition. Because both reasons are plausible in this case, the perceiver should be less certain about the presence of the internal attribute. Jones and Davis present little direct evidence to support this implication. The study by Steiner and Field (1960) which they cite in this regard provides only a partial and indirect test.

In that earlier study, subjects formed groups of three to "discuss the desirability of desegregation of public schools" (Steiner and Field, 1960, p.241). In half of the groups, a confederate of the experimenter was explicitly assigned the role of a southern segregationist for the discussion. In the remaining groups, no roles were assigned, but the confederate was seen to espouse the same segregationist point of view. This choice-no choice manipulation was expected to affect the quality of subject inferences regarding the attitude of the confederate toward the issue of segregation. As predicted, subjects in the choice condition involving no role assignment tended to





express more confidence in their attribution of  
prosegregation beliefs to the confederate. Jones and  
Davis suggest that

Since there are so many objectives  
served when the actor in the role  
assignment condition follows his  
assignment, and since most of these  
objectives are quite culturally  
desirable, the perceiver learns very  
little from the actor's compliance  
(Jones and Davis, 1965, p.238).

A subsequent study by Jones and Harris (1967)  
provides a more direct test of this hypothesis. In a  
series of experiments, Jones and Harris attempt to  
explore the relationship posited by correspondent  
inference theory between the actor's perceived freedom  
of choice and the social desirability or prior  
probability associated with the chosen action. The  
correspondence of an inference is thought to vary  
directly with the degree of choice available to the  
actor and inversely with the prior probability of the  
act occurring.

Accordingly the researchers exposed subjects  
to written arguments advocating one side or the other  
of a high consensus issue (Castro's Cuba, segregation).  
Subjects were led to believe either that the writer was  
assigned the position he adopted or that he was  
permitted to choose that position. Jones and Harris



predicted that subjects reading one of the low prior probability arguments (pro-Castro or pro-segregation) would attribute the argument to the underlying attitude of the writer only when the writer was perceived to have a choice in the selection of his position.

In general, the findings from these experiments lend additional empirical support to the basic discounting principle of correspondent inference theory. The manipulation of choice significantly affected the attribution of attitude in the low prior probability conditions. On the other hand, the experiments revealed that this explanation is not by itself sufficient to account for the results.

A striking feature of the results in each experiment was the powerful effect on attribution of the content of opinions expressed. While the subjects do take account of choice and prior probability, as correspondent inference theory proposes, they also give substantial weight to the extrinsic or "face value" meaning of the act itself in their attributions of attitude. This is true even when the act occurs in a no choice context. The question is whether this tendency reflects an irrational bias that is inherent in person perception, or whether it is a function of specific, removable cues in the three procedures (Jones and Harris, 1967, p.22).

A study by Jones, Worshel, Goethals and Grumet



(1971) attempts to throw some light on this question. In effect, these investigators suggest that the "no choice" condition in the above experiments does in fact leave the target person with a range of options in terms of the strength of the essay that he writes. Thus in a forced compliance situation, they predict that a weak argument will be interpreted by subjects as an expression of disagreement with the view, while a strong argument should indicate the actor's agreement with the view. In their test of this hypothesis, the investigators found precisely this effect. Subjects attributed opposite views to the writer of an equivocal essay in the "no choice" condition, and congruent views to the writer of an unequivocal essay.

Subsequent investigations of this phenomenon by Miller (1974, 1976), by Snyder and Jones (1974) and by Worchel, Insko, Andreoli and Drachman (1974) would seem to indicate that behaviour continues to have a disproportionate impact on the attribution of internal dispositions even when the actor is seen to be constrained in his choice of action. However, this impact is seen to diminish as the strength of the external force is increased.

While most of the attribution research has centred on the issues discussed above, there is limited





empirical support for some of the subtler aspects of the Jones and Davis framework. Newston (1974), for example, notes that while correspondence is held to be a function of the number of plausible behavioural effects remaining after analysis, information theory might lead us to predict that it is a function of the number of effects eliminated. In his experimental investigation of these alternate hypotheses, Newston found support for the Jones and Davis interpretation. "While persons can respond to both effects chosen and effects foregone, they apparently prefer to respond to effects chosen" (Newston, 1974, p.495).

Similarly Ajzen and Holmes (1976) observe that almost all of the correspondence research has involved the elimination of external causes as plausible alternates to an internal attribution. They attempt, therefore, to test the correspondence model when the alternate explanations are all internal attributions. Presumably correspondence for any one attribution should vary with the number of alternates regardless of whether they are internal or external. Ajzen and Holmes reported that the predictions from the correspondence model were confirmed in their experimental setting.

From this review of the attribution literature, there would seem to be sufficient empirical



support for the correspondence model to warrant its inclusion within an account of person perception processes. Nevertheless several of its most serious limitations should be acknowledged.

First, the correspondence model vastly oversimplifies the processes of behavioural analysis in that it deals only with the analysis of an isolated act. Clearly most impression formation situations involve the observation of a complex sequence of behaviours. Thus the perceiver would usually have considerably more data from which to draw inferences (2).

Secondly, although the correspondence model focuses on the perceiver's dispositional explanation of behaviour, it provides little basis for predicting the precise nature of that explanation. That is, the model only specifies the general conditions under which a perceiver will gain information about an actor. (3)

As we have seen, the major analytical thrust of the Jones and Davis model is on the linkage (through the analysis of effects) between the act and the actor's intention. The second crucial step in this process - the inference of dispositions from intentions - is largely ignored. The research findings discussed above are somewhat misleading in this respect, in that



they involve only the simplest sorts of attribution situations. Typically, the actor in these experiments provides explicit information about himself (his character traits or his attitude position) and the subject is asked to assess the credibility of these self-attributions. It seems plausible, however, to assume that the inference of a particular intention in a particular situational context may reveal information about more than one attribute of the actor. These inferred attributes, then, would constitute multiple necessary causes of the action (Kelley, 1972).

Thirdly, the lack of specificity in the model leaves open the possibility that the content of information gleaned from an action may be more or less perceiver-determined. That is, perceiver biases may affect the process of identifying or labelling the information gained from the behavioural analysis.

The issue is obviously an important one within the context of the present research. Unfortunately, it has received little systematic attention by attribution theorists. No clear conclusion can be drawn from available evidence.

On the one hand, it appears that balance or consistency factors may affect the content or character of attributions. Jones and Davis (1965), for example,





suggest that the positive or negative relevance of an act for the perceiver may affect the "connotative meaning of attributed dispositions."

Let us assume that we have identical information concerning the moderately high risk-taking tendencies of Adams and Bagby. If Adams does something which, on balance, goes against our interests, the assimilation hypothesis proposes that risk-taking proclivity might be construed as recklessness and irresponsibility. If Bagby does something that supports our interests and benefits us, riskiness might take on connotations of creativeness and inventive autonomy. This would seem to be an expression of Heider's (1958) general balance principle: Bad actions come from bad people and good is achieved by the good (Jones and Davis, 1965, p.239).

Jones and Davis cite the findings of two studies by Kleiner (1960) and by Jones and de Charms (1957) to support this hypothesis. Both studies used confederates to manipulate the rewards given to subjects in group-related tasks. In a manipulation of positive relevance, Kleiner found that the harder the task solved by the confederate for the group, the more positive was the evaluation of him by his fellow group members. In a manipulation of negative relevance, Jones and de Charms found that the confederate's failure in a "common fate" task resulted in an extreme negative evaluation of his competence and dependability by group



members. In contrast, the investigators found that subjects' evaluation of the confederate when his failure had no effect on their rewards ("individual fate" condition) was significantly more moderate.

Along these same lines, Regan, Straus and Fazio (1974) investigated the effects of liking and disliking on the attribution process. In separate experiments, the researchers exposed subjects to a target person performing either a skill-requiring task or a beneficial service. In each experiment, positive and negative affect for the actor was manipulated. From examination of subject analyses of these situations, the investigators found that subjects tended to attribute causation for the behaviour in line with previously developed affect for the actor. Successful accomplishment of a task was attributed to the ability of a liked actor, but to external factors for a disliked actor. Failure in the task reversed these findings. Similarly the beneficial service was attributed to positive internal qualities of a liked actor, but to external factors for either a disliked or an unknown actor. These findings suggest, then, that balance or consistency principles may affect not only the connotative meaning of internal attributions, but the internal-external source of causation as well.



While these findings are suggestive, they are certainly not conclusive nor are they without qualification. Thus Jones and de Charms (1957) in the experiment described above reported that relevance seemed to affect only some of the confederate's perceived attributes. It had no effect, for example, on the perceived likeability and friendliness of the confederate. Chaikin and Cooper (1973), on the other hand, found in another experiment that the hedonic relevance of an act seemed to affect the liking and friendship for an actor, but had no apparent effect on the subjects' respect and admiration for the actor. In yet another experiment, Eisinger and Mills (1968) found that subjects were able to make discriminating evaluative trait assessments even from acts with high negative relevance. These researchers manipulated the perceived discrepancy between subjects' views on a number of issues and the views of an anonymous questionnaire respondent. Subjects were then asked to assess the personal qualities of the respondent. The investigators found that attributional effects of greater issue discrepancy were not uniformly negative. Respondents with extreme opposite views were perceived as less competent than those with moderate opposite views, but they were perceived as being more sincere as







well.

Jones and Davis themselves conclude from their review of the evidence that "the strength of confirmation (of the relevance hypothesis) depends on other conditions, such as the ambiguity of available information about the actor and the consequent leeway for facilitative distortion" (Jones and Davis, 1965, p.246). It would seem reasonable, therefore, to expect that behaviour under some circumstances can convey to the perceiver new and potentially significant information about the actor.

This chapter has sought to develop some basic conceptual tools with which to examine the formation of candidate image. We have proposed that the image be viewed as a constellation of perceived attributes. We have examined several theories of attribution both to isolate the sources of content and to describe the processes by which this content is inferred.

It was suggested that the perceiver's use of stereotypes and his application of an implicit theory of personality can account for the inference of much personal image content. Thus limited social categoric or trait information about an actor can serve as the



basis for additional inferences about his character and, indeed, about his attitudes.

Secondly, it was suggested that attribution theory, and correspondent inference theory in particular, may help to account for the initial acquisition of trait information that is not based on previous inferences. The attribution model proposed by Jones and Davis (1965) describes the process of inference from an instance of the actor's behaviour. Behaviour, then, may constitute a second important source of information about the personal characteristics of the actor.

In the following chapter, we will argue that this theoretical approach helps us to understand the formation of candidate image.

### Notes

1. Although Jones and Davis seem to treat the properties of certainty and distinctiveness of attribution as integral to the correspondence concept, their subsequent usage of the terms suggests that the terms should more appropriately be regarded as implications or reflections of correspondence. Such a conceptual distinction might serve to underline the further implication that certainty and distinctiveness do not necessarily imply that a correspondent inference has been made (certainty and distinctiveness might



derive from an entirely different source), and that certainty and distinctiveness, except as reflections of correspondence, need not always covary.

2. Recent theoretical contributions by Kelley (1967, 1971, 1972) would seem to go some way toward the development of a more general theory of attribution, and one that would address these kinds of phenomena.





## CHAPTER IV

### Person Perception and Candidate Image Formation

The theories and research reviewed in the previous chapter may have relevance for our understanding of leader image phenomena. Specifically, the person perception literature may provide a theoretical context within which to understand the origins of both "perceiver" and "stimulus" aspects of the image.

In this chapter, we will argue that the attribution approach provides a plausible and a useful account of the events. The thrust of this argument can be summarized in a number of propositions.

1. The individual voter seeks information with which to comprehend the causal structure of events in his political environment.
2. His voting decision is based upon this conception of the causal structure.
3. The personalities of the leadership candidates are generally regarded as central elements of the causal structure.
4. In the process of acquiring personality information, the voter usually finds that leader behaviour is of little information value, since that behaviour is usually explicable simply in terms of those



conventional "political" motives expected of role incumbents.

5. As a consequence, personal image content tends to be based on inferences from demographic and group cues.

6. In general, voters will glean useful information from the leader's behaviour when that behaviour cannot be explained adequately in terms of role expectations.

7. When voters are given the opportunity to make correspondent internal attributions from behaviour, this information contributes to the voter's image of the actor.

On the following pages, we will attempt to show that this interpretation of candidate image formation is not inconsistent with available empirical data on the subject. Indeed it should be apparent that it complements and parallels some of the more recent developments in the voting literature.

The attribution framework conceives of the perceiver as a reasonable or rational processor of information. The perceiver is thought to seek information in order to acquire a causal understanding of his environment. As we have seen, this view of the citizen is not common in traditional treatments of mass political behaviour. The perceptual balance thesis, with its emphasis on selective exposure and the impact



of psychological predispositions, has informed most accounts of political perception and voting behaviour.

In recent years, however, some researchers have challenged this traditional view. They have proposed a reconstruction of existing evidence that retains an assumption of voter rationality.

The opening salvo of this challenge can be found in the writing of V. O. Key. In The Responsible Electorate (1966), Key advances the "perverse and unorthodox argument"

that voters are not fools . . . . In American presidential campaigns of recent decades the portrait of the American electorate that develops from the data is not one of an electorate straitjacketed by social determinants or moved by subconscious urges triggered by devilishly skilful propagandists. It is rather one of an electorate moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality (Key, 1966, p.8).

The prodigious volume of subsequent research on this question has not yet produced a consensus. Nevertheless a growing body of theorists appear to recognize the inadequacies of prevailing approaches. This dissatisfaction is aptly expressed by Popkin and his associates (1976) in their review of the "S. R. C. treatment" of issue voting:





In other words, sometimes party and issues will be correlated and sometimes they will not. Apparently . . . when issues correlate with party, people are following the party line - as in the "loyalist" model - and issues do not matter. But now that issues do not correlate, they do matter . . . . A much stronger and clearer statement is needed. If partisan attachments were "affective" and "psychologically predisposing", as the S. R. C. theory of voting originally postulated, orthogonality would not have developed. If orthogonality has developed, the theory is wrong (Popkin et al., 1976, p.793).

The alternate model proposed by these researchers conceives of the voter as a rational actor. "An instrumental voter applies information relevant to the choice between alternatives, i.e., information which bears upon the expected returns to the voter of the election of particular candidates" (Popkin et al., 1976, p.787). Similar economic-rational models have been proposed by Downs (1957), Shapiro (1969), Goldberg (1969, Reynolds (1974), and Macaluso (1975).

If one adopts this view of the voting decision, it becomes necessary to describe those rational processes that account for the observed patterns of voter perception and behaviour. The theory proposed by Jones and Davis (1965) may provide insights into the range of factors affecting perceptions of political leaders.



Specifically the attribution approach may help to explain the dominance of "personal" content in the voter's images of the candidates, but "personal" content that is apparently perceiver-determined. On the one hand, it is clear from the existing literature that voters regard the leader's personal qualities as highly relevant criteria in their decisions. The rationale for this relevance may be instrumental in nature, as Butler and Stokes (1969, p. 221, abridged) and Popkin et al. (1976) suggest; or, as Sears (1968) argues, it may simply be an attempt on the public's part to reduce the complexities of politics to something more familiar and related to personal experience. Regardless of the reason, it is not surprising that voters should strive to analyse the personalities of leadership candidates, and that voter descriptions of candidates should reflect these concerns.

On the other hand, our understanding of naive attribution processes might lead us to suspect that voters would encounter difficulties in completing this personality analysis. That is, we might expect that under ordinary circumstances, the primary data for such an analysis - the behaviour of the leader - would yield little useful information to distinguish him from his peers. For attribution theory suggests that a leader's



behaviour will have information value when such behaviour generates correspondent inferences. In turn, the key to correspondence lies in the perceiver's ability to isolate the leader's true intention for behaving in a particular fashion.

In the political environment, voters would seldom be given an opportunity to infer the leader's true intentions. For the political context is one in which success, defined in terms of mass support, is seen to be highly valued by political actors. In this situation, voters would seldom be in a position to eliminate "political" motives as plausible explanations for the candidate's behaviour. It follows that voters would tend to discount the behaviour as a useful guide to the nature of the candidate. Even when a leader's actions have negative career implications, the voter may be unable to choose between internal and external causes, reasoning that the leader had simply erred in his calculation of the implications.

Is there evidence to suggest that voters do in fact discount the behaviour of political actors under ordinary circumstances? Certainly there has been no direct test of the discounting thesis per se. Nevertheless there would appear to be some indirect or circumstantial support for this interpretation.







First, if as suggested, "political" motives are ubiquitous elements in the analysis of conventional leader actions, we might expect that citizens would regard the intentions of politicians with some skepticism. That is, they should view the political role as disingenuous.

While comparative data on this question are largely unavailable, findings reported by Rotter and Stein (1971) would seem to be relevant here. These researchers asked subjects to rank various occupations in terms of trustworthiness, competence and altruism. They found that the politician role was ranked nineteenth out of twenty occupations (ahead of used car salesmen) on all three dimensions.

Similarly, Blumler and McQuail (1969) asked their sample of British respondents to assess the reliability of promises made by campaigning politicians. Only about 15% of the sample indicated that they believed such policy statements were reliable expressions of future intentions (Blumler and McQuail, 1968, p.106-107). In addition, these researchers noted that their respondents seemed to be preoccupied with the leader qualities of "straightforwardness" and "sincerity". They suggested that this preoccupation was probably a reflection of uneasiness about the motives



of the political leaders (Blumler and McQuail, 1969, p.118).

Secondly, a number of political observers have remarked on the ambiguity and informational uncertainty that seem to surround events in the political arena. Key (1966), for example, argues that these factors reduce the public's ability to choose among candidates. He ascribes the problem in large part to the nature of the stimuli to which the public is exposed. Describing the Kennedy and Nixon presidential campaigns, for example, he notes:

The political world of 1960 had its ambiguities which surely must have become more ambiguous as they seeped through the communications system to take shape in the minds of voters . . . . The television debates made the candidates visible to the viewing public in disputation, yet, despite the extravagant claims of the TV network managers, the "great" debates, tailored to the requisites of show business, did not enable the candidates to develop their positions on the questions confronting the country . . . . The TV screen conveyed not much more than an impression of the relative glibness, composure under fire, capacity in repartee, and quickness of wit of the contenders (Key, 1966, p.112).

Like Key, most political theorists in this area have focused on the deliberate creation of ambiguity by political figures. Among others, Downs



(1957), Shepsle (1972), and Page (1976) have attempted to develop empirical models of electoral competition that involve issue proximity among candidates and candidate equivocation as rational strategies in election situations.

However the point is implicit in many analyses that voter uncertainty extends beyond the candidate's position on controversial issues. It extends as well to those personal and political attributes about which the candidate would prefer to remove all doubt. A number of investigators have remarked, for example, on the relatively weak impact of television exposure on voter impressions of the candidates (Carter, 1962; Key, 1966; Blumler and McQuail, 1969, p.251). It seems that despite the wealth of data that is presented to the contemporary voter via the television screen, despite the best efforts of the candidates to exhibit their leadership qualities to the public, subjective images of the candidates often reflect the same patterns of fuzziness, partisanship, assimilation and contrast that characterize the voter's impression of the issues.

Indirect acknowledgement of this state of affairs is evident in some recent treatments of partisan image content. Specifically, a growing body of theorists would seem to ascribe the apparent group





basis of candidate image content to the difficulty of acquiring reliable personal information from more direct sources. As Popkin and his associates (1976) suggest,

The accumulation of information always involves the expenditure of resources by individuals. These costs are directly affected by the quality of the information available; the problem of assessing the credibility of information; the difficulty of distinguishing between campaign rhetoric and actual position statements; the questions of interpretation of vague positions; the difficulty of assigning responsibility for collective outputs; and simple gaps in the available information. Under such conditions, we would expect voters to employ information cost-saving devices, such as party and ideological labels and demographic characteristics of the candidates, and to be satisfied with incomplete information (Popkin et al., 1976, p.787).

Similarly Jenson (1975) conceives of the party as a general policy guide to the voter.

Party identification is conceptualized here as a cost-saving mechanism in the voter's rational calculations. As long as it is a meaningful and correct cue, it is maintained and used. However, as politics change, adaptation can occur. Thus the implication of this definition is that party identification could be either stable or mutable, depending on the political situation of the time (Jenson, 1975, p.544).



Consistent with this construction, other researchers have noted that party appears to provide a source of candidate image content in the absence of more personalized information. Sigel (1964), for example, concludes from her examination of Nixon and Kennedy images that

Given two nonincumbents about equally well known, and the absence of any large scale immediate crisis, it may well be that the image voters have of candidates is mostly the party's image and only partially the candidate's image (Sigel, 1964, p.493).

Similarly, Weisberg and Rusk (1970) suggest that "party seems to be a useful cue for candidate evaluation when the individual is a new candidate without well-known policy stands. . . ." (Weisberg and Rusk, 1970, p.1182).

Finally, Key observes in The Responsible Electorate (1966) that



Engulfed by a campaign fallout composed chiefly of fluffy and foggy political stimuli, the voter tends to let himself be guided by underlying and durable identifications, group loyalties, and preferences rather than by the meaningless and fuzzy buzz of the transient moment. In every campaign, of course, these underlying identifications and loyalties provide cues for action for many voters, perhaps many more than a majority (Key, 1966, pp. 113-114).

This thesis that group associations might serve as functional surrogates for more individualized information about an actor finds support within the social psychological literature. A number of researchers have found that observers assign a similar functional status to both group-based and target-based information about an actor. It appears that either can serve as a basis for generating behavioural expectancies about an actor.

Thus Jones and Berglas (1976) report that both kinds of information served as prior expectancies in their test of the correspondent inference model. Although these investigators hypothesized that the source of the expectancy (group or individual) would alter the impact of subsequent confirming or discrediting behaviour, they concluded tentatively that information from both sources was treated in





essentially the same manner by subjects.

Similarly, Feldman (1972) and Feldman and Hiltermann (1975) provide evidence that observers use a functional criterion in selecting which of a number of categoric group stereotypes they will use to describe a target person. This functional criterion appears to correspond to the behavioural significance of the categoric cue. Thus they found that group memberships implying long-term behavioural expectancies such as those defined by occupation or social mobility controlled more of the variance in attribution than ascriptive attributes such as race.

Findings reported by Miller (1976) and by Landy and Sigall (1975) provide some limited support for the corollary that group cue information gives way to reliable individual information when the latter is available. Both of these studies manipulated the reliability of behavioural information in the presence or absence of appearance cues. The investigators in both studies found that appearance cues were most important in describing the target when behavioural information was ambiguous. When this information became less ambiguous, the significance of the appearance cue in the description task diminished considerably.

Clearly the evidence presented here is not



sufficient to sustain unequivocally the attribution argument with respect to discounting leader behaviour. Nevertheless available findings do seem to conform with theoretical expectations. We suggest, therefore, that the relevance of the discounting thesis to the political domain warrants additional investigation.

However the attribution framework provides more than a footnote to our understanding of leader image formation. Besides contributing to our understanding of the group basis of image content, the framework suggests in addition the source of content that is independent of these socio-political stereotypes. That is, it suggests the conditions under which we might expect a leader's behaviour to serve as a basis for trait attributions.

In general, the Jones and Davis framework specifies that the information value of such actions will increase to the extent that the actions appear unconstrained by the situations in which they occur. That is, behaviour increases in usefulness as an index to the nature of the actor when that behaviour cannot adequately be explained by the situational context of the action.

Within the realm of political action, therefore, we might expect the information value of



behaviour to increase when "political" considerations can be eliminated as plausible reasons for a candidate's behaviour. We might expect, for example, that voters would assign a higher information value to acts carried out prior to the candidate's entry into politics, acts that have come to the public's attention despite efforts to conceal them, acts with no apparent political significance, or acts of the candidate, apparently freely chosen, that have clear negative political implications for his career. In each of these cases, the perceiver can eliminate "political" motivations as a plausible cause of the events. Of course, it may be that such acts can be ascribed to other external causes. If so, correspondence would remain low. Nevertheless, the opportunity arises in these cases to eliminate an obvious and potent source of uncertainty regarding the cause of the event.

Once again, there is a dearth of evidence in the literature with which to assess the usefulness of this framework in the political context. As discussed in Chapter II, political scientists have for the most part ignored the origins of that image content that cannot be traced to the socio-political dispositions of the perceiver. Indeed it would be a difficult task, retrospectively, to trace the origins of a general





attribution such as sincerity or intelligence to a particular act or series of acts.

Research reported by Mills and Jellison (1967) does provide some limited support for this account of behavioural impact on candidate image. In an experimental situation, subjects read a speech "favoring increasing tractor-trailer fees." They were told that the speaker, a candidate in the primary election for the Missouri legislature, had delivered the speech to an audience comprised either of long haul truck drivers (hostile audience treatment) or of railway workers (sympathetic audience treatment). After reading the speech, the subjects rated the speaker on a number of personality and character dimensions.

The investigators found that subjects exposed to the "hostile audience" treatment rated the speaker as more sincere and honest and as less opportunistic, obliging and cynical than those exposed to the "sympathetic audience" treatment. While these findings reflect only differences in evaluation, and not necessarily differences in correspondence of attribution, they do suggest that the behaviour had an effect on impression formation that is consistent with a prediction from attribution theory.

Perhaps the only situation investigated in the



political literature that approximates any of the attribution scenarios suggested above is the experience of former military heroes in political affairs. As discussed previously, studies by Sellers (1965) and by Converse and Dupeux (1966) have noted the impact of an illustrious military career on the electoral fortunes of a candidate. Both suggest that military prowess seems to be highly transferable to the political domain.

The observed relationship here would seem to be consistent with an attribution account of image formation. The attribution theorist might suggest in this case that it is the highly visible performance of the candidate in a nonpolitical context that is important for image formation. This performance has given the public a fund of behavioural data, explanations of which do not include the confounding motivation of political ambition. Thus the public has been given an apparently rare opportunity to "observe" the candidate's personal qualities. It may be the case that a military performance in times of war is one of the few institutionalized opportunities for a potential candidate to gain this kind of apolitical exposure.

Consistent with this interpretation of the relationship, Converse and Dupeux (1966) note that the



qualities attributed to the victorious Generals they examined pertained less to military contributions and more to the general virtues expected of esteemed public figures:

The modal themes are those of a more generalized worship, that is, vague, affective attraction or the ascription of attributes which ignore civil-military bounds, such as conscientiousness, sincerity and integrity (Converse and Dupeux, 1966, p.304).

In this chapter, we have proposed an account of leader image formation that is drawn from recent advances in person perception research. We have attempted to argue first that this account provides a means of understanding and explaining phenomena hitherto neglected by political scientists. That is, it provides a general framework within which to understand the origins of both "stimulus" and "perceiver" aspects of the image. Secondly we have argued that this account is not inconsistent with recent theoretical advances in the voting literature.

Nevertheless, it should be evident from our discussion in this chapter that, in many cases, we have little empirical basis upon which to assess the





adequacy of the proposal. With reference to the summary propositions set out at the beginning of the chapter, there would appear to be some support for the political rationality of the voting decision (prop. 1 and 2), and for the posited centrality of leadership personality concerns within the voting calculus (prop. 3). In addition, there is considerable evidence associating personal image content with demographic characteristics and socio-political group associations (prop. 5).

The central tenets of the proposal, however, pertaining to the parameters of behavioural analysis (prop. 4, 6 and 7), are almost entirely unexamined within the context of political or voting research. Thus our empirical investigation will focus on these aspects of the proposal.

The research reported in subsequent chapters is designed to provide evidence relevant to two general and related hypotheses.

First, we wish to test the hypothesis that perceivers tend to find uninformative political actions that are consistent with behavioural expectations associated with the political role. Briefly stated, we believe that a candidate's inferred "political" motivation to retain or enhance his electoral support would constitute an omnipresent explanation for his



public actions. As a consequence, we expect that actions having this desirable "political" effect would tend to yield little reliable information to perceivers about the "true" character of the candidate.

Second, we wish to test the hypothesis that candidate actions for which "political" motives can be eliminated as implausible tend to provide more information about the candidate's personal qualities. This second hypothesis is a direct implication of the first. That is, if candidate actions are uninformative because possible "political" motivations confound interpretation, the removal of such motivations from contention should render the actions more informative.

Since we believe it is imperative to control and manipulate the context within which a political action is taken in order to test these hypotheses, we will attempt to examine these hypotheses through a series of experiments. The forms of these experiments are described in the following chapters.



## CHAPTER V

### The Discounting Experiment

The experiment reported in this chapter is designed to test the tenability of our first hypothesis. We suspect that conventional political actions of leaders - those which have as one of their consequences the retention or enhancement of public support for the actor - tend to provide little additional information about the underlying character of the actor. They are largely uninformative, we believe, because the voter is unable to disentangle "political" causes for the action, which are endemic to the role, from "personal" causes, which stem from the actor's unique character. As a consequence, we believe that the voter's analysis of such actions tends to produce few reliable inferences about the distinguishing character of the actor. In effect, the behaviour is discounted as a source of character information.

In this experiment, subjects were presented with a news item describing a target person identified as a candidate for political office. All subjects received the same demographic and social group profile of the target person, and a brief report of his appearance at a public meeting.





For half of the group, however, this information was supplemented with a report of his more partisan behaviour before the assembly. We assumed that the behaviour, a statement supporting views known to be held by the audience, would be viewed by subjects as not inconsistent with political role expectations. We predicted

that subjects given the additional behavioural data would infer no more about the character of the target person than those subjects who were denied this additional information.

As noted above, the hypothesis is based on the premise that subjects will discount, as a source of information about the actor, behaviour that is explicable in terms of role demands. As a check on this interpretation, the experiment was administered simultaneously to a second pool of subjects. The treatment and comparison conditions were identical to those used in the first. For these subjects, however, the target person was identified as the occupant of a nonpolitical role. Since we assumed that the behaviour of this nonpolitical target person would not be explicable in terms of role expectations, we predicted

that subjects given the additional behavioural data would infer more information about the character of the nonpolitical target person than those subjects who were denied this information.



### Subjects

The subjects were 92 male and female students enrolled in 1977 spring intersession courses at Wilfrid Laurier University. Subjects were enrolled in Introductory Math, Introductory or Second year Sociology, or Introductory Religion and Culture classes. Subjects were run in class time, and were assigned randomly to one of four conditions. The number of subjects in each of the conditions ranged from 22 to 24.

### Procedure and Descriptive Materials

After a brief introduction by the host instructor, the experimenter explained the purpose of the study as "an attempt to investigate how a person forms an impression of another person from limited information." Subjects were told that the instructions for completing the study were contained in a booklet that each would be given. Subjects were then handed a multilithed booklet that contained a set of instructions, a news item describing the target person, and a questionnaire. (See Appendix A for a copy of these materials.)

The instructions restated the purpose of the



study and requested that subjects read the accompanying news item several times to form a mental picture of the individual described there. When they had formed as complete a picture as possible from the news item, they were instructed to go on to the questionnaire part of the study where they would be asked to record their impressions on the pairs of scales provided. Use of the semantic differential and of the accompanying "confidence" scales was briefly described. Subjects were then told that they would be asked several background questions about the news item and about themselves.

The three paragraph news item described the recent appearance of a person named Kenneth Butte before the "Provincial Council of the Mine, Mineral and Smelter Workers". Butte was described as a veteran observer of resource development who had recently resigned a "senior position with a private consulting firm advising government and industry . . . ." Half of the subjects read that he had resigned this position to run as "a political candidate in the B.C. riding of Kamloops-Cariboo" (the Political role condition). The remaining subjects read that he had assumed a position on the "National Resource Advisory Council" (the Nonpolitical role condition).





The news item reported the target person's address in either of two ways. For half of the subjects in each role condition, the news item reported that Butte had chosen to speak to the union officials on the topic of industrial safety in the mines, and that he had described recent technological advances in the development of safety equipment. The safety issue was identified as a "major bone of contention" in upcoming labour-management negotiations, but Butte's address did not bear on this contentious part of the safety topic. The information provided here, then, constituted the "Neutral Behaviour" treatment in the experiment.

The remaining subjects in each role condition read in addition that Butte

expressed strong support for labour's argument that safety measures should not be treated as "negotiable fringe benefits". Where human lives are at stake, he said, it is imperative that resource development not outpace our ability to provide safe working conditions. In such cases, he added, it is better to err on the side of caution even at the expense of some growth.

Subjects receiving this additional behavioural information were considered to be in the "Partisan Behaviour" treatment group.



### Response Measures

The news item was followed in the booklet by (a) a 20-item semantic differential pertaining to the personal qualities of the target person; (b) a corresponding "confidence" scale for each of the 20 SD items so that the subject could estimate the confidence that he would place in the accuracy of his SD judgement; (c) two 9-interval scales for the subject to estimate (i) the position on safety in the mines that the target person was attempting to convey to his audience, and (ii) the position on safety in the mines that the target person actually held; (d) a 9-interval scale for the subject to estimate the degree to which the target person's behaviour was felt to be consistent or inconsistent with subject expectations.

### Dependent Variables

The central hypotheses of this experiment concern the impact of additional behavioural data on subjects' impressions of a target person. We have predicted that the provision of additional behavioural data that is consistent with political role expectations will not yield additional information to subjects about the character of a political actor. On the other hand, we have predicted that the same act



will yield additional character information when the actor occupies a role for which there are no relevant behavioural expectations.

To test these hypotheses, it is necessary to develop a measure or set of measures that will permit us to examine differences in the level of information held about the target person. Unlike most other studies of this nature, the present experiment permits few predictions about the specific kinds of information that might be gleaned from the action. While there are several possible inferences that will be compared in the analysis, we prefer to concentrate more directly on a global notion of information that does not require prior assumptions about these matters. Even with this simplification, however, it is apparent that the phrase "information level" may refer to a number of different properties of the image. Since our predictions in this respect are highly tentative, we would argue that it is premature to limit our concerns to a particular image property.

At this exploratory research stage, we propose to employ three different summary indices, each tapping a somewhat different aspect of the information variable. Before describing these indices, however, it may be useful first to describe the basic data from





which they are fashioned.

For two of the three measures, the data are derived from subject ratings of the target person using the semantic differential technique. The semantic differential was selected here as the basic measure of person perception because of its flexibility, the ease with which it could be administered, its amenability to parametric analytical techniques, and its demonstrated adequacy in similar research capacities (Warr and Knapper, 1968; Blumler and McQuail, 1969).

While seven-interval scales are commonly employed in semantic differential applications, a nine-interval format was adopted for this research. Findings reported by Warr and Knapper (1968, pp. 57-58) seemed to indicate that subjects drawn from a university population could easily handle the finer discriminations of judgements involved here. These investigators also suggested that the larger continuum did not seem to affect the general shape of the distribution of ratings.

A 20-item semantic differential for the target person was administered to the subjects after they had finished reading the news item. Fifteen of the twenty items were selected to represent the expected dimensions of semantic space with respect to this



target person. Based on extensive research published by Osgood and his associates (1957), and more recently by Warr and Knapper (1968), we anticipated that subjects would employ three basic dimensions to describe this target person. As a consequence, we attempted to select a set of five scales to represent each of the three dimensions. Scale selection was based partly on previously published research (Warr and Knapper, 1968, p. 76), and partly on the relevancy of each scale to this kind of judgemental task. The scales representing each of the anticipated dimensions are listed below.

Evaluative dimension

good-bad  
sincere-insincere  
humane-ruthless  
trustworthy-untrustworthy  
wise-foolish

Potency dimension

strong-weak  
rugged-delicate  
large-small  
hard-soft  
bold-timid

Activity dimension

fast-slow  
active-passive  
tense-relaxed  
hot-cold  
sharp-dull

The judgements of our subjects on these scales were factor analysed to examine the validity of our assumptions. The ratings were subjected to principal



component factor analysis with unit commonalities. Five factors, accounting for 63% of the common variance, were extracted and rotated using the varimax criterion. The rotated factor matrix is displayed in Table 5.1.

The factor structure revealed by this analysis differs somewhat from that anticipated, but it is nevertheless interpretable. The nature of the first factor, clearly evaluative in tone, is fairly consistent with expectations. Surprisingly, the scale trustworthy-untrustworthy loaded only moderately on this factor (.35), while relaxed-tense loaded quite heavily (.59). No explanation is readily available for this anomaly.

The second factor, labelled Dynamism, would seem to reflect a tendency noted by other researchers for subjects to collapse the Activity and Potency dimensions into one composite dimension in judgements of political leaders (Warr and Knapper, 1968; Blumler and McQuail, 1969).

The remaining three factors would seem to summarize minor variants in meaning on the activity, evaluative and potency themes respectively. Based on their respective scale compositions, they have been labelled Activity, Humaneness, and Toughness factors.

While these SD scales were presented to





Table 5.1. Rotated factor matrix for 15 trait judgements  
of the target person

|                           | I<br>Evaluative<br>factor | II<br>Dynamism<br>factor | III<br>Activity<br>factor | IV<br>Humaneness<br>factor | V<br>Toughness<br>factor | $h^2$ |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|-------|
| Good-bad                  | .80                       | .03                      | .05                       | -.08                       | .04                      | .65   |
| Sincere-insincere         | .68                       | .01                      | -.13                      | -.13                       | .24                      | .56   |
| Wise-foolish              | .66                       | -.41                     | .05                       | -.01                       | -.13                     | .61   |
| Relaxed-tense             | .59                       | -.13                     | .18                       | .01                        | -.01                     | .40   |
| Humane-ruthless           | .49                       | -.04                     | .15                       | -.54                       | .04                      | .56   |
| Active-passive            | .11                       | -.73                     | -.22                      | -.08                       | -.14                     | .62   |
| Strong-weak               | .04                       | -.68                     | .25                       | -.15                       | .02                      | .55   |
| Sharp-dull                | .27                       | -.63                     | .34                       | .22                        | .33                      | .74   |
| Bold-timid                | .26                       | -.56                     | .10                       | -.22                       | .42                      | .62   |
| Hard-soft                 | -.05                      | -.56                     | .05                       | -.13                       | .37                      | .47   |
| Fast-slow                 | -.04                      | -.35                     | .85                       | -.01                       | -.11                     | .86   |
| Hot-cold                  | .15                       | .15                      | .75                       | -.29                       | .16                      | .73   |
| Large-small               | -.17                      | -.31                     | .15                       | -.72                       | -.01                     | .68   |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy | .35                       | -.01                     | .24                       | -.65                       | .09                      | .61   |
| Rugged-delicate           | .06                       | -.13                     | .01                       | -.02                       | .37                      | .79   |
| Eigenvalue                | 3.86                      | 1.94                     | 1.47                      | 1.11                       | 1.06                     |       |
| % of variance             | 25.7%                     | 12.9%                    | 9.8%                      | 7.4%                       | 7.1%                     |       |



subjects in random order and were directionally balanced, no attempt was made to vary across subjects either the order or the direction of scale presentation.

For each of these SD scales, we provided subjects with a 5-interval confidence scale. As noted previously, we instructed subjects to assess the confidence with which they could make each of their semantic differential judgements about the target person.

The subjects' 15 semantic differential ratings of the target serve as the basis for two derived indices of information level. For the first of these measures, the information notion is defined broadly as the meaning assigned to the target person. It is the particular configuration of judgements that are associated with a concept.

The semantic differential technique was developed specifically to measure such qualitative differences in configurations. The subjects' location of the target on a scale continuum between two polar adjectives is thought to reflect both the direction and the intensity of his judgement of the target person on this meaning dimension (Osgood et al., 1957, p. 20). Given a representative sample of dimensions, therefore,



the semantic differential is believed capable of operationalizing our meaning of a concept.

In comparing the meanings of concepts, researchers have generally ascribed metric qualities to the SD scales, and have attempted to quantify the differences in meaning in terms of the differences in ratings.

For present purposes, we propose to test the hypothesis by comparing group mean scores on each of the major orthogonal dimensions of the profile. That is, we will summarize the subjects' profile of the target into five factor scores corresponding to the factors identified in our earlier analysis. A subject's score on a factor will be computed by averaging his rating on the scales loading heaviest on the factor. An arbitrary cut-off loading of .45 was selected for determining scales to be included in a factor score (2).

If the target's partisan behaviour in the treatment conditions of our experiment affected the subjects' impressions of him, we would expect to find significant differences in at least one factor score after comparing treatment and comparison group profiles. Based on our hypotheses, then, we predict no significant differences in factor scores between the





treatment and comparison group profiles of the political target. However, we predict at least one significant difference across factor scores in comparing treatment and comparison group profiles of the nonpolitical target.

It should be apparent that these factor indices of behavioural impact are sensitive to all differences in central tendency between the experimental groups. In much of the attribution literature, however, researchers tend to be more concerned with particular kinds of changes in subjective image. Specifically, they tend to make predictions in terms of information gain about the actor, in terms of the power of dispositional inferences about the actor, and in terms of the level of information held about the actor. Indeed, attribution researchers would seem to share a common interest in the perceiver's level of understanding regarding the dispositional structure of the actor. The theory of correspondent inference, for example, suggests one process through which parts of this structure are revealed to the perceiver.

Clearly, the argument advanced in this thesis concerning the information value of candidate behaviour focuses on this quantitative dimension of the



information variable. Researchers have generally adopted one or both of two different measures as empirical referents of this quality. We propose to employ both measures in this research.

The first of these measures is the extremity or polarity of judgements on the semantic differential. In the original development of the SD technique, polarity of response was thought to reflect how intensely a concept was associated with a term, or how well the term applied to the concept. Jones and Davis appear to extend this thinking somewhat further. First, they seem to equate intensely held associations with distinctive associations. Thus, extremity of judgement for these theorists is held to reflect the distinctiveness of the actor on the trait dimension in question. Second, they seem to assume that increased distinctiveness implies a gain in information about the actor. It is partly in this sense that a correspondent inference is thought to imply information gain. That is, it is a necessary implication of the Jones and Davis model that the actor be distinguished from his peers in terms of the inferred disposition.

If extremity of ratings on the SD reflect the distinctiveness of the image, we predict no differences in mean rating polarity between those treatment and



comparison groups that were exposed to the political target. On the other hand, we predict that, among subjects exposed to the nonpolitical target, the provision of additional behavioural data will lead to more extreme judgements of the target.

The confidence or certainty with which judgements are made is the second dimension of information most commonly measured in studies of attribution phenomena. In tests of the correspondence model, the confidence and extremity of ratings are generally treated as joint measures of correspondence. As Newston (1973) points out, however, there is no reason to assume that the two variables are equivalent measures of information state. Both would seem to describe unique properties of the image and properties that do not necessarily covary.

Nevertheless, our predictions with respect to confidence ratings are similar to those discussed for extremity scores. While we expect no difference in the overall confidence of ratings between the two groups exposed to the political target, we predict for those exposed to the nonpolitical target that the treatment group will exceed the comparison group in overall confidence of attribution.

All of the measures discussed so far are







derived from the ratings on the fifteen semantic differential scales, or from their corresponding confidence ratings. In addition to these measures, however, five different descriptive judgements were included in the battery to provide evidence of the impact of particular aspects of the manipulations. These scales are listed below.

Special Purpose Scales

political-nonpolitical  
partial-impartial  
cautious-adventurous  
committed-uncommitted  
devious-straightforward

The first of these scales was included to check on the role manipulation. We expected that subjects exposed to the political candidate would perceive him as more political than those exposed to the nonpolitical target.

The remaining scales, together with the scale humane-ruthless, were included to test more specific predictions about information gain. Although our major hypotheses are limited to a general notion of information gain, the content of the partisan behaviour in this experiment suggested that attributions of caution, committedness, humaneness, partiality, and straightforwardness might be specifically affected. We suspected that the additional behavioural data might



lead to stronger inferences of these qualities when the target was not seen to be a politician. We suspected that there would be no differences in the attribution of these traits when the target was a politician.

## Results

### A. Neutral-Partisan Behaviour Manipulation.

One of the two manipulations in the experiment was the amount of raw behavioural data that was made available to subjects. Subjects in the partisan behaviour condition were given explicit behavioural data concerning the target's support of union safety demands. We expected that this data would provide additional information about the motives or intentions of the actor. While we recognized that these intentional inferences might vary across subjects, we suspected that all subjects in this condition would glean from the behaviour the impression that Butte wanted to appear sympathetic to the union demands.

As a check on the success of the manipulation, therefore, we asked all subjects to estimate the impression on this issue that Butte wanted to convey to his audience. We provided a 9-interval scale to record this estimate (1=No sympathy for Union demands;



9=Strong sympathy for Union demands).

We suspected that subjects in the partisan behaviour group would rate Butte significantly stronger in overt sympathy. The differences between the neutral and partisan behaviour groups were in the predicted direction on this variable, but the observed differences were not significant ( $\bar{X}$ -neutral=7.3;  $\bar{X}$ -partisan=7.6;  $t(df=89)=-.62$ ,  $p.<.26$ ).

The magnitude of the "neutral" group's rating on this variable (7.3) suggests that more information was conveyed about the target person's intentions in this condition than was originally anticipated. It may be that Butte's agreement to address the union gathering, his "choice" of safety as the topic of his speech, and his description of safety advancements were construed by subjects as evidence of his tacit support of union safety demands.

While we cannot reject a chance interpretation of these observed differences, we note that other comparisons between the neutral and partisan behaviour groups suggest that the behaviour manipulation had a considerable impact on perceptions of the target. Specifically, the neutral and partisan behaviour groups differed significantly on four of the fifteen ratings that they were asked to make (3).





It would seem reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the partisan behaviour served to alter impressions of the target, but that it may not have altered impressions of the target's primary intention for addressing the union group.

#### B. Political-Nonpolitical Role Manipulation.

As a second manipulation in the experiment, we endeavoured to alter the perceived role context of the target. We attempted to create a political role context for half of the subjects and a nonpolitical role context for the remainder.

To assess the success of this manipulation, we asked the subjects to rate the target person on a political-nonpolitical dimension (1=Political, 9=Nonpolitical). We expected that subjects exposed to Butte as a "political candidate" would rate him as significantly more political than those exposed to Butte as a member of the "National Resource Advisory Board". While differences between the political and the nonpolitical role groups were in the expected direction, these differences were not significant ( $\bar{X}$ -political=3.0;  $\bar{X}$ -nonpolitical=3.3;  $t(df=90)=.62$ ,  $p.<.25$ ).

The nature of the problem here is somewhat



difficult to isolate. The problem may be that subjects do not differentiate between such political and advisory roles. It may be that both are seen to involve the same kinds of political norms, motives, and constraints. If this is the case, the success of the manipulation must be regarded as doubtful.

However, we asked subjects also to estimate the degree to which Butte's actions were consistent with subject's expectations, "given Butte's position, and given the nature of his audience". It would appear that group differences in response to this question are consistent with the assumption of a successful role manipulation, and incidentally, with the assumption of a successful behaviour manipulation as well. The mean responses, by role and behaviour conditions, are displayed in Table 5.2.

From this table, it is apparent, first, that the Political Role group perceived Butte's behaviour as significantly more consistent with their expectations than did the Nonpolitical Role group. Assuming that public performances are more closely associated with political actors than they are with government advisors, this finding is consistent with our expectations.

In addition, the pattern of differences within



Table 5.2 Perceived consistency of target person's attitude with subject expectations, by role and nature of behaviour

|                    |           | <u>Political Role</u>             | <u>Nonpolitical Role</u>        |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Neutral Behaviour  | $\bar{X}$ | 3.21                              | 3.55                            |
|                    | SD        | 2.19                              | 2.39                            |
|                    |           | $t(df=45)=.71$<br>$p<.48, N.S.$   | $t(df=41)=.28$<br>$p<.78, N.S.$ |
| Partisan Behaviour | $\bar{X}$ | 2.78                              | 3.74                            |
|                    | SD        | 1.93                              | 2.00                            |
| Both Behaviours    | $\bar{X}$ | 3.01                              | 3.65                            |
|                    | SD        | 2.06                              | 2.19                            |
|                    |           | $t(df=86)=6.69$<br>$p<.001, SIG.$ |                                 |

Scores may range between 1-9 where the lower score indicates greater consistency with expectations.

All significance tests report two-tailed probabilities.





the role groups is also consistent. Assuming that partisan behaviour is much more closely associated with the political role, and is not usually associated with the administrative role, we would expect that the additional partisan behaviour would lead to a perception of greater consistency when the actor is a politician, and to a perception of less consistency when the actor is an administrator. Although the differences between behaviour groups are not significant, these differences are in the predicted directions.

While the findings noted here do not warrant unequivocal conclusions with respect to the manipulations, they would seem to be sufficiently supportive to permit us to proceed to the major hypotheses.

### C. Hypotheses.

The first hypothesis in this experiment pertained to qualitative group differences in the profiles of the target person. We predicted no significant differences between the profiles of the two Political Role groups on any of the five factors, but at least one significant difference when comparing the factor profiles of the two Nonpolitical Role groups.



Table 5.3 displays the summary data relevant to these predictions. The data provide relatively strong support for our hypotheses. A comparison of the group means within the Political Role condition reveals no significant differences across the five factors. However, the Neutral and Partisan Behaviour groups within the Nonpolitical Role condition differed significantly in their judgements for two of the factors. It appears that subjects exposed to the partisan behaviour of the nonpolitical actor gave him significantly more positive ratings and perceived him as being significantly more active than did subjects exposed only to his neutral behaviour.

The remaining hypotheses involved more specific predictions about the nature of differences between the profiles of the Neutral and Partisan Behaviour groups. The first of these pertained to rating polarity. We predicted that the partisan behaviour would lead to significantly greater polarity in rating only in the Nonpolitical Role condition.

The results of this analysis, displayed in Table 5.4, are less than conclusive. In neither the Political nor the Nonpolitical Role conditions do the differences in overall mean polarity approach significance.



Table 5.3. Group mean profiles of the target person,  
by condition and factor

|                      |                 | Political<br>Role    |                                  |                       | Nonpolitical<br>Role |                                    |                       |
|----------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                      |                 | Neutral<br>Behaviour | Significance                     | Partisan<br>Behaviour | Neutral<br>Behaviour | Significance                       | Partisan<br>Behaviour |
| Evaluative<br>Factor | $\bar{X}$<br>SD | 3.78<br>1.43         | $t(df=45)=1.34$<br>$p<.19, N.S.$ | 3.25<br>1.27          | 3.55<br>.96          | $t(df=43)=2.97$<br>$p<.005, SIG.$  | 2.80<br>.70           |
| Dynamism<br>Factor   | $\bar{X}$<br>SD | 3.25<br>1.29         | $t(df=45)=-.28$<br>$p<.78, N.S.$ | 3.35<br>1.10          | 3.39<br>1.24         | $t(df=43)=-.08$<br>$p<.94, N.S.$   | 3.42<br>.97           |
| Activity<br>Factor   | $\bar{X}$<br>SD | 4.33<br>1.56         | $t(df=44)=.56$<br>$p<.62, N.S.$  | 4.13<br>1.02          | 4.91<br>1.72         | $t(df=35.1)=2.06$<br>$p<.05, SIG.$ | 4.02<br>1.06          |
| Humaneness<br>Factor | $\bar{X}$<br>SD | 4.02<br>1.49         | $t(df=45)=1.61$<br>$p<.11, N.S.$ | 3.41<br>1.07          | 3.52<br>3.30         | $t(df=43)=.64$<br>$p<.53, N.S.$    | 3.30<br>1.07          |
| Toughness<br>Factor  | $\bar{X}$<br>SD | 3.96<br>1.60         | $t(df=45)=-.35$<br>$p<.73, N.S.$ | 4.11<br>1.35          | 3.61<br>3.59         | $t(df=43)=.08$<br>$p<.94, N.S.$    | 3.59<br>1.15          |

All scores have a range 1-9, where the lower score indicates more positive evaluation, greater perceived dynamism, activity, humaneness or toughness.

All significance tests report two-tailed probabilities.





Table 5.4. Mean Polarity scores in group judgements of the target person, by condition, by factor and overall

|                     |           | Political Role    |                   |                    | Nonpolitical Role |                  |                    |
|---------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
|                     |           | Neutral Behaviour | Significance      | Partisan Behaviour | Neutral Behaviour | Significance     | Partisan Behaviour |
| 15 Scale Profile    | $\bar{X}$ | 2.76              | $t(df=37.3)=-.11$ | 2.73               | 2.77              | $t(df=43)=-.28$  | 2.82               |
|                     | SD        | 1.14              | $p<.45,N.S.$      | .67                | .73               | $p<.40,N.S.$     | .68                |
| Evaluative Polarity | $\bar{X}$ | 2.77              | $t(df=45)=-1.42$  | 3.18               | 2.82              | $t(df=43)=-2.76$ | 3.41               |
|                     | SD        | 1.13              | $p<.08,N.S.$      | .84                | .70               | $p<.008,SIG.$    | .73                |
| Dynamism Polarity   | $\bar{X}$ | 2.95              | $t(df=45)=.43$    | 2.81               | 3.06              | $t(df=43)=.90$   | 2.83               |
|                     | SD        | 1.25              | $p<.17,N.S.$      | .96                | .88               | $p<.13,N.S.$     | .86                |
| Activity Polarity   | $\bar{X}$ | 2.59              | $t(df=44)=1.67$   | 2.04               | 2.27              | $t(df=42)=.75$   | 2.02               |
|                     | SD        | 1.29              | $p<.06,N.S.$      | .87                | 1.16              | $p<.23,N.S.$     | 1.04               |
| Humaneness Polarity | $\bar{X}$ | 2.67              | $t(df=39.9)=-.74$ | 2.88               | 2.72              | $t(df=43)=-1.01$ | 2.99               |
|                     | SD        | 1.16              | $p<.24,N.S.$      | .76                | .97               | $p<.16,N.S.$     | .73                |
| Toughness Polarity  | $\bar{X}$ | 2.83              | $t(df=45)=1.32$   | 2.41               | 2.75              | $t(df=43)=.26$   | 2.67               |
|                     | SD        | 1.15              | $p<.09,N.S.$      | 1.03               | .89               | $p<.40,N.S.$     | 1.06               |

All scores may range between 1-5, where the higher score in all cases indicates greater mean polarity of judgement.

All significance tests report one-tailed probabilities.



However, a closer examination of polarity differences for each of the five factors provides some weak support for the hypothesis. Within the Nonpolitical Role condition, the mean difference in polarity among scales loading heavily on the evaluative factor was highly significant. None of the factor differences in the Political Role condition exceeded the critical .05 level of significance. Indeed, two factors in this condition approached one-tailed significance in the opposite direction (Activity factor,  $p < .06$ ; Toughness factor,  $p < .10$ ).

Table 5.5 displays the summary data regarding the confidence of ratings by the various groups. It would appear that the results of this test are also inconclusive. On the one hand, none of the comparisons reached the critical level of significance (.05) set for these hypotheses. We had predicted that the comparisons in the Nonpolitical Role condition would do so.

On the other hand, three of the five factor differences in the Nonpolitical Role condition were significant beyond the .10 level, and the overall difference in mean confidence level for that condition approached the critical level of significance ( $p < .06$ ). Only one factor difference in the Political Role



Table 5.5. Mean Confidence scores in group judgements of the target person, by condition, by factor, and overall

|                       |           | Political Role    |                   |                    | Nonpolitical Role |                    |                    |
|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                       |           | Neutral Behaviour | Significance      | Partisan Behaviour | Neutral Behaviour | Significance       | Partisan Behaviour |
| 15 Scale Profile      | $\bar{X}$ | 3.69              | $t(df=36.5)=-.62$ | 3.83               | 3.30              | $t(df=34.8)=-1.55$ | 3.63               |
|                       | SD        | .92               | $p<.27,N.S.$      | .52                | .87               | $p<.06,N.S.$       | .54                |
| Evaluative Confidence | $\bar{X}$ | 3.68              | $t(df=40)=-.88$   | 3.88               | 3.50              | $t(df=32.5)=-1.46$ | 3.81               |
|                       | SD        | .97               | $p<.19,N.S.$      | .61                | .92               | $p<.08,N.S.$       | .51                |
| Dynamism Confidence   | $\bar{X}$ | 3.72              | $t(df=44)=-1.29$  | 4.01               | 3.35              | $t(df=42)=-1.33$   | 3.65               |
|                       | SD        | .90               | $p<.10,N.S.$      | .63                | .89               | $p<.09,N.S.$       | .59                |
| Activity Confidence   | $\bar{X}$ | 3.70              | $t(df=44)=.61$    | 3.52               | 3.07              | $t(df=41)=-.60$    | 3.24               |
|                       | SD        | .95               | $p<.28,N.S.$      | .99                | .97               | $p<.27,N.S.$       | .87                |
| Humaneness Confidence | $\bar{X}$ | 3.57              | $t(df=31.1)=.97$  | 3.80               | 3.15              | $t(df=41)=-1.46$   | 3.54               |
|                       | SD        | 1.00              | $p<.17,N.S.$      | .47                | .95               | $p<.07,N.S.$       | .78                |
| Toughness Confidence  | $\bar{X}$ | 3.52              | $t(df=44)=-1.51$  | 3.89               | 3.48              | $t(df=41)=-.88$    | 3.71               |
|                       | SD        | .89               | $p<.07,N.S.$      | .77                | .97               | $p<.19,N.S.$       | .78                |

All scores have a range 1-5, where the higher score indicates greater confidence in trait judgement.

All significance tests report one-tailed probabilities.





condition met these less rigorous standards of statistical reliability.

Although these three kinds of comparison constitute the major test of the general hypothesis, the nature of the partisan behaviour described in this experiment might lead us to predict differences in the attribution of some specific traits. In particular, the traits of caution, committedness, humaneness, partiality and straightforwardness might be seen as direct dispositional implications of the partisan behaviour. As before, our prediction is that the partisan behaviour will permit stronger inferences regarding the presence of these traits only in the Nonpolitical Role condition.

Table 5.6 displays the mean ratings for the four groups on these five trait dimensions. As expected, subjects in the Nonpolitical Role condition who were exposed to the partisan behaviour of the actor saw the actor as more cautious, committed, humane, partial and straightforward than did those denied this information. Two of these differences, pertaining to the traits humaneness and straightforwardness, were statistically significant.

Contrary to expectations, however, group differences within the Political Role condition follow



Table 5.6. Mean group ratings of the target person for five selected traits

|                          |           | <u>Neutral Behaviour</u> |                 | <u>Partisam Behaviour</u> |
|--------------------------|-----------|--------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| <u>Nonpolitical Role</u> |           |                          |                 |                           |
| Adventurous-cautious     | $\bar{X}$ | 4.86                     | $t(df=43)=-.37$ | 5.13                      |
|                          | SD        | 2.61                     | $p<.52,N.S.$    | 2.26                      |
| Committed-uncommitted    | $\bar{X}$ | 2.91                     | $t(df=42)=1.12$ | 2.36                      |
|                          | SD        | 1.77                     | $p<.27,N.S.$    | 1.43                      |
| Humane-ruthless          | $\bar{X}$ | 3.27                     | $t(df=43)=1.98$ | 2.30                      |
|                          | SD        | 1.52                     | $p<.05,SIG.$    | 1.74                      |
| Partial-impartial        | $\bar{X}$ | 3.73                     | $t(df=43)=.93$  | 3.17                      |
|                          | SD        | 2.25                     | $p<.36,N.S.$    | 1.70                      |
| Straightforward-devious  | $\bar{X}$ | 3.59                     | $t(df=43)=2.37$ | 2.43                      |
|                          | SD        | 1.87                     | $p<.02,SIG.$    | 1.38                      |
| <u>Political Role</u>    |           |                          |                 |                           |
| Adventurous-cautious     | $\bar{X}$ | 5.04                     | $t(df=45)=-.57$ | 5.43                      |
|                          | SD        | 2.40                     | $p<.57,N.S.$    | 2.31                      |
| Committed-uncommitted    | $\bar{X}$ | 3.29                     | $t(df=45)=.90$  | 2.78                      |
|                          | SD        | 1.94                     | $p<.37,N.S.$    | 1.93                      |
| Humane-ruthless          | $\bar{X}$ | 3.95                     | $t(df=43)=2.25$ | 2.70                      |
|                          | SD        | 1.99                     | $p<.03,SIG.$    | 1.77                      |
| Partial-impartial        | $\bar{X}$ | 3.42                     | $t(df=45)=-.27$ | 3.43                      |
|                          | SD        | 2.12                     | $p<.98,N.S.$    | 2.45                      |
| Straightforward-devious  | $\bar{X}$ | 4.38                     | $t(df=45)=2.22$ | 3.00                      |
|                          | SD        | 2.28                     | $p<.03,SIG.$    | 1.93                      |

Scores may range between 1-9 where, for each scale, the lower score implies the first adjective in each pair.

Significance tests report two-tailed probabilities.



almost an identical pattern. The only notable deviation from the nonpolitical pattern occurs in judgements of partiality. While the differences were not statistically reliable ( $p < .17$ , one-tailed), subjects exposed to the partisan behaviour of the nonpolitical actor seemed to perceive him as somewhat more partial than did subjects exposed only to the nonpolitician's neutral behaviour. When the actor was identified as a politician, however, the partisan behaviour manipulation appeared to have virtually no impact on the attribution of partiality.

The findings of this research suggest a number of tentative conclusions. First, it is clear that the partisan behaviour was not entirely discounted as a source of information about the character of the political actor. There were significant differences between the Partisan and Neutral Behaviour groups within the Political Role condition on judgements of the actor's sincerity, his humaneness and his straightforwardness. All of these differences appear to be explicable in terms of the nature or content of the partisan behaviour.

However, it seems equally clear that the partisan behaviour was less useful to subjects in the Political Role condition than it was to subjects in the





Nonpolitical Role condition. All differences significant in the former were significant in the latter as well. But the Nonpolitical Role groups also differed from each other in terms of their overall evaluation of the actor. Moreover, the partisan behaviour of the nonpolitical target led to significantly more extreme normative judgements of the actor, and led to differences in the confidence of ratings that approached significance.

Our understanding of the inference processes which account for these particular differences is less than complete. We had speculated that the primary information value of the partisan behaviour would be reflected in the attribution of five specific traits. While this reasoning proved correct in large part, it does not really help us to understand extant differences in perception between the Political and Nonpolitical Role groups. That is, the behaviour appears to have had equal information value regarding these traits in both role conditions. Thus we cannot trace the differences in the impact of the partisan behaviour across role conditions to differences in the attribution of these five behaviour-relevant traits.

An examination of the fifteen individual trait judgements reveals only two differences in the



Nonpolitical Role condition that were not matched in the Political Role condition. These differences in substantive judgement were on the traits wise-foolish ( $\bar{X}$ -neutral/nonpolitical=3.45;

$\bar{X}$ -partisan/nonpolitical=2.52;  $t(df=43)=2.67$ ,  $p.<.01$ ).

and hot-cold ( $\bar{X}$ -neutral/nonpolitical=5.18;

$\bar{X}$ -partisan/nonpolitical=4.09;  $t(df=42)=2.57$ ,  $p.<.01$ )

#### D. Additional Findings.

A central assumption behind the hypotheses in this experiment concerns the public's perception of the political role. We have suggested that voters would tend to have difficulty isolating the "true" motive for a leader's behaviour primarily because the "political" motive - the desire to retain or enhance public support - would be seen as a strong omnipresent and plausible ulterior reason for most political actions. That is, we have assumed that the "political" motive is commonly associated with the political role.

In discussing this assumption in the previous chapter, we cited a number of incidental findings in the literature that seemed to point to such a conclusion. While we did not attempt to test the assumption directly in the present research, several features of our data would seem to bear indirectly on



the issue.

Specifically, we might expect to find differences in the perceptions of the political and nonpolitical actors for traits pertaining to the ingenuousness of the actor. That is, if subjects associate a norm of opportunism with the political role, we might expect them to see the political actor as being less ingenuous than a corresponding nonpolitical actor.

In the profile we used for this research, the trait dimensions sincere-insincere, trustworthy-untrustworthy and straightforward-devious seem closest in reflecting this quality. The summary data for the relevant groups are presented in Table 5.7.

A comparison of group means reveals that differences between the Political and Nonpolitical Role groups are in the predicted direction for judgements of all three traits, and that the differences are significant for the trait dimension, straightforward-devious. These results, then, provide some tentative support for the validity of our underlying assumption.

In an attempt to examine the same implication in a more realistic setting, we asked subjects to





Table 5.7 Mean ratings of the target leader for  
3 "political" traits, by role condition

|                  |           | <u>Political Role</u> | <u>Nonpolitical Role</u> |      |
|------------------|-----------|-----------------------|--------------------------|------|
| Sincere-         | $\bar{X}$ | 3.51                  | $t(df=90)=1.41$          | 3.04 |
| Insincere        | SD        | 1.76                  | $p<.08, N.S.$            | 1.38 |
| Trustworthy-     | $\bar{X}$ | 3.74                  | $t(df=90)=.41$           | 3.60 |
| Untrustworthy    | SD        | 1.88                  | $p<.34, N.S.$            | 1.50 |
| Straightforward- | $\bar{X}$ | 3.70                  | $t(df=90)=1.70$          | 3.00 |
| Devious          | SD        | 2.21                  | $p<.04, SIG.$            | 1.71 |

All scores may range between 1-9, where the lower score indicates respectively greater sincerity, trustworthiness and straightforwardness.

All significance tests report two-tailed probabilities.



complete a ten-item semantic differential for a number of political and nonpolitical Canadian public figures. In doing so, we expected to find systematic differences in subjects' impressions of political and nonpolitical actors. Consistent with our assumption about political role perceptions, we expected to find that political actors are perceived as comparatively less sincere and less trustworthy than nonpoliticians (4).

This second part of the study was prefaced as follows:

Very often, our exposure to another person is limited primarily to one role context (for example, as teacher, writer, politician or athlete). As a consequence, it is sometimes difficult to determine the true or core nature of the person - to separate the man from the role he is occupying.

In this part of the study, we will name a number of public figures in Canada. For each individual, we will ask you to describe as best you can the true nature of the person.

Subjects were asked to employ an abbreviated semantic differential, comprised of ten items, to describe the individuals listed below.

Bobby Orr as a Person  
 Bobby Hull as a Person  
 Pierre Berton as a Person  
 Pierre Trudeau as a Person  
 Joe Clark as a Person  
 Ed Broadbent as a Person



These individuals were selected for their visibility, and for the clarity of their membership or nonmembership in the political role group.

Because there were only six public figures involved in this test, we saw no need to compute summary role scores on these trait judgements. Rather, it seemed feasible to analyse the data by comparing directly the judgements of each political leader with those of each nonpolitical leader.

In Table 5.8, the cell entries represent the average signed differential in rating between the political and nonpolitical figures indicated. As arbitrarily computed, a positive score reflects the relative advantage of the nonpolitical figure over the political figure for the two positive qualities. A negative score, of course, would reflect the relative advantage of the political figure in the same way.

The data in the table conform to a pattern that is remarkably consistent with our assumption. All eighteen differences in rating between political and nonpolitical figures are in the predicted direction, and fully two-thirds of these differences meet at least our minimum standards of statistical reliability. That is, the subjects in this experiment consistently attributed greater sincerity and trustworthiness to the





Table 5.8 Average signed differences between judgements of political and nonpolitical public figures for the traits sincere-insincere and trustworthy-untrustworthy

| <u>Political Figures</u>  | <u>Nonpolitical Figures</u> |               |                  |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|------------------|
|                           | Bobby<br>Orr                | Bobby<br>Hull | Pierre<br>Berton |
| <u>Pierre Trudeau</u>     |                             |               |                  |
| Sincere-insincere         | + .45**                     | + .47**       | + .71***         |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy | + .70***                    | + .28         | + .20            |
| <u>Joe Clark</u>          |                             |               |                  |
| Sincere-insincere         | + .05                       | + .07         | + .20            |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy | + 3.6***                    | + 3.2***      | + 3.2***         |
| <u>Ed Broadbent</u>       |                             |               |                  |
| Sincere-insincere         | + .47**                     | + .49*        | + .60***         |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy | + .83***                    | + .44*        | + .37            |

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .025

\*\*\*p < .01

Each cell entry was computed by subtracting the nonpolitical leader score from the political leader score. Since, in all judgements, a lower score indicated greater sincerity and trustworthiness, a positive difference reflects a judgement of relatively greater sincerity or trustworthiness for the nonpolitical leader.



nonpolitical public figures.

Clearly, this kind of test is not conclusive. The results here may reflect only the relative attractiveness of these particular sports and cultural personalities, or the relative unattractiveness of current political leadership in Canada. Nevertheless, the consistency of the results, achieved without the benefit of pretesting, argues persuasively for the plausibility of the assumption.

### Conclusion

It would appear that the data from this experiment support a qualified discounting hypothesis. The partisan behaviour registered an impact on character assessment in both the political and nonpolitical role conditions. However, the impact was considerably stronger when the overt political context of the action was absent.

In addition, the data provide some support for the operational assumption underlying our explanation of these results. That is, the data provide some indication that subjects tend to view the motives or character of political figures with a degree of suspicion or skepticism. In matching subjects'



judgements of both hypothetical and real political figures against their judgements of nonpolitical counterparts, we found that the political figures were consistently perceived at a relative disadvantage on traits reflective of ingenuousness.

We do not claim, however, that the empirical argument presented in this chapter provides conclusive evidence of the tenability of our model. First, the data bearing on the disingenuousness of the political role must be regarded as only suggestive at this point. It does not directly test the underlying assumption, and may simply reflect our particular selection of personalities.

Similarly, our findings in the main experiment must be treated with caution as we did not use a pure control group as a basis of comparison. The adequacy of the Nonpolitical Role condition as a control condition rests on the assumption that the partisan behaviour was not relevant to behavioural expectations associated with the nonpolitical role. While there is some evidence to support this assumption, it will surely be necessary to replicate the experiment a number of times using a variety of nonpolitical roles before we could claim confidence in the generality of the finding.





Notes

1. For a discussion of evidence bearing on the validity of the metric assumption in interpretations of the semantic differential, see Warr and Knapper (1968), pp. 61-62, and Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), ch. 3.

2. Using a minimum loading of .45 as the criterion for scale inclusion in the computation of factor scores, the following are the factor compositions for the analysis reported in this chapter.

Evaluative factor composition

good-bad  
sincere-insincere  
wise-foolish  
relaxed-tense  
humane-ruthless

Dynamism Factor composition

active-passive  
strong-weak  
sharp-dull  
bold-timid  
hard-soft

Activity factor composition

fast-slow  
hot-cold

Humaneness factor composition

humane-ruthless  
large-small  
trustworthy-untrustworthy

Toughness factor composition

rugged-delicate  
bold-timid

3. Significant differences between Neutral and Partisan Behaviour groups were found on judgements of the following traits:

sincere-insincere  
hot-cold  
humane-ruthless  
trustworthy-untrustworthy



4. Unfortunately, the scale straightforward-devious was not included in this ten-item battery.



## CHAPTER VI

### The "Martyrdom" and "Eisenhower" Experiments

In the first experiment, we attempted to show that a political actor's in-role behaviour provides little additional character information about him. The evidence from this experiment suggests that such behaviour, while not entirely uninformative, appears to convey less character information than an identical act performed, ceteris paribus, by a nonpolitical actor. We have argued that the presence in the political role condition of role demands consistent with the behaviour inhibited subjects' inferences of character attributes distinctive of the actor.

The second hypothesis follows directly from this interpretation. Specifically, if in-role political behaviour is largely uninformative because role demands can alone account for such behaviour, then the elimination of this possible external explanation should enhance the plausibility of an internal one. Therefore, it should increase the value of the act as a source of character information about the actor.

In Chapter IV, we suggested a number of practical political situations that might satisfy this general requirement. To test the second hypothesis, we propose to simulate two of these situations in a





controlled research environment.

The first of these situations, here denoted the "martyrdom" effect, involves an action, apparently freely chosen, with probable negative political implications for the actor. Given our definition of the "political" role, such an action should be regarded as out-of-role - as inexplicable in terms of political role expectations or demands. As a consequence, such an action should yield more information about the character of the actor than a similar behaviour having positive political consequences.

The second situation, which might be labelled the "Eisenhower" effect, also involves a behaviour that is, in a sense, out-of-role. Modelled loosely on the electoral experience of General Eisenhower in post-war U. S. politics, it entails the behaviour of a political actor prior to his entry into partisan politics. We expect that a retrospective analysis of an actor's pre-political achievements would be more informative than the analysis of another actor's political achievements. Interpretation of the latter situation would be confounded by the possibility of self-serving political motives, and perhaps also by the suspicion of public relations embellishment.

Both the "martyrdom" and the "Eisenhower"



hypotheses were tested using the same research paradigm. Subjects were provided with written materials designed to acquaint them with a hypothetical political system. The country itself was briefly described together with descriptions of two political parties and their respective party leaders. News items reporting campaign speeches were also included.

To test the "martyrdom" effect, subjects were presented with fairly neutral or uninformative descriptions of the various objects in the system. The only difference between treatment and comparison conditions in this experiment concerned the content of one leader's campaign behaviour as reported in a news item. Subjects in the treatment condition were led to believe that the target leader's behaviour - the adoption of a particular campaign platform - was unpopular within important sectors of the electorate and might cost him the election (Unpopular Policy condition). On the other hand, subjects in the comparison group were led to believe that the same behaviour would enhance the target leader's chances of election (Popular Policy condition). We predicted that treatment group subjects who were exposed to the unpopular policy selection would tend to make stronger inferences about the character of the leader than would



subjects in the comparison group.

To test the "Eisenhower" effect, we provided subjects with somewhat more detailed information about the past achievements of one political leader. While the achievements themselves were identical for both the treatment and comparison conditions of this experiment, comparison group subjects were led to believe that these were achievements of the target leader acting in a prior political capacity (Political Achievement condition). Treatment group subjects were told that these were achievements of the target leader acting in a prior nonpolitical capacity (Nonpolitical Achievement condition). Both groups were exposed to the same news items reporting current campaign behaviour. These news items were identical with those used in the Popular Policy condition of the "martyrdom" experiment. We predicted that treatment group inferences about the character of the leader would tend to be stronger than those of the comparison group.

### Subjects

The subjects for these two experiments were 98 male and female students enrolled in 1974 summer session courses at the University of Alberta. Subjects were enrolled in Sociology or Canadian Government







classes. Subjects were run in class time; they were assigned randomly to one of the two experiments and to one of the two relevant experimental conditions. The number of subjects assigned to the "martyrdom" experiment was 45 and to the "Eisenhower" experiment, 42. Group sizes ranged from 21 to 24.

### Procedure

Following a brief and noncommittal introduction by the host instructor, the experimenter stated the purpose of the study as an attempt to examine how people form impressions of political organizations, people and events. Subjects were told that they would receive two booklets, one of which they were to look at immediately while the other was to be temporarily set aside. They were told that the instructions for completing the study were explained entirely in the booklets; however the point was emphasized orally that once they had finished with the first booklet, it was to be set aside permanently ("under your seat") and not opened again. The pair of booklets were then distributed (see Appendices B and C for copies of these materials).

The first page of the first booklet restated the oral instructions and attempted to prepare subjects



for the materials to follow. Subjects were told that they would be introduced to an "entirely fictitious" country within which they were asked to place themselves "in the role of citizen and observer."

They were told that they would receive information about the general characteristics of the country, about some recent events in the country, and about the persons and groups responsible for those events. The instructions emphasized the need for concentration on these materials.

#### A. Descriptive Material: The "Martyrdom" Experiment

The first two pages of the written scenario involved a descriptive narrative describing the country, two political parties, their respective new party leaders and the current political climate. All of the objects were described in rather vague terms designed to give each a unique identity without arousing strong subject affinities or aversions. The scenario described a country not unlike those with which subjects would tend to be familiar; however, the point was repeatedly made that the scenario was imaginary or hypothetical.

To avoid the necessity of identifying one party and leader as incumbent, the scenario mentioned a



"devastating world crisis" which had required a period of coalition government, and from which the country was just now recovering. Subjects read that the first election in the post-crisis period had been called.

Three one-page news items were appended to this narrative. The first described the opening campaign speech by one of the party leaders (the nontarget leader). The speech, announcing the party's platform in the coming election campaign, was designed to appear conventional and consistent with subject expectations. The general thrust of the platform involved the "crucial issue of getting the economy going again." Subjects in the treatment and comparison groups read the same news item regarding this nontarget leader.

The second news item described the initial campaign speech of the target leader. In both the treatment and the comparison conditions, subjects read that this leader had adopted a strong anti-labour election platform. The platform involved proposed legislation to counter the threat of costly strikes and to prevent paralysis of the "still-fragile post-crisis economy".

The only difference between the news items read by the treatment and comparison groups concerned





the probable political consequences of this platform. While subjects in the treatment condition were led to believe that the platform would be highly unpopular (Unpopular Policy condition), subjects in the comparison group were led to believe that the platform would probably appeal to the electorate (Popular Policy condition). This difference in the political context of the policy selection constituted the only difference between the treatment and comparison group scenarios. The differences were limited almost exclusively to the wording of one paragraph, the two versions of which are reproduced below.

Popular Policy condition  
(Comparison Condition)

When polled for their reactions to the Public Action leader's speech, most political observers agreed that Hampton-Jones will get a sympathetic hearing from voters with this hardline message to labour groups. This policy, they said, coincides with a rising sense of uneasiness and apprehension within the nation about the prospects of economic stability in the near future. Recent militant union demands, and the threat of disruptive strikes, have brought these sentiments to the surface. Thus it is quite possible that many voters will find Hampton-Jones' policy platform both reassuring and appealing.



Unpopular Policy Condition  
(Treatment Condition)

When polled for their reactions to the Public Action leader's speech, most political observers agreed that a campaign based on proposed anti-labour legislation could seriously endanger any chances of victory for Hampton-Jones in the coming election. Trade unions, they said, have anxiously awaited the end of the crisis to press their demands. Now that the end has come, they will fight any attempt to disarm their strike threat in the impending negotiations. With this platform, Hampton-Jones will face powerful opposition from this quarter.

The last paragraph of this news item, identical for both groups, conveyed the target leader's acknowledgement that his policy selection might well have the positive (comparison group) or negative (treatment group) political consequences made explicit in the preceding paragraph.

A third news item was included to summarize the two party platforms and to bring readers up to the election date itself. The simulated news commentary attempted to create a mood of uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome to avoid bandwaggon or underdog complications in subject reactions to the manipulation.

A final page in this booklet instructed subjects to go on to Part II when they felt



sufficiently familiar with the situation. However, it encouraged them to turn back and refresh their memories about uncertain aspects of the descriptions.

#### B. The "Eisenhower" Experiment.

The scenario for the comparison group in the "martyrdom" experiment, described above, served as the basic model in this experiment. The description of the country, of the political parties, and of the leader actions, as reflected in the news items, were adopted without change in this experiment for both treatment and comparison groups.

Indeed, the only difference between the scenarios of this experiment and the comparison scenario of the previous one concerned the background description of one political leader. In this experiment, the target leader is described as having made a major contribution to the success of the crisis government. As a member of the three-man "Governing Triumvirate", this leader "is said to have served . . . with distinction. In fact, many knowledgeable observers feel that his contributions to policy were largely responsible for the impressive record of the crisis government."

The experimental manipulation here concerned





the leader's role at the time that he performed these feats. Subjects in the treatment condition read that he served on the governing council as the "independent member of the community at large," rather than as a representative of one of the two political parties (Nonpolitical Achievement condition). That is, we attempted to cast him in a prior nonpolitical role although he was now entering the realm of partisan politics.

Subjects in the comparison group read that this leader served in the crisis government in a more overtly political capacity as the representative of one of the political parties (Political Achievement condition).



### Response Measures

The second booklet was the same in both experiments. It contained (a) a number of background questions about the subject; (b) a 20 item semantic differential for each of the following seven concepts: Austen Reid as a Political Leader (Nontarget leader), Austen Reid as a Person, the National Party (Nontarget leader's party), Most Political Leaders as Persons, John Hampton-Jones as a Political Leader (Target leader), John Hampton-Jones as a Person, Public Action Party (Target leader's party); (c) six 9-interval "vote likelihood" scales assessing the subject's voting choice between all paired combinations of parties and leaders; (d) three 9-interval scales to record subject impressions of leader motivations for choosing policy platforms; (e) two 9-interval scales for assessing each leader's attitude toward a "Trade Union's Right to Strike"; (f) two 9-interval scales for the subject to assess his own success in completing the experimental task.

### Dependent Variables

The hypotheses of both experiments concern the effect of a context manipulation on the information



value of an act. In the "martyrdom" experiment, we have predicted that the adoption of an unpopular campaign platform would yield more character information to subjects than the adoption of an identical platform that is seen to be popular. In the "Eisenhower" experiment, we have predicted that a past public service accomplishment performed in a nonpolitical capacity would yield more character information to subjects than if it were performed in a political capacity.

As in the first experiment reported in Chapter V, the central dependent variable in both cases is a notion of information level. Although we might be in a position to make a number of predictions about specific trait inferences, such predictions involve assumptions that are not integral to the theoretical framework. Thus we prefer at this exploratory research stage to focus our concerns on a general dependent variable that is not trait specific.

In the previous experiment, we developed three different indices to measure various aspects of the information variable. In the present research, we propose to retain the two indices based directly on responses to the semantic differential, but to exclude the confidence index. The decision not to employ a





confidence measure here was taken primarily for methodological reasons.

We were concerned that an extended questionnaire booklet might overtax the patience of subjects in this experiment. In a study such as this one that is highly dependent for success on subject co-operation, we believed that this problem should be avoided if at all possible. Pretests indicated that administration time for these experiments would average about seventy minutes with confidence ratings included. Since we felt that this period was too long, we sought to eliminate those aspects of the questionnaire that were least essential to the study. Although there were a number of possible candidates for exclusion, we concluded that the confidence ratings would contribute the least amount of unique information.

It is our contention that the confidence ratings are largely redundant in the present theoretical context. That is, if information is gained because perceivers have made correspondent inferences, then either a measure of confidence or a measure of distinctiveness will suffice to reflect this information gain. Both properties are necessary implications of correspondence.

This is not to suggest that the two properties



are invariably related. It seems quite conceivable that a perceiver might conclude with confidence that a target is undistinguished on a trait dimension. The point is simply that such a conclusion could not result from a correspondent inference.

The principal dependent variables employed in this research are restricted to one measure each of qualitative and quantitative information gain. To measure qualitative impression differences between the experimental groups, we will compare summary factor scores on the orthogonal dimensions of the target leader profile. In both the "martyrdom" and the "Eisenhower" experiments, we predict significant group differences on one or more of these semantic dimensions.

To measure quantitative differences in inference strength, we will compare summary indices of attribute extremity or polarity. We predict that the treatment groups in each experiment - those exposed to the target's out-of-role behaviour will tend to make more extreme judgements about the character of the target leader.

All subjects were required to complete descriptive profiles of the leaders who were identified first as "political leaders" and then as "persons". In



requiring this, we wanted to ascertain what impact the frame of reference had on judgements of these political figures. However, the variables used here to test the experimental hypotheses were limited to those derived from ratings of the target leader judged as a person.

As in the first experiment, a set of fifteen 9-interval scales were selected to provide a representative profile of the target leader. We selected five scales for each of the three major dimensions of semantic space generally found in this kind of research. These scales are listed by dimension below.

#### Evaluative Dimension

honest-dishonest  
trustworthy-untrustworthy  
good-bad  
sincere-insincere  
unselfish-selfish

#### Potency Dimension

powerful-powerless  
rugged-delicate  
hard-soft  
bold-timid  
committed-uncommitted

#### Activity Dimension

fast-slow  
active-passive  
tense-relaxed  
emotional-unemotional  
sharp-dull

Subjects' judgements of the two political





leaders in these experiments were factor analysed to examine the actual dimensionality of their impressions. The ratings were subjected to principal component factor analysis with unit commonalities. Three factors, accounting for 61% of the common variance, were extracted and rotated using a varimax criterion. Table 6.1 displays the rotated factor matrix.

The factor structure apparent from this analysis is again different from the one that was anticipated. The first two factors, however, are quite similar to those found in the first reported experiment. Once again, the expected Potency and Activity dimensions appear to have collapsed into a Dynamism factor with heavy loadings from both groups of scales. The first factor is clearly Evaluative in tone with heavy loadings on all of the expected scales. The third factor, although more difficult to interpret, would seem to reference a personal style dimension that taps the Intenseness of the actor.

The semantic differential scales for each concept were presented to subjects in random order and were directionally balanced. Although we did not vary either the order or the direction of scale presentation across subjects, we did systematically vary the order of concept presentation. Half of each experimental



Table 6.1. Rotated factor matrix for 15 trait judgements  
of both target and nontarget leaders

|                           | I<br>Evaluative<br>factor | II<br>Dynamism<br>factor | III<br>Intenseness<br>factor | $h^2$ |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------|
| Sincere-Insincere         | .903                      | .100                     | .101                         | .835  |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy | .897                      | .119                     | .074                         | .824  |
| Honest-dishonest          | .895                      | .074                     | .005                         | .805  |
| Good-bad                  | .846                      | .133                     | .169                         | .763  |
| Unselfish-selfish         | .633                      | - .245                   | - .086                       | .468  |
| Bold-timid                | - .005                    | .796                     | .055                         | .637  |
| Fast-slow                 | .037                      | .758                     | .022                         | .576  |
| Active-passive            | .040                      | .732                     | - .053                       | .540  |
| Powerful-weak             | .083                      | .727                     | - .194                       | .573  |
| Sharp-dull                | .269                      | .690                     | - .003                       | .549  |
| Hard-soft                 | - .172                    | .663                     | .252                         | .532  |
| Rugged-delicate           | - .105                    | .562                     | .350                         | .449  |
| Committed-uncommitted     | .423                      | .484                     | .234                         | .463  |
| Tense-relaxed             | - .234                    | .184                     | .713                         | .527  |
| Emotional-unemotional     | .333                      | - .153                   | .624                         | .523  |
| Eigenvalue                | 4.44                      | 3.53                     | 1.17                         |       |
| % of variance             | 29.6%                     | 23.5%                    | 7.6%                         | 60.9% |



group received the concepts in a reversed order.

An analysis of mean ratings for the two groups revealed only two significant differences over sixty individual comparisons. These results suggest that order of concept presentation was not a significant factor affecting the judgemental task. As a consequence, subject responses from both order groups were pooled, and not differentiated in the subsequent analysis.

As in the previous experiment, we propose to use summary factor scores rather than individual trait ratings as the basic data in the analysis. Factor scores will be computed by simply averaging the trait judgements loading heavily on the factor in question. The same arbitrary cut-off loading of .45 will be used in determining the scales to be included in each factor index (1).

In addition to the fifteen selected profile traits, the semantic differential for each concept included five scales designed to reflect the judged causal efficacy of the concept. From attribution theory, we suspected that information gain from correspondent inferences would imply an enhanced impression of the target leader as a causal agent. That is, our understanding of the correspondence notion





involves the perceiver's prior inference of personal causality in analysing an action. We believed that this process might lead to more enduring attributions of importance to the actor. Thus we selected five pairs of adjectives to tap this dimension. The scales are listed below.

Causal Importance Dimension

nonconforming-conforming  
unusual-usual  
essential-nonessential  
consequential-inconsequential  
indispensable-dispensable

The first two of these scales were selected to reflect a uniqueness aspect of the dimension, while the remaining three scales were thought to tap more directly the perceived causal salience of the object in the relative environment.

Given the theoretical relationship of causal importance to correspondence, we might expect that attributed importance would covary with the extremity of judgements. Thus we would predict that the treatment groups in both experiments would judge the target leader as significantly more important than would their respective comparison groups.

In addition to these semantic differential scales, we asked subjects a number of questions designed to tap their impressions of the political



leaders' attitudes and behavioural motivations. Regarding the latter, we asked subjects to assess which of two factors was more important in determining each leader's policy platform selection. Subjects were given a choice between the motivation "to choose a policy that was attractive to voters" ("political" motive), and the motivation "to choose the best policy for the country" (altruistic motive).

Given our theoretical framework, we predicted that treatment group subjects in both experiments would display less equivocation than their respective comparison group subjects in assigning a motive for the policy selection. Thus we expected that these treatment groups would exhibit greater polarity in their motivational attributions.

In addition, we predicted that treatment group subjects in both experiments would attribute a more altruistic motivation to the target leader than their counterparts in the comparison groups.

In the "martyrdom" experiment, these predictions are based on a straightforward application of correspondent inference theory. Given two possible motives for an action, the implausibility of the political motive in the unpopular policy condition should cause these subjects to display less



equivocation in identifying the motive, and should cause them to place more weight on the altruistic motive.

In the "Eisenhower" experiment, on the other hand, the same predictions are based on a slightly different rationale. In this case, we expect treatment group subjects to place more weight on the altruistic motive in response to their more unequivocal interpretation of the target leader's past achievements. That is, the attractive qualities inferred from those achievements should lead subjects to overweight the altruistic motive at the expense of the political one in their analysis of this action.

We also asked subjects to estimate each leader's "personal attitude" on the issue of a trade union's right to strike. This question was included largely to provide a means of checking that subjects in the experiments were not confusing which policy was chosen by which leader. However, using the same rationales discussed for the motivation predictions, we might predict differences across groups in the attribution of this attitude as well. Specifically, we would expect that treatment group subjects in both experiments would tend to see the target leader as being more strongly opposed to the right to strike than







would comparison group subjects.

Finally, we asked subjects to indicate their voting preferences in the hypothetical election. To explore the nature of these preferences, we asked subjects to make a series of voting judgements, each involving a choice between two different objects. Six scales were necessary to exhaust all paired combinations of parties and leaders.

For each choice, we provided a 9-interval scale with a pair of objects anchoring the ends. We asked subjects to use the nine intervals to indicate the likelihood or certainty of their choosing one object rather than the other in the election.

Our predictions regarding voting behaviour pertain not to the substance of the choice between objects, but to the certainty with which these choices are made. The theoretical framework developed in this thesis has not dealt explicitly with the behavioural implications of making correspondent inferences. Available evidence suggests that this linkage is neither obvious nor simple.

Nevertheless, if we assume that the political leader is a relevant object in voting considerations, we might expect that the firmness or certainty of the voting decision would reflect, however indirectly, the



firmness or certainty of information held about the leader object. Consequently, we might predict that the treatment groups in these experiments would display significantly greater certainty in their voting decisions than would their respective comparison groups.

While we might be able to justify a global prediction about the average level of certainty displayed over the six paired comparisons, it seems more prudent at this exploratory stage to limit our predictions to the comparisons most relevant to the subject as voter. That is, we will limit our predictions about certainty to the scale comparing the two political parties as summary objects in the hypothetical system, and to the scale comparing the two leaders directly.

## Results

### A. Scenario Effectiveness

The use of hypothetical scenarios in experiments such as these creates a paradoxical situation for the investigator. On the one hand, the scenario must be sufficiently realistic to engage the interest of subjects and permit them to play their roles effectively. On the other hand, the scenario



must not be so realistic that subjects will succeed in "identifying" real models for the hypothetical situation, and thus go beyond the information provided in the booklet.

In these experiments, we attempted to enhance subject involvement by appealing directly for their co-operation in a difficult task, by preparing them in advance for a role-playing exercise, by using culturally familiar terms, names and descriptions, and by providing sufficient materials to immerse them in the situation for an extended period (an average of thirteen minutes).

To gain some indication of our success in this endeavour, we asked subjects to estimate the degree of involvement that they were able to develop with the hypothetical system. The mean response on this 9-interval scale was 4.91 which did not vary significantly across the four groups (1= No Involvement, 9=Great Involvement).

While this finding suggests that the scenarios were not highly involving, the consensus of opinion in debriefing sessions was considerably more encouraging, and the level of nonresponse or nonco-operation in these experiments was less than 2%. These results suggest that the scenarios elicited a reasonable degree





of involvement although we must be cautious in generalizing to other situations.

We employed a number of means to inhibit subject identification of this scenario with real models. First, we stressed that no such models existed and that subjects would not be asked to make comparisons between aspects of the scenario and the real world. Secondly, we introduced the world crisis theme into the scenario to discourage the association of this political system with any existing contemporaneously. At the time that these experiments were run, neither the world energy situation, nor the world economic recession had attained the level of public saliency they later achieved. Because the experiment was run shortly after the 1974 Canadian federal election campaign in which the Progressive Conservative Party adopted a wage and price control policy, we were concerned that subjects might identify that party and party leader in the scenario.

We asked subjects to estimate the degree to which their images of the various hypothetical objects were based on real people and parties. The mean response for all subjects on this 9-interval scale was a disappointing 3.74 (1=Answers Based Largely on Real People, 9=Answers Based Only on Imaginary Situation).



In the debriefing session, we attempted to ascertain the kinds of identifications that people tended to make. There appeared to be no consensus within the subject pool. Given the origins of the subject pool, it was perhaps not surprising that they cited Canadian political objects somewhat more frequently than they did others, but this proportion was not overwhelming. Indeed, even among these subjects, there seemed to be no agreement about which Canadian persons or parties resembled the hypothetical objects.

From both the written and the oral responses on this question, we must infer that subject images in these experiments were at least partially a function of real world projections. It is encouraging from our research perspective, however, that the real world associations appeared to follow no discernible pattern. That is, the additional error variance introduced by these projections may not necessarily have introduced to responses a systematic bias within the groups. Given the importance of achieving realism and subject involvement, this result may be the most that we can hope for in experiments such as these.



## B. Policy-Leader Association

In the "martyrdom" experiment especially, it was important that subjects correctly associate the target leader with the manipulated policy. Since subjects were not given an opportunity to refer back to the scenario once they had begun the questionnaire booklet, it was possible that the responses for some subjects would be based on an incorrect leader-policy association. To check on this possibility, we asked subjects to estimate each leader's attitude on the right to strike issue.

As expected, most subjects in both experiments estimated that the target leader was opposed to the strike right (1=Sympathetic, 9=Opposed;  $\bar{X}(\text{target leader})=7.54$ ,  $SD=1.87$ ). Displaying a tendency toward contrast, most subjects attributed a corresponding sympathetic attitude to the nontarget leader ( $\bar{X}(\text{nontarget leader})=3.31$ ,  $SD=1.87$ ).

Because subjects were estimating a "personal" attitude of the leaders, we did not believe that the target leader estimate by itself was sufficient evidence of correct or incorrect association. That is, we reasoned that it was possible for a subject to associate the target leader with the correct policy,







but nevertheless to attribute to him an attitude of sympathy. While this was accepted as a possibility, we reasoned that it was highly unlikely that a correct association would lead subjects to infer a sympathetic target leader attitude together with a nontarget leader attitude of opposition to the strike right. Thus we designated this latter combination of responses to the two questions as evidence of incorrect or confused leader-policy association. We deemed it advisable to eliminate from the analysis subjects who manifested this response pattern. Ten subjects were eliminated for this reason, four from the "martyrdom" experiment, and six from the "Eisenhower" experiment.

### C. Hypotheses: the "Martyrdom" Experiment

In this experiment, subjects read that the target leader had adopted a policy that appeared to have either negative (treatment condition) or positive (comparison condition) implications for his success in the impending election. Our first hypothesis predicted that this difference in behavioural context would lead to a significantly different impression of the target - a difference that would be reflected on at least one of the main empirical dimensions. The data presented in



Table 6.2 would seem to support this hypothesis.

The two mean profiles differ significantly in terms of target leader evaluation. While the Evaluative factor as a whole is significant in the analysis, a scale by scale examination (not shown) indicates that the treatment group is consistently more positive in evaluating the target. For three of these scales, group differences exceed the .05 level of significance, while differences for the other two scales are significant beyond the .10 level. Only two other scales among the fifteen in the battery appear to yield significant differences. Apparently, treatment group subjects perceived the target as less rugged and less hard than did subjects in the comparison group.

The second hypothesis of this experiment predicted that treatment group subjects would make stronger inferences about the target than would comparison group subjects, and that this tendency would be reflected in more extreme judgements.

A summary of this analysis is presented in Table 6.3. This data provides little, if any, support for the hypothesis. There is no significant difference in overall extremity of judgement, and there are no significant differences across the three general



Table 6.2. Group mean profiles of the target leader by factor

|                    |           | <u>Unpopular<br/>Policy</u> |                 | <u>Popular<br/>Policy</u> |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Evaluative factor  | $\bar{X}$ | 3.37                        | $t(df=44)=-2.6$ | 4.53                      |
|                    | SD        | 1.47                        | $p<.01, SIG.$   | 1.55                      |
| Dynamism factor    | $\bar{X}$ | 3.77                        | $t(df=44)=1.28$ | 3.28                      |
|                    | SD        | 1.37                        | $p<.21, N.S.$   | 1.23                      |
| Intenseness factor | $\bar{X}$ | 5.02                        | $t(df=44)=1.22$ | 4.42                      |
|                    | SD        | 1.64                        | $p<.23, N.S.$   | 1.72                      |

(Scores on each of these factor scales may range between 1 and 9. As arbitrarily computed, a score of 1 corresponds respectively to the most positive evaluation, the highest degree of dynamism, and the greatest intensity.)

Table 6.3 Mean polarity scores in group judgements of the target leader, by factor and overall

|                    |           | <u>Unpopular<br/>Policy</u> |                 | <u>Popular<br/>Policy</u> |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Evaluative factor  | $\bar{X}$ | 2.99                        | $t(df=44)=1.34$ | 2.58                      |
|                    | SD        | 1.06                        | $p<.18, N.S.$   | .99                       |
| Dynamism factor    | $\bar{X}$ | 2.72                        | $t(df=44)=1.36$ | 3.03                      |
|                    | SD        | .71                         | $p<.18, N.S.$   | .81                       |
| Intenseness factor | $\bar{X}$ | 2.61                        | $t(df=44)=1.20$ | 2.96                      |
|                    | SD        | .86                         | $p<.24, N.S.$   | 1.07                      |
| All 15 scales      | $\bar{X}$ | 2.85                        | $t(df=44)=-.15$ | 2.89                      |
|                    | SD        | .85                         | $p<.88, N.S.$   | .94                       |

(Polarity scores may range between 1 and 5. The higher the score, the greater the polarity of judgement.)





factors. Indeed, there is not even a consistent pattern to the observed differences on these factors.

The third hypothesis concerned the perception of causal efficacy. We predicted that the treatment group would ascribe to the target more importance as a causal agent. We assumed that this kind of judgement would be reflected in assessments of the five qualities: nonconforming, indispensable, essential, consequential, and unusual. The treatment and comparison group mean ratings for these scales and for the summary Importance index are displayed in Table 6.4.

Contrary to expectations, there appear to be no differences between the groups in terms of these judgements. None of the six comparisons yield significant results and no pattern is apparent.

Next, we made predictions regarding differences in the attribution of target motivation and target attitude. We suggested that treatment group subjects would manifest less equivocation in identifying the target leader's motivation for his policy selection; we predicted as well that these subjects would weight the altruistic motive more heavily than would their counterparts in the comparison



Table 6.4. Group mean judgements of target leader importance

|                                   |           | <u>Unpopular<br/>Policy</u> |                  | <u>Popular<br/>Policy</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Nonconforming-<br>Conforming      | $\bar{X}$ | 4.91                        | $t(df=44)=.39$   | 4.33                      |
|                                   | SD        | 2.47                        | $p<.39, N.S.$    | 1.97                      |
| Indispensable-<br>Dispensable     | $\bar{X}$ | 5.0                         | $t(df=44)=.46$   | 4.71                      |
|                                   | SD        | 2.31                        | $p<.65, N.S.$    | 1.97                      |
| Essential-<br>Nonessential        | $\bar{X}$ | 4.05                        | $t(df=44)=-.65$  | 4.42                      |
|                                   | SD        | 2.01                        | $p<.52, N.S.$    | 1.84                      |
| Consequential-<br>Inconsequential | $\bar{X}$ | 3.27                        | $t(df=44)=-1.04$ | 3.75                      |
|                                   | SD        | 1.61                        | $p<.31, N.S.$    | 1.51                      |
| Unusual-usual                     | $\bar{X}$ | 4.64                        | $t(df=44)=.99$   | 4.08                      |
|                                   | SD        | 2.13                        | $p<.33, N.S.$    | 1.64                      |
| Importance<br>Index               | $\bar{X}$ | 4.37                        | $t(df=44)=.33$   | 4.26                      |
|                                   | SD        | 1.33                        | $p<.74, N.S.$    | .98                       |

(For each scale, the lower the score, the greater the imputed importance. Mean scores may range between 1 and 9.)



group. Thirdly, we hypothesized that treatment group subjects would tend to perceive the target leader as being more opposed on the right to strike issue than would comparison group subjects.

In Table 6.5, the mean target ratings on the motivation and attitude questions are presented. Our predictions regarding the attribution of motivation are only partially confirmed with these data. As predicted, the treatment group tends to give significantly more weight than the comparison group to the target leader's altruistic motive. However, there are no significant group differences in the polarity of motivational attributions.

In addition, the data in this table provide no support for the attitude attribution hypothesis. There is almost no difference between the treatment and comparison groups on this variable. From the magnitude of both group means, it appears that the policy, whether popular or unpopular, is seen as an expression of the actor's personal attitude.

Finally, the summary data relevant to the voting hypotheses are presented in Table 6.6. We had predicted that subjects exposed to the unpopular policy selection would manifest greater certainty in their





Table 6.5. Group mean attributions of policy selection motivation and anti-labour attitude, target leader

|                                      |           | <u>Unpopular<br/>Policy</u> |                 | <u>Popular<br/>Policy</u> |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Attribution of motive*               | $\bar{X}$ | 6.71                        | $t(df=43)=2.28$ | 4.88                      |
|                                      | SD        | 2.59                        | $p<.03, SIG.$   | 2.79                      |
| Polarity of Motivation attribution** | $\bar{X}$ | 3.70                        | $t(df=39)=.92$  | 3.33                      |
|                                      | SD        | 1.34                        | $p<.36, N.S.$   | 1.20                      |
| Attribution of Strike attitude***    | $\bar{X}$ | 7.43                        | $t(df=43)=.47$  | 7.17                      |
|                                      | SD        | 1.89                        | $p<.64, N.S.$   | 1.83                      |

\* Range of scores 1 - 9; 1 = "Political" motive, 9 = Altruistic motive.

\*\* Range of scores 1-5; 1 = lowest polarity, 5 = greatest polarity.

\*\*\*Range of scores 1-9; 1 = Pro-labour attitude of leader, 9 = anti-labour attitude of leader.

Table 6.6. Mean group vote certainty for parties and leaders

|                                |           | <u>Unpopular<br/>Policy</u> |                 | <u>Popular<br/>Policy</u> |
|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Vote Certainty Between Parties | $\bar{X}$ | 3.32                        | $t(df=38)=0.04$ | 3.33                      |
|                                | SD        | 1.34                        | $p<.97, N.S.$   | 1.39                      |
| Vote Certainty Between leaders | $\bar{X}$ | 3.14                        | $t(df=44)=.24$  | 3.04                      |
|                                | SD        | 1.21                        | $p<.82, N.S.$   | 1.49                      |

Scores range between 1 and 5; a higher score indicates greater mean polarity of voting choice.



voting selections when choosing between the two parties and between the two leaders. Contrary to expectations, the analysis indicates virtually no group differences in voting polarity for either variable.

A comparison of the substantive voting decisions of the subjects reveals that the behaviour of the two groups was not identical. In selecting between the two leaders, subjects in the treatment group leaned decidedly toward the target leader, while the balance of opinion in the comparison group was slightly toward the nontarget leader (1=Certain to Vote for Target, 9=Certain to Vote for Nontarget;  $\bar{X}$ -unpop=3.95, SD=2.26;  $\bar{X}$ -pop=5.71, SD=2.46,  $t(df=44)=-2.71$ ,  $p<.02$ ) Thus it appears that the context of the policy selection did have a significant impact on the nature of subject voting preferences, but it did not apparently affect the certainty of those preferences.

The results of the first experiment yield no firm conclusions. On the one hand, it appears that the adoption of an unpopular policy by the target leader provided a different picture of his motivation for policy selection. Subjects in the treatment group tended on the whole to weight the altruistic motive more heavily than did those in the comparison group.



The selection of the unpopular policy seems also to have led to a more positive evaluation of the target leader. This is reflected both in the comparison of mean group scores on the Evaluative factor, and in the comparison between groups of mean voting preferences.

While the policy context manipulation appears to have had these effects, it did not significantly affect the polarity of subjects' character attributions, motivational attributions, or voting preferences; in addition, it did not significantly affect the perceived importance of the target as a causal agent, or the perceived attitude of the target on the right-to-strike issue. Since each of these failed predictions was a direct implication of the theoretical model, some further investigation seems warranted here.

A number of methodological explanations might account for these findings. First, it may be the case that the policy context manipulation in this experiment did not, as anticipated, create an in-role and an out-of-role condition. It may have created two out-of-role conditions, each informative in its own way. That is, the adoption of the popular policy in the





comparison condition may have been interpreted by subjects as a particularly self-serving action that contravened even the norms of the political role in this respect. Such a situation would account for the differences in target evaluation without differences in rating polarity.

There is some support for this hypothesis. If the scales nonconforming-conforming and unusual-usual reflect how conventional or in-role the leader appeared, then it seems that both experimental groups saw their respective target leaders as somewhat unconventional. Indeed the groups did not differ significantly in their mean judgements on either variable.

Moreover, both groups did distinguish the target leader from the nontarget leader on these dimensions. Recall that we attempted to make the nontarget leader appear as conventional or in-role as possible. Subject ratings of this leader on the same two scales suggest that we were reasonably successful in this endeavour. The fact, therefore, that comparison group subjects tended to see the target leader as considerably more unusual and nonconforming than this conventional nontarget leader raises doubts about our



success in creating an in-role target leader action in the comparison condition.

On the other hand, if this conclusion is valid, we might also expect that comparison group subjects would place considerable weight on the political motive as an explanation for the target leader's policy selection. As we have seen, the comparison group mean on the motivation variable seems to indicate ambiguity or equivocation, not clarity. Comparison group ratings of the nontarget leader and of the concept "Most Political Leaders" are also inconsistent with the above conclusion. Subjects in the comparison group weighted the "political" motive no more heavily for the target leader than for the apparently conventional nontarget leader. They saw this motive as being significantly more important for "Most Political Leaders" than for either of the leaders portrayed in their scenario (2).

A second possible explanation for the results of this experiment pertains to the reference scales employed by the two experimental groups. We had assumed that subjects in both groups would use a common reference scale and a common anchor in assessing the target leader. We expected that they would judge the



target leader against a common conception of people in general, politicians in general, or perhaps the nontarget leader. Initial comparisons of their ratings of the other objects (the nontarget leader, most political leaders) in the experiment seemed to support this assumption.

However, it may be the case that the manipulation altered the reference scale of subjects such that manipulation effects are not solely reflected in the target assessment. Specifically, it may be the case that treatment group subjects expressed their impression of the distinctiveness of the target leader in their comparative judgements of the target and nontarget leaders. If so, we would require measures of behavioural impact that incorporated judgements of both objects.

To this end, we computed a relative polarity score for each subject rating based on the difference in polarity between a subject's rating of the two leaders. Scores could range from -4, indicating maximum polarity for the nontarget leader, and minimum polarity for the target leader, to +4, indicating minimum nontarget polarity and maximum target polarity. A score of 0 would indicate no difference in polarity







between judgements of the two leaders. If the context manipulation affected the amount of information gained from the behaviour, as expected, treatment group relative polarity scores should exceed those of the comparison group. The results of this comparative analysis are displayed in Table 6.7.

While the differences are not large, they seem to form a much clearer pattern than that observed using only target leader scores. In fifteen scale comparisons (not shown), the mean differences in treatment group polarity exceeded the corresponding mean comparison group scores on twelve occasions, three of which were significant beyond the .05 level.

The summary factor differences shown in the table reflect this tendency. The treatment group subjects exhibited greater target-nontarget differences in polarity for two of the three factors, and for the fifteen scale summary index. Among these, the differences on the evaluative factor were significant beyond the .02 level.

In addition to these extremity comparisons, we examined similar target-nontarget differences in attitude attribution and in attributed leader importance. The results of these comparisons are



Table 6.7. Target leader-Nontarget leader differences in mean polarity of attributions, by factor and over 15 scales.

|                         |           | <u>Unpopular<br/>Policy</u> |                  | <u>Popular<br/>Policy</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Evaluative factor       | $\bar{X}$ | + .41                       | $t(df=44)=2.15$  | - .23                     |
|                         | SD        | .90                         | $p<.02, SIG.$    | 1.00                      |
| Dynamism factor         | $\bar{X}$ | + .38                       | $t(df=44)=.18$   | - .28                     |
|                         | SD        | .77                         | $p<.72, N.S.$    | .96                       |
| Intenseness factor      | $\bar{X}$ | + .20                       | $t(df=44)=-.14$  | + .25                     |
|                         | SD        | 1.00                        | $p<.44, N.S.$    | 1.17                      |
| Polarity over 15 scales | $\bar{X}$ | .33                         | $t(df=44)=-1.10$ | + .09                     |
|                         | SD        | .59                         | $p<.28, N.S.$    | .84                       |

Scores may range between -4 to +4, where a negative score indicates relatively greater polarity for the nontarget leader, and a positive score indicates relatively greater polarity for the target leader.

Significance tests reflect one-tailed probabilities.

Table 6.68. Target leader-Nontarget leader differences in mean attitude attribution and attributed importance.

|  |           | <u>Unpopular<br/>Policy</u> |                | <u>Popular<br/>Policy</u> |
|--|-----------|-----------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| Perceived difference in Anti-labour attitudes of leaders | $\bar{X}$ | + 4.27                      | $t(df=44)=.57$ | + 3.80                    |
|  | SD        | 2.89                        | $p<.28, N.S.$  | 2.83                      |
| Perceived difference in Importance of leaders*           | $\bar{X}$ | .91                         | $t(df=44)=.40$ | .72                       |
|  | SD        | 1.74                        | $p<.35, N.S.$  | 1.55                      |

\* Summary index of Importance used here.

Scores may range between -8 and +8 where a positive score indicates attribution of greater anti-labour attitude or importance to the target leader.

Significant tests reflect one-tailed probabilities.



presented in Table 6.8.

Again it appears that the effect of the manipulation is more clearly reflected using the two-leader difference measures. While treatment and comparison groups differed only slightly in their perception of the target leader's anti-strike attitude, they differed somewhat more in their estimates of the comparative attitudinal distance between the target and the nontarget leaders. Although the group differences here are not significant, treatment group subjects tended to see a greater distance between the two leaders.

In comparing estimates of overall leader importance, it is evident that there was no significant group difference on this perception. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the groups did differ significantly in their comparative judgement of leader nonconformity. Consistent with our original expectations, the treatment group attributed a greater mean distance between the target and nontarget leaders on this variable.

While the results of the experiment must be regarded as inconclusive, we would argue that these findings form a discernible pattern that is consistent





for the most part with the theoretical model proposed in this thesis.

It is apparent that the context manipulation in this experiment did affect subjects' impressions of the target leader. Clearly, it affected the attributions of motivation and the overall evaluation of the target. In addition, however, we contend that the unpopular context conveyed more information about the character of the target leader. While the evidence for this assertion is based on more complex psychometric assumptions than we had originally made, and is in places only suggestive, we believe that the account, as revised, is a plausible one. For this reason, we feel that the experiment warrants replication.

#### D. Hypotheses: The "Eisenhower" Experiment

The hypotheses for this experiment were similar to those tested in the previous one. In general, we expected that a prior leader achievement set in a nonpolitical context (treatment condition) would convey more character information about the target leader than an identical achievement set in a political context (comparison condition).



An examination of differences in Table 6.9 reveals that the context manipulation did appear to affect subject impressions of the target. As in the "martyrdom" experiment, there were significant differences between the group profiles of the target leader centering on the evaluation of the target.

Unlike the previous results, however, these seem to indicate that the veteran political achiever of the comparison condition was more positively evaluated than the nonpolitical achiever of the treatment condition. Four of the five evaluative differences were significant and all reflected a more favourable image of the comparison group target.

Table 6.10 displays the summary data pertinent to the extremity hypotheses. As in the "martyrdom" experiment, we predicted that the treatment group subjects would tend to make stronger inferences about the target leader and that this tendency would be reflected in the greater extremity or polarity of their judgements.

The hypothesis receives no support from these data. There is no significant difference in overall extremity nor are there significant differences in extremity for any of the three factors. What



Table 6.9. Group mean profiles of the target leader by factor

|                    |           | <u>Nonpolitical<br/>Achievement</u> |                 | <u>Political<br/>Achievement</u> |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Evaluative factor  | $\bar{X}$ | 4.70                                | $t(df=42)=2.83$ | 3.34                             |
|                    | SD        | 1.94                                | $p<.007, SIG.$  | 1.20                             |
| Dynamism factor    | $\bar{X}$ | 3.15                                | $t(df=42)=.55$  | 2.97                             |
|                    | SD        | 1.19                                | $p<.55, N.S.$   | .98                              |
| Intenseness factor | $\bar{X}$ | 4.64                                | $t(df=42)=.55$  | 4.39                             |
|                    | SD        | 1.24                                | $p<.58, N.S.$   | 1.71                             |

Scores on each factor may range between 1-9. As arbitrarily computed, a score of 1 corresponds respectively to the most positive evaluation, the highest degree of dynamism, and the greatest intensity.

Table 6.10. Mean polarity scores in group judgements of the target leader, by factor and overall importance.

|                    |           | <u>Nonpolitical<br/>Achievement</u> |                 | <u>Political<br/>Achievement</u> |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Evaluative factor  | $\bar{X}$ | 2.65                                | $t(df=42)=1.37$ | 3.11                             |
|                    | SD        | 1.22                                | $p<.18, N.S.$   | 1.04                             |
| Dynamism factor    | $\bar{X}$ | 3.04                                | $t(df=42)=.55$  | 3.08                             |
|                    | SD        | .81                                 | $p<.42, N.S.$   | .71                              |
| Intenseness factor | $\bar{X}$ | 2.64                                | $t(df=42)=-.79$ | 2.87                             |
|                    | SD        | .82                                 | $p<.43, N.S.$   | 1.06                             |
| All 15 scales      | $\bar{X}$ | 2.90                                | $t(df=42)=1.0$  | 3.17                             |
|                    | SD        | .91                                 | $p<.32, N.S.$   | .87                              |

Polarity scores may range between 1 and 5. The higher the score, the greater the polarity of judgement.





differences there are suggest consistently across the factors that the political achievement was more informative to comparison group subjects than the nonpolitical achievement was to subjects in the treatment group.

We expected that the treatment group would glean more character information from the achievement because they would be more likely to see a personal as opposed to an external (political) cause for the achievement. This reasoning led us to predict that the treatment group target would be seen as a more important causal agent than the comparison group target.

Contrary to expectations, but consistent with the pattern of findings so far, Table 6.11 reveals that the comparison group subjects tended to assign greater importance to their political achiever than the treatment group subjects did to their nonpolitical achiever. The group differences are significant for the overall index of importance and for three of the five scales comprising that index. All six differences are in the direction opposite to that predicted.

The summary data pertinent to the motivational and attitudinal hypotheses are displayed in Table 6.12.



Table 6.11. Group mean judgements of target leader importance

|                 |           | <u>Nonpolitical<br/>Achievement</u> |                   | <u>Political<br/>Achievement</u> |
|-----------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| Nonconforming - | $\bar{X}$ | 5.33                                | $t(df=42)=.73$    | 4.83                             |
| Conforming      | SD        | 2.44                                | $p<.47, N.S.$     | 2.15                             |
| Indispensable - | $\bar{X}$ | 5.81                                | $t(df=42)=4.20$   | 3.39                             |
| Dispensable     | SD        | 2.04                                | $p<.001, SIG.$    | 1.78                             |
| Essential -     | $\bar{X}$ | 4.48                                | $t(df=42)=2.12$   | 3.39                             |
| Nonessential    | SD        | 1.72                                | $p<.04, SIG.$     | 1.67                             |
| Consequential - | $\bar{X}$ | 3.95                                | $t(df=42)=2.12$   | 3.00                             |
| Inconsequential | SD        | 1.77                                | $p<.04, SIG.$     | 1.17                             |
| Unusual-usual   | $\bar{X}$ | 5.14                                | $t(df=42)=.77$    | 4.57                             |
|                 | SD        | 2.50                                | $p<.44, N.S.$     | 2.45                             |
| Importance      | $\bar{X}$ | 4.94                                | $t(df=33.2)=2.99$ | 3.83                             |
| Index           | SD        | 1.48                                | $p<.006, SIG.$    | .94                              |

For each scale, the lower the score, the greater the imputed importance. Mean scores may range between 1 and 9.



Table 6.12. Group mean attributions of policy selection motivation and anti-labour attitude, target leader

|                                      |           | <u>Nonpolitical<br/>Achievement</u> |                 | <u>Political<br/>Achievement</u> |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Attribution of motive*               | $\bar{X}$ | 5.16                                | $t(df=40)=.35$  | 4.83                             |
|                                      | SD        | 2.85                                | $p<.72, N.S.$   | 3.14                             |
| Polarity of Motivation attribution** | $\bar{X}$ | 3.71                                | $t(df=37)=-.44$ | 3.86                             |
|                                      | SD        | 1.04                                | $p<.66, N.S.$   | 1.17                             |
| Attribution of strike attitude***    | $\bar{X}$ | 7.95                                | $t(df=40)=.43$  | 7.70                             |
|                                      | SD        | 1.99                                | $p<.67, N.S.$   | 1.84                             |

\*Range of scores 1-9; 1= "political" motive, 9 = altruistic motive.

\*\*Range of scores 1-5; 1 = lowest polarity, 5 = greatest polarity.

\*\*\*Range of scores 1-9; 1 = pro-labour attitude of leader, 9 = anti-labour attitude of leader.

Table 6.13. Mean group vote certainty for parties and leaders

|                                |           | <u>Nonpolitical<br/>Achievement</u> |                 | <u>Political<br/>Achievement</u> |
|--------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Vote certainty between parties | $\bar{X}$ | 3.11                                | $t(df=37)=-.92$ | 3.50                             |
|                                | SD        | 1.53                                | $p<.37, N.S.$   | 1.15                             |
| Vote certainty between leaders | $\bar{X}$ | 3.60                                | $t(df=41)=.61$  | 3.35                             |
|                                | SD        | 1.31                                | $p<.54, N.S.$   | 1.37                             |

Scores range between 1 and 5; a higher score indicates greater mean polarity of voting choice.





We predicted that the treatment group subjects would tend to be less equivocal in assigning a motive for the policy selection, would tend to assign greater weight to the altruistic motive, and would tend to attribute a stronger anti-labour attitude to the target leader. All of the observed differences are in the predicted direction, but none of these differences are large enough to be considered statistically reliable.

Finally, Table 6.13 displays comparative data relevant to the vote certainty hypotheses. The summary data reveal no significant differences between the two groups on either voting variable. In addition, there were no significant differences between the groups in substantive voting preference.

As in the "martyrdom" experiment, this analysis yields no firm conclusions. Unlike that former endeavour, however, the findings here suggest context effects opposite to those predicted. We had hypothesized that a nonpolitical achievement would provide more information about the achiever simply because an external explanation in terms of political role demands would not be plausible in this case. As the name implies, the success of General Eisenhower in post-war U. S. Politics served as the model for this



prediction.

The results of the experiment reveal few differences in the group profiles of the target leader. Significant differences are found only for normative and causal evaluations of the target. Comparison group subjects apparently perceived the target leader as a more attractive and important figure. In addition, these subjects tended to use slightly more extreme intervals to describe the target, although the differences here were not significant.

A secondary analysis of target-nontarget differences, similar to that conducted in the "martyrdom" experiment, revealed a pattern of extremity differences not substantially different from that found using only target leader ratings. That is, in comparative polarity as well, the comparison group was slightly, but not significantly, more extreme in their judgements.

A possible explanation of the results of this experiment might be found in the interaction of the achievement context with the policy selection context. Specifically, it may be that the nonpolitical achievement of the target leader generated tentative expectations about the leader's altruism that were



thrown in doubt with his subsequent selection of an overtly "political" policy platform. That is, the combination of these two contrasting pieces of information about the target leader may have made the treatment group subjects somewhat ambivalent in their impressions of him. The differences observed in this experiment, then, might not reflect as much the distinctiveness of the political achiever, as they do the enigmatic character of the nonpolitical achiever.

While this explanation seems plausible, the pattern of differences between the groups is not sufficiently clear to warrant our drawing such a conclusion. Rather it would seem preferable to replicate the experiment retaining our original hypotheses, but including additional conditions that bear on this post hoc speculation.

This replication and that of the "martyrdom" experiment are discussed in the next chapter.

### Notes

1. Using as a criterion, a minimum loading of .45, the compositions of the three factor indices used in this analysis are as follows:





## Evaluative factor composition

sincere-insincere  
trustworthy-untrustworthy  
honest-dishonest  
good-bad  
unselfish-selfish

## Dynamism factor composition

bold-timid  
fast-slow  
active-passive  
powerful-powerless  
sharp-dull  
hard-soft  
rugged-delicate  
committed-uncommitted

## Intenseness factor composition

tense-relaxed  
emotional-unemotional

2. The summary data for these secondary analyses of target-nontarget leader ratings are not presented here.



## CHAPTER VII

### The "Martyrdom" and "Eisenhower" Replications

For somewhat different reasons, we believed that both experiments reported in the previous chapter warranted replication. Concerning the "martyrdom" experiment, we found some weak but consistent indications that the policy context manipulation had generated the expected differences in subjects' impressions of the target leader. A replication in this instance, by providing additional evidence on the question, might help us to assess the validity of our original tentative conclusions.

The results of the "Eisenhower" experiment, on the other hand, were not at all as expected. The distinguishing behaviour (nonpolitical achievement) appeared, if anything, to convey less information to subjects about the target leader than did the nondistinguishing behaviour (political achievement). Although we suggested that this effect may have been an artifact of the particular scenario we provided to subjects, we were unable to provide empirical support for or against this hypothesis. A replication of this experiment with an additional condition to test the above interpretation seemed advisable.



We employed one basic scenario for both experiments. All four experimental groups were exposed to a target leader who carried impressive achievement credentials and who had selected an anti-labour or anti-strike policy platform for the election. The achievement context and policy context variables were simultaneously and independently manipulated so that we achieved a 2 X 2 factorial design, as displayed in Figure 7.1.

Our expectations in this experiment depend upon the additivity of the two manipulated factors. If, as originally assumed, the two factors are additive, we expect significant main effects for both the Policy and Achievement context manipulations. However, if the combination of nonpolitical achievement and popular policy interacts to produce greater uncertainty, as suggested at the end of the last chapter, then we would expect interaction effects in which the Policy condition specifies the nature of the Achievement effect.

### Subjects

Subjects for this replication were 104 male and female students enrolled in Introductory Political Science classes at Wilfrid Laurier University in the





Figure 7.1. The "Martyrdom" and "Eisenhower" Replications.

|                                  | Political<br>Achievement<br>Condition | Nonpolitical<br>Achievement<br>Condition |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Popular<br>Policy<br>Condition   | CELL I                                | CELL II                                  |
| Unpopular<br>Policy<br>Condition | CELL III                              | CELL IV                                  |



fall of 1974. Subjects were run in class time, and were assigned randomly to one of four experimental conditions. The number of subjects ranged from 25 to 27.

### Procedure

The procedure in this experiment was precisely the same as that used in the previous two. Subjects were briefed on the nature of the study and were prepared orally for the two-booklet format. The pairs of booklets were then distributed (see Appendices D and E for copies of these materials).

The initial page of the first booklet was an exact replica of that used in the previous experiments. It restated the purpose of the study and attempted to prepare subjects for the tasks demanded of them.

### Descriptive Materials

Much of the descriptive material common to the two prior experiments was adopted without change in this experiment. The initial descriptions of the country and of the two political parties were not altered, although the name of one party was shortened. The world crisis theme and the election setting were also carried over, as were the nontarget news item and



the news commentary.

Minor changes were made to the description of the nontarget leader and to the target news item. These changes did not reflect a change in purpose, but simply an attempt to enhance realism and effectiveness.

These common features represented the basic scenario used in all four conditions of the experiment. The differences among conditions occurred on either or both of two independent variables, corresponding to an Achievement Context variable, and to a Policy Context variable.

The Achievement Context manipulation was limited to the description of the target leader. While the name, socio-economic background, and achievements of the target leader did not vary across conditions, subjects read that the leader had made significant policy contributions to the coalition government either in a political capacity as his party's representative in the coalition (Political Achievement condition), or in a nonpolitical capacity as the "chief economic advisor to the coalition government" (Nonpolitical Achievement condition). The implication was made explicit that the target leader was a party veteran in the former condition, and a political novice in the latter.





The Policy Context manipulation was limited to differences in the target leader's news item. As in the previous "martyrdom" experiment, subjects were led to believe either that the target leader's selection of an anti-labour policy platform would "gain him the support of important sectors of the society", or that the policy selection "could seriously hurt his chances in the coming election". In both conditions, subjects read that the target leader "conceded to reporters that his adoption of this policy might have such positive/negative electoral implications".

### Response Measures

The questionnaire booklet accompanying the descriptive material differed little from the common booklet used in the previous two experiments. It included in this order (a) a 20-item semantic differential for each of the following concepts: Austen Reid (nontarget leader), National Party (nontarget leader's party), Most Politicians, John Hampton (target leader), and Public Party (target leader's party); (b) a number of background questions about the subject; (c) six 9-interval "vote-likelihood" scales assessing the subject's voting choice between all paired combinations of parties and leaders; (d) two 9-interval scales for



assessing each leader's anti-strike attitude; (e) three 9-interval scales for subject assessment of leader motivation regarding platform selection; (f) two 9-interval scales for subject assessment of his own success in completing the experimental task; and (g) two 9-interval scales for subjects to estimate the prior political activity of each leader.

### Dependent Variables

The central hypotheses of this experiment combine those of the previous two. If our manipulations are successful, we predict that the two out-of-role conditions will yield more information about the character of the target leader than will their respective in-role conditions.

We propose to use the two basic dependent variables employed previously to examine information gain. To reflect qualitative information gain, we will compare summary factor scores on the orthogonal dimensions of the target leader profile. For both the Achievement Context and the Policy Context manipulations, we predict significant effects on one or more of these semantic dimensions.

As in the previous experiments, we will employ a summary measure of attribute polarity to reflect the



quantitative aspect of information gain. We predict that each of the out-of-role conditions will lead to relatively more extreme attributions of character traits. Thus we predict significant effects for both Achievement Context and Policy Context variables on one or more of the extremity factor scores.

The target profile for this experiment was composed of the same fifteen semantic differential scales used in the previous two experiments. These scales were presented to subjects in random order and were directionally balanced. However, we did not vary across subjects the order or the direction of scale presentation, nor in this experiment did we vary across subjects the order of concept presentation.

Subjects' judgements of both target and nontarget leaders were analysed using principal component factor analysis with unit communalities. Three factors, accounting for 58% of the common variance, were extracted and rotated using the varimax criterion.

The rotated factor matrix, which is displayed in Table 7.1, bears a close resemblance to that obtained from the earlier experiments. The first two factors, although reversed in order, do not differ substantially in scale composition from the earlier







Table 7.1. Rotated factor matrix for 15 trait judgements of both target and non-target leaders

|                           | I<br>Dynamism<br>factor | II<br>Evaluative<br>factor | III<br>Intenseness<br>factor | $h^2$ |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|-------|
| Powerful-powerless        | .741                    | - .037                     | - .242                       | .609  |
| Fast-slow                 | .702                    | .261                       | .077                         | .566  |
| Bold-timid                | .701                    | .092                       | .419                         | .676  |
| Active-passive            | .661                    | .310                       | .273                         | .608  |
| Sharp-dull                | .621                    | .351                       | .078                         | .515  |
| Committed-uncommitted     | .485                    | .309                       | .348                         | .452  |
| Hard-soft                 | .597                    | .021                       | .517                         | .623  |
| Rugged-delicate           | .552                    | .072                       | .586                         | .653  |
| Trustworthy-untrustworthy | .038                    | .831                       | .050                         | .701  |
| Honest-dishonest          | .054                    | .792                       | - .039                       | .659  |
| Good-bad                  | .251                    | .767                       | - .055                       | .654  |
| Sincere-insincere         | .160                    | .727                       | .265                         | .624  |
| Unselfish-selfish         | .098                    | .658                       | .041                         | .444  |
| Tense-relaxed             | .093                    | - .209                     | .703                         | .546  |
| Emotional-unemotional     | .011                    | .193                       | .577                         | .370  |
| Eigenvalue                | 5.25                    | 2.32                       | 1.13                         |       |
| % of variance             | 35%                     | 15.5%                      | 7.6                          | 58%   |



result. The first factor, reflecting a Dynamism dimension, combines scales from both of the anticipated Potency and Activity dimensions. The second factor is clearly evaluative in tone. The third factor exhibits the same heavy loadings found previously for the scales tense-relaxed and emotional-unemotional, but it also includes some overlap with the Dynamism factor regarding the scales hard-soft and rugged-delicate.

We propose to employ here the same scale composition for the computation of factor scores as that used in the previous experiments. While this decision entails some cost in precision regarding the composition of the third factor, it enhances our ability to compare the two sets of experimental results (1).

In addition to the primary indices of information level, we retained here measures relevant to the motivational, attitudinal and importance hypotheses tested in the original experiments. The predictions remain unchanged.

We predict that the out-of-role conditions of the Achievement Context and of the Policy Context manipulations will lead to motivational attributions that are more extreme and more altruistic than those of their respective in-role conditions. Secondly, we



predict that subjects in the out-of-role conditions will perceive the target leader as more anti-labour than will subjects in the in-role conditions. We predict as well that the out-of-role conditions will lead to attributions of greater target leader importance.

In our analysis of the original experimental data, we discovered that the impact of the manipulation was at times more clearly evident in comparative measures based on target-nontarget differences in rating. That is, subjects' differential impressions of the situation found expression jointly in terms of judgements of both leaders. In these replications, therefore, we will employ comparative measures for each of the variables discussed above, and we will examine their variation concurrently with our analysis of the single target leader ratings.

Finally, we included in these experiments the "vote likelihood" questions used in the original protocols. That is, we asked subjects to express on a 9-interval scale the likelihood of their selecting one party or leader over another. Subjects were presented with six different voting scales, each pairing a different combination of the two parties and two leaders.





As in the former experiments, we expect that an improvement in the quality of information held about a political leader should enhance the certainty of one's voting choice in matters involving that leader. Thus we predict that the treatment group subjects in both experiments should display greater certainty in their voting selection. Because this effect should be most evident in the pairings of the two parties and of the two leaders, we will limit our predictions to these two scales.

## Results

### A. Scenario Effectiveness

Although we changed the original basic scenario only in a number of minor ways, subjects in this experiment seemed to manifest greater situational involvement and seemed less prone to making real world projections than subjects in the previous experiments. As reflected in Table 7.2, the differences in involvement between the original and replicated experiments were statistically significant.

Part of the reason for this improvement may involve a greater interest in the exercise by subjects in the second administration. Unlike the first, subjects for this experiment were drawn exclusively



Table 7.2. Mean judgements of Involvement and Tendency to Project for the first set of experiments and for the second

|   |           | <u>Original<br/>Experiments</u> |                   | <u>Replicated<br/>Experiments</u> |
|---|-----------|---------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Involvement in<br>Hypothetical system     | $\bar{X}$ | 4.98                            | $t(df=210)=-3.90$ | 6.01                              |
|   | SD        | 2.10                            | $p<.001, SIG.$    | 1.73                              |
| Tendency to project<br>real world objects | $\bar{X}$ | 3.72                            | $t(df=210)=-.90$  | 3.97                              |
|   | SD        | 2.04                            | $p<.25, N.S.$     | 2.00                              |

Scores for both variables may range between 1=9. A greater score implies greater involvement and less tendency to project.

Significance tests report two-tailed probabilities.

Table 7.3. Interest in Politics by Experimental Group

|                 | <u>Original<br/>Experiment<br/>%</u> | <u>Replicated<br/>Experiment<br/>%</u> |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| Very Interested | 24                                   | 35                                     |
| Somewhat        | 50                                   | 56                                     |
| Not very        | 22                                   | 6                                      |
| Not at all      | 4                                    | 3                                      |
| Total           | <u>100%</u><br>(99)                  | <u>100%</u><br>(113)                   |

$$\chi^2 = 11.32 \text{ df} = 3 \text{ } p<.02$$



from introductory political science classes. In fact, Table 7.3 reveals that there were significant differences between the two subject pools in terms of their degree of interest in politics.

In Table 7.4, we re-examine involvement and projection differences between the subject pools, after dividing both pools into high and low interest groups. These data suggest that the greater interest of the second group does indeed account for some of the improvement in involvement. Subjects with greater political interest in both pools tended to register greater involvement in the exercise, although there was no comparable pattern with respect to the projection estimate. However, it should be noted that this interest variable does not account for all of the improvement in involvement. Among those very or somewhat interested in politics, the replication pool still exhibits significantly greater involvement in the hypothetical system.

#### B. Policy-Leader Association.

In this experiment, as in the former, there was a possibility that subjects might become confused as to which leader adopted which policy. Since an incorrect association would contribute unnecessary





Table 7.4. Mean judgements of Involvement and Tendency to Project, holding Interest in Politics constant, for the first and second experimental groups

|                                     |           | <u>Original Experiments</u> |                  | <u>Replicat Experime</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>Very or Somewhat Interested</u>  |           |                             |                  |                          |
| Involvement in System               | $\bar{X}$ | 5.23                        | $t(df=164)=3.11$ | 6.15                     |
|                                     | SD        | 2.13                        | $p<.001, SIG.$   | 1.65                     |
| Tendency to project                 | $\bar{X}$ | 3.77                        | $t(df=164)=-.41$ | 3.90                     |
|                                     | SD        | 2.02                        | $p<.45, N.S.$    | 1.96                     |
| <u>Not Very - At all Interested</u> |           |                             |                  |                          |
| Involvement in System               | $\bar{X}$ | 4.18                        | $t(df=31)=-.28$  | 4.38                     |
|                                     | SD        | 1.89                        | $p<.45, N.S.$    | 1.92                     |
| Tendency to project                 | $\bar{X}$ | 3.59                        | $t(df=31)=1.35$  | 4.75                     |
|                                     | SD        | 2.20                        | $p<.10, N.S.$    | 2.43                     |

Scores may range between 1-9, where the lower score indicates less involvement and greater tendency to project.

Significance tests report two-tailed probabilities.



error variance to the target leader ratings, we sought to identify and eliminate responses apparently based on such erroneous associations. Again, we asked subjects to assess each leader's attitude on the right to strike issue, and we designated as incorrect, a response pattern in which the target leader was perceived as clearly sympathetic, while the nontarget leader was perceived as clearly opposed. Four subjects satisfied this joint criterion and were eliminated from the subsequent analysis.

#### C. Leader-Activity Association.

In the original "Eisenhower" experiment, the Political and Nonpolitical Achievement groups seemed to differ little in their target leader impressions. Since some of this problem may have stemmed from an ineffective manipulation of the political/nonpolitical context of the achievement, we attempted to sharpen this distinction in the replication. In the Political Achievement condition, subjects read that the target leader had been a member of the coalition government. In the Nonpolitical Achievement condition, subjects read that he had been chief economic advisor to that government.

In this replication, we included a question



designed to check the effectiveness of the context manipulation. Subjects were asked to estimate directly the degree of prior political involvement they associated with each of the party leaders. The mean group ratings of the leaders on 9-interval scales are presented in Table 7.5.

Comparisons among these groups suggest that the manipulation was quite effective. In ratings of the target leader, the mean for subjects in the Political Achievement Context condition was on the "active" side of the scale, while the mean for those in the Nonpolitical Achievement Context condition was on the "not active" side of the scale. The difference between these means was significant beyond the .001 level. A contrast effect, similar to that found in the "martyrdom" experiment, is apparent in corresponding involvement ratings of the nontarget leader. While both Political and Nonpolitical Context groups gave this leader a mean rating toward the "active" end of the scale, the Nonpolitical Achievement groups were significantly more pronounced in this tendency.

#### D. Hypotheses.

The substantive hypotheses are tested using a two-way analysis of variance. Table 7.6 displays a





Table 7.5. Mean ratings of target and nontarget leaders' prior involvement in politics

|                  |           | <u>Nonpolitical<br/>Achievement</u> |                  | <u>Political<br/>Achievement</u> |
|------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| Target leader    | $\bar{X}$ | 4.18                                | $t(df=97)=-6.06$ | 6.73                             |
|                  | SD        | 2.27                                | $p<.001, SIG.$   | 1.91                             |
| Nontarget leader | $\bar{X}$ | 7.48                                | $T(df=97)=3.02$  | 6.51                             |
|                  | SD        | 1.71                                | $p<.003, SIG.$   | 1.47                             |

Scores may range between 1-9, where the lower score indicates less prior political involvement.

Significance tests report two-tailed probabilities.



summary of the means in each condition of the two factors over the range of dependent measures. Individual cell means and standard deviations are found in Appendix F. Tables 7.7-7.15 display summary tables for each individual analysis of variance. In Figures 7.2-7.4, significant interactions are graphed to clarify the nature of the relationships.

Summary tables relevant to the first hypothesis are presented in Tables 7.7 and 7.8. We had predicted that the Policy and Achievement context manipulations would produce qualitatively different profiles of the target political leader. Contrary to expectations, neither the main effects nor the interaction effects are significant for any of the three major dimensions of the leader profile. In Table 7.7, the analysis is based on mean dimension scores derived only from ratings of the target leader. In Table 7.8, the dimension scores are derived from target-nontarget differences in leader ratings.

The summary analyses pertinent to the polarity hypotheses are displayed in Tables 7.9 and 7.10. In these tables, the findings are more supportive of our hypotheses. Specifically, in the analyses based only on ratings of the target leader (Table 7.9), none of the main effects are significant, but there are significant



Table 7.6. Summary of Policy and Achievement Group Means over all Dependent Measures.

| Dependent Measures  | N | Policy Factor Popular (50) | Policy Factor Unpop. (50) | Achievement Factor Political (50) | Achievement Factor Nonpol. (49) |
|---|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Target Leader Ratings (1)   |   |                            |                           |                                   |                                 |
| Evaluative Dimension  |   | 3.52                       | 3.52                      | 3.50                              | 3.55                            |
| Dynamism Dimension  |   | 2.84                       | 2.75                      | 2.82                              | 2.76                            |
| Intenseness Dimension   |   | 3.89                       | 3.74                      | 3.66                              | 3.97                            |
| Target-Nontarget Differences in Ratings (2)                       |   |                            |                           |                                   |                                 |
| Evaluative Dimension  |   | .45                        | .77                       | .72                               | .49                             |
| Dynamism Dimension  |   | 1.21                       | 1.80                      | 1.40                              | 1.59                            |
| Intenseness Dimension   |   | 1.63                       | 2.12                      | 2.01                              | 1.74                            |
| Target Leader Rating Polarity (3)                                 |   |                            |                           |                                   |                                 |
| Evaluative Dimension  |   | 2.91                       | 2.13                      | 2.16                              | 2.87                            |
| Dynamism Dimension  |   | 3.20                       | 3.32 x                    | 3.29                              | 3.23                            |
| Intenseness Dimension   |   | 3.23                       | 3.18                      | 3.22                              | 3.19                            |
| Overall Profile   |   | 3.21                       | 3.37 x                    | 3.37                              | 3.22                            |
| Target-Nontarget Differences in Rating Polarity (4)               |   |                            |                           |                                   |                                 |
| Evaluative Dimension  |   | .20                        | .40                       | .38                               | .19                             |
| Dynamism Dimension  |   | .43 *                      | .99 x                     | .68                               | .74                             |
| Intenseness Dimension   |   | .37                        | .28                       | .25                               | .40                             |
| Overall Profile   |   | .30 *                      | .60 x                     | .45                               | .45                             |
| Target Importance (1)   |   | 4.01                       | 3.72                      | 3.87                              | 3.86                            |
| Target - Nontarget Differences in Importance (2)                  |   | 1.03 *                     | 1.71                      | 1.31                              | 1.44                            |
| Polarity of Target Policy Motivation (3)                          |   | 3.02 *                     | 3.86                      | 3.48                              | 3.40                            |
| Polarity of Target-Nontarget Differences in Policy Motivation (4) |   | -.75 *                     | .60                       | .22                               | -.37                            |
| Nature of Target Policy Motivation (5)                            |   | 5.90 *                     | 7.30                      | 6.60                              | 6.60                            |
| Nature of Target-Nontarget Differences in Motivation (6)          |   | 1.78 *                     | 3.96                      | 2.96                              | 2.78                            |
| Target Anti-Labour Attitude (7)                                   |   | 2.97                       | 7.92                      | 7.80                              | 8.08                            |
| Target-Nontarget Differences in Anti-Labour Attitude (8)          |   | 3.86                       | 4.74                      | 4.40                              | 4.20                            |
| Vote Certainty Between Parties (9)                                |   | 3.43                       | 3.57                      | 3.50                              | 3.50                            |
| Vote Certainty Between Leaders (9)                                |   | 3.26 *                     | 3.78 x                    | 3.50                              | 3.54                            |





### Notes for Table 7.6

- \* - Significant main effects between conditions of factor (see summary analysis of variance tables 7.7 - 7.15).
  - x - Significant interaction effects between factors (see summary analysis of variance tables 7.7 - 7.15).
- (1) Mean scores for the Target Leader Ratings may range between 1-9, where the lower score indicates a more positive evaluation, greater dynamism, greater intenseness, or greater attributed importance.
  - (2) Mean scores for the Target-Nontarget Differences in Rating may range between -8 and +8 where a positive score reflects greater positive evaluation, greater dynamism and greater intenseness of the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
  - (3) Mean polarity scores for the Target Leader may range between 1-5 where the higher score reflects greater polarity.
  - (4) Mean scores for Target-Nontarget Differences in Polarity may range between -4 and +4 where a positive score indicates greater polarity for the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
  - (5) Mean scores for Policy Motivation may range between 1-9, where the higher score reflects greater weight on the altruistic motive, and the lower score indicates greater weight on the "political" motive.
  - (6) Mean differences in Motivational Attribution between Target and Nontarget may range between -8 and +8, where a positive score reflects greater altruism attributed to the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
  - (7) Mean attitude scores for the Target Leader may range between 1-9, where the higher score reflects a stronger attributed Anti-Labour attitude.
  - (8) Mean differences in attitude scores between the Target and Nontarget Leader may range between -8 and +8, where a positive score reflects a stronger Anti-Labour attitude attributed to the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
  - (9) Mean Vote Certainty scores may range between 1-5, where the higher score indicates greater certainty of decision.



Table 7.7. Target Leader Ratings by  
Achievement and Policy Factors:  
Summary Analysis of Variance Tables.

(i) Target Ratings on the Evaluative Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .007   | 1  | .007 | .000 | .98 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .051   | 1  | .051 | .027 | .87 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 2.00   | 1  | 2.00 | 1.07 | .30 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 179.72 | 96 | 1.87 |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 181.77 | 99 | 1.84 |      |     |

(ii) Target Ratings on the Dynamism Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .14    | 1  | .14  | .13  | .72 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .073   | 1  | .073 | .07  | .79 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 3.35   | 1  | 3.35 | 3.13 | .08 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 102.69 | 96 | 1.07 |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 106.26 | 99 | 1.07 |      |     |

(iii) Target Ratings on the Intenseness Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F   | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|-----|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .56    | 1  | .56   | .19 | .67 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 2.40   | 1  | 2.40  | .79 | .38 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 7.02   | 1  | 7.02  | 2.3 | .13 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 291.84 | 96 | 3.040 |     |     |
| TOTAL                               | 301.82 | 99 | 3.048 |     |     |



Table 7.8. Target - Nontarget Differences  
in Rating by Achievement and  
Policy Factors: Summary Analysis  
of Variance Tables.

(i) Target - Nontarget Differences in Rating on the Evaluative Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 2.62   | 1  | 2.62 | .67  | .42 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 1.39   | 1  | 1.39 | .35  | .55 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | .089   | 1  | .089 | .023 | .88 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 377.52 | 96 | 3.93 |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 381.63 | 99 | 3.85 |      |     |

(ii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Rating on the Dynamism Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS    | df | MS    | F     | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|-------|----|-------|-------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 9.90  | 1  | 9.0   | 2.78  | .098 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .90   | 1  | .90   | .28   | .60  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 3.61  | 1  | 3.61  | 1.115 | .29  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 310.7 | 96 | 3.236 |       |      |
| TOTAL                               | 324.2 | 99 | 3.27  |       |      |

(iii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Rating on the Intenseness Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F    | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 6.00   | 1  | 6.00  | 1.03 | .31  |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 1.82   | 1  | 1.82  | .31  | .57  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 10.56  | 1  | 10.56 | 1.81 | .182 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 560.29 | 96 | 5.84  |      |      |
| TOTAL                               | 578.68 | 99 | 5.85  |      |      |





Table 7.9. Polarity of Target Leader Ratings  
by Achievement and Policy Factors:  
Summary Analysis of Variance Tables.

(i) Polarity of Target Ratings on the Evaluative Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS    | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 1.19  | 1  | 1.19 | 1.78 | .18 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 2.27  | 1  | 2.27 | 3.39 | .07 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 1.38  | 1  | 1.38 | 2.06 | .15 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 64.25 | 96 | .66  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 69.09 | 99 | .70  |      |     |

(ii) Polarity of Target Ratings on the Dynamism Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS    | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .42   | 1  | .42  | 1.07 | .29 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .09   | 1  | .09  | .25  | .62 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 2.27  | 1  | 2.27 | 6.03 | .02 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 36.09 | 96 | .38  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 38.86 | 99 | .39  |      |     |

(iii) Polarity of Target Ratings on the Intenseness Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS    | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .062  | 1  | .062 | .067 | .80 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .022  | 1  | .022 | .024 | .88 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 1.56  | 1  | 1.56 | 1.64 | .20 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 91.39 | 96 | .95  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 93.05 | 99 | .93  |      |     |




(iv) Polarity of Target Ratings on the Overall Profile

| SOURCE                              | SS    | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .61   | 1  | .61  | 1.31 | .26 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .54   | 1  | .54  | 1.16 | .28 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 2.48  | 1  | 2.48 | 5.28 | .02 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 45.09 | 96 | .47  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 48.74 | 99 | .49  |      |     |



Figure 7.2. Graphs of Interactions for (i) Dynamism Polarity Ratings and (ii) Overall Profile Polarity Ratings of the Target Leader.

(i) Interaction of Dynamism Polarity



(ii) Interaction of Overall Profile Polarity








Table 7.10. Target - Nontarget Differences in Polarity of Rating by Achievement and Policy Factors. Summary Analysis of Variance Tables.

(i) Target - Nontarget Differences in Polarity on the Evaluative Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS    | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 1.04  | 1  | 1.04 | 1.12 | .29 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 1.12  | 1  | 1.12 | 1.21 | .27 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | .21   | 1  | .21  | .23  | .63 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 89.02 | 96 | .93  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 91.40 | 99 | .92  |      |     |

(ii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Polarity on the Dynamism Factor

| SOURCE                              | SS    | df | MS   | F    | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|-------|----|------|------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 7.56  | 1  | 7.56 | 8.61 | .004 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .90   | 1  | .90  | .102 | .75  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 3.42  | 1  | 3.42 | 3.90 | .05  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 84.29 | 96 | .88  |      |      |
| TOTAL                               | 95.37 | 99 | .96  |      |      |

(iii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Polarity on the Intenseness

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .20    | 1  | .20  | .17  | .68 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .56    | 1  | .56  | .47  | .49 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 3.06   | 1  | 3.06 | 2.58 | .11 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 113.86 | 96 | 1.19 |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 117.69 | 99 | 1.19 |      |     |




(iv) Target - Nontarget Differences in Polarity on the Overall Profile

| SOURCE                              | SS   | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 2.15 | 1  | 2.15 | 4.85 | .03 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .003 | 1  | .003 | .006 | .94 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 2.31 | 1  | 2.31 | 5.21 | .02 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 42.5 | 96 | .44  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 47.0 | 99 | .47  |      |     |



Figure 7.3. Graphs of Interactions for (i) Target-Nontarget Differences in Dynamism Polarity Ratings, and (ii) Target-Nontarget Differences in Overall Profile Polarity Ratings.

(i) Interaction of Target-Nontarget Dynamism Polarity



(ii) Interaction of Target-Nontarget Overall Profile Polarity








Table 7.11. (i) Target and (ii) Target-Nontarget  
Differences in Leader Importance  
by Achievement and Policy Factors:  
Summary Analysis of Variance Tables.

(i) Target Leader Importance

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS   | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 2.10   | 1  | 2.10 | 1.28 | .26 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .003   | 1  | .003 | .002 | .97 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 1.83   | 1  | 1.83 | .50  | .48 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 158.25 | 96 | 1.65 |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 161.19 | 99 | 1.63 |      |     |

(ii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Importance

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 11.56  | 1  | 11.56 | 3.77 | .05 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 1.40   | 1  | 1.40  | .134 | .72 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 3.10   | 1  | 3.10  | 1.01 | .32 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 294.05 | 96 | 3.06  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 309.12 | 99 | 3.12  |      |     |



Table 7.12. (i) Target and (ii) Target-Nontarget Differences in Polarity of Motivational Attribution by Achievement and Policy Factors: Summary Analysis of Variance Tables.

(i) Polarity of Target Leader Motivational Attribution

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F     | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|-------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 17.63  | 1  | 17.63 | 13.46 | .004 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .16    | 1  | .16   | .12   | .73  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 1.0    | 1  | 1.0   | .76   | .38  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 125.84 | 96 | 1.31  |       |      |
| TOTAL                               | 144.64 | 99 | 1.46  |       |      |

(ii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Motivational Attribution

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F     | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|-------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 13.71  | 1  | 13.71 | 10.21 | .002 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 2.79   | 1  | 2.79  | 2.08  | .15  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 2.88   | 1  | 2.85  | 2.12  | .15  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 128.64 | 96 | 1.34  |       |      |
| TOTAL                               | 148.50 | 99 | 1.50  |       |      |



Table 7.13. (i) Target and (ii) Target-Nontarget Differences in Policy Motivation by Achievement and Policy Factors: Summary Analysis of Variance Tables.

(i) Attributed Policy Motivation of Target Leader

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F    | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 42.72  | 1  | 42.72 | 9.62 | .002 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .16    | 1  | .16   | .04  | .85  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 1.98   | 1  | 1.98  | .45  | .51  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 417.33 | 96 | 4.44  |      |      |
| TOTAL                               | 462.20 | 99 | 4.76  |      |      |

(ii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Attributed Policy Motivation

| SOURCE                              | SS      | df | MS    | F    | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|---------|----|-------|------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 118.8   | 1  | 118.8 | 6.99 | .009 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .81     | 1  | .81   | .05  | .83  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 32.4    | 1  | 32.4  | 1.91 | .17  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 1631.19 | 96 | 16.99 |      |      |
| TOTAL                               | 1783.30 | 99 | 18.01 |      |      |





Table 7.14. (i) Target and (ii) Target-Nontarget Differences in Anti-Labour Attitude By Achievement and Policy Factors: Summary Analysis of Variance Tables.

(i) Attributed Anti-Labour Attitude of the Target Leader

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F    | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|------|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | .0003  | 1  | .0003 | .000 | .99 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 2.61   | 1  | 2.61  | 1.22 | .27 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | .71    | 1  | .71   | .33  | .57 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 202.03 | 96 | 2.15  |      |     |
| TOTAL                               | 205.35 | 99 | 2.12  |      |     |

(ii) Target - Nontarget Differences in Attributed Anti-Labour Attitude

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS    | F    | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|-------|------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 19.36  | 1  | 19.36 | 2.80 | .097 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | 1.00   | 1  | 1.00  | .14  | .70  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | .16    | 1  | .16   | .02  | .88  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 664.47 | 96 | 6.92  |      |      |
| TOTAL                               | 684.99 | 99 | 6.92  |      |      |



Table 7.15. Certainty of Voting Decision by  
Achievement and Policy Factors:  
Summary Analysis of Variance  
Tables.

(i) Certainty of Voting for One Party Rather than the Other


| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS   | F   | SIG |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|------|-----|-----|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 1.06   | 1  | 1.06 | .94 | .33 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .11    | 1  | .11  | .10 | .76 |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | .02    | 1  | .02  | .01 | .91 |
| RESIDUAL                            | 102.84 | 96 | 1.12 |     |     |
| TOTAL                               | 103.99 | 99 | 1.9  |     |     |

(ii) Certainty of Voting for One Leader Rather than the Other

| SOURCE                              | SS     | df | MS   | F    | SIG  |
|-------------------------------------|--------|----|------|------|------|
| POLICY TREATMENT                    | 7.10   | 1  | 7.10 | 7.11 | .009 |
| ACHIEVEMENT TREATMENT               | .32    | 1  | .32  | .32  | .58  |
| POLICY x ACHIEVEMENT<br>INTERACTION | 6.78   | 1  | 6.78 | 6.80 | .01  |
| RESIDUAL                            | 91.82  | 96 | .99  |      |      |
| TOTAL                               | 105.96 | 99 | 1.12 |      |      |



Figure 7.4. Graph of Interaction for Voter Certainty in Choice Between Political Leaders.







interaction effects in comparisons of Dynamism polarity and in comparisons of Overall Profile polarity.

It is apparent from Figure 7.2 that the interactions for both of these dependent variables are due largely to the relative polarity of ratings in one cell - the Unpopular Policy condition of the Political Achievement context. All differences among the other three cell means are of a much smaller magnitude.

These findings suggest tentatively that the Policy context manipulation has an impact only when the target has followed a conventional political career pattern. When the previous career pattern is nonpolitical, the manipulation appears to have very little impact on the polarity of ratings. Indeed, although the differences are not significant, these data suggest that the adoption of an unpopular policy in the nonpolitical career context tends to inhibit rather than to enhance the subject's ability to make inferences about the actor.

It is apparent as well from Figure 7.2 that the data do not conform to the pattern of findings observed from the previous "Eisenhower" experiment. In this second experiment, subjects exposed to the popular policy of a nonpolitical achiever tend, if anything, to exhibit greater polarity in their ratings of the



achiever than do subjects exposed to the popular policy of a political achiever. These differences are not significant, but they are in the direction predicted in our original hypothesis.

Summary tables for the analyses of target-nontarget differences in polarity are displayed in Table 7.10. The findings here are similar to those observed with the target ratings alone. Thus only the Dynamism and Overall Profile analyses yield significant effects. In addition to the interaction effects, however, both of these analyses indicate the presence of significant Policy treatment effects.

Inspection of the graphs displayed in Figure 7.3 suggests that the main effects are due almost entirely to Policy treatment differences in the Political Achievement condition. As in the analysis of target ratings alone, there are almost no differences in rating polarity between the two policy conditions when the target achievement is set in a nonpolitical context. The interaction effects here reflect the differential impact of the Achievement manipulation in the two policy conditions. As before, the directional impact of the Achievement manipulation depends on the policy adopted by the target. If the policy is seen to be popular, inferences made in the nonpolitical



achievement context tend to be stronger than those made in the political achievement context. The reverse holds when the policy is seen to be unpopular.

Table 7.11 summarizes the analysis of variance for group differences in the importance associated with the target leader. Examining the analysis based on target ratings alone, we can see that there are no significant effects. We note from Table 7.6, however, that the differences among treatment means for both factors are in the directions predicted by our original hypotheses.

The adjacent analysis based on target-nontarget differences in attributed importance suggests again that the impact of the behavioural manipulation is more completely reflected in the subjects' comparative assessments of the two leaders. In this analysis, the Policy treatment main effects are significant. Subjects exposed to the unpopular policy selection of the target leader tend to attribute greater relative importance to the target than do subjects exposed to the popular policy selection. Differences in attributed importance between the Achievement conditions are not significant.

Summary tables relevant to the motivational hypotheses are presented in Tables 7.12 and 7.13. The







patterns are similar in both tables (Polarity and Nature of Motivational Attribution), and in both parts of each table (Target and Target-Nontarget Differences). There are significant main effects for the Policy context manipulation, and no other significant effects. Thus subjects in the out-of-role behaviour group (Unpopular Policy condition) are significantly more extreme in their attributions of motivation; in addition, policy group differences in the weighting of the altruistic motive are significant in the predicted direction.

In Table 7.14, an analysis of mean attitude assessments on the Anti-Labour issue reveals no significant differences for either factor whether subjects are rating the target leader alone, or comparatively rating the target and nontarget leaders on this dimension.

Finally, in Table 7.15, the summary analysis pertaining to subjects' voting behaviour is displayed. We predicted that the unpopular policy selection and the nonpolitical achievement context would permit subjects to express more certainty in their voting judgements, relative to the choices of those in their respective comparison groups.

The analyses of variance indicate no



significant effects in subjects' voting for the two parties involved. However, in leader voting, the analysis indicates both a significant Policy treatment main effect, and a significant interaction effect between the two factors.

The pattern of differences apparent in Figure 7.4 parallels those found in Figure 7.3. That is, the main effect for the Policy manipulation is due almost exclusively to Policy group differences in the Political Achievement condition. In addition, the interaction effect indicates that the directional impact of the Achievement manipulation depends on the nature of the policy seen to be adopted by the target leader. If the popular policy is seen to be adopted, those exposed to the nonpolitical achiever manifest greater certainty in their leader voting decision. If, on the other hand, the unpopular policy is seen to be adopted, the reverse pattern of voting certainty obtains.

### Discussion and Conclusions

In designing this experiment, we were attempting to re-test the "martyrdom" and "Eisenhower" hypotheses. The results of the experiment provide



fairly strong support for the former, and very little for the latter.

In the "martyrdom" hypothesis, we predicted that a political leader's selection of an unpopular policy rather than a popular one would convey more information to subjects and permit them to make stronger inferences about the leader. Although we found no qualitative differences in group profiles of the target, there was considerable evidence to suggest that subjects exposed to the unpopular policy selection tended to make stronger inferences about the target.

Specifically, subjects in the unpopular policy condition tended to make stronger inferences about the dynamism of the target, and about his character profile overall. They tended to make stronger attributions of motivation to explain his policy selection. They tended to attribute greater importance to the target; and they exhibited greater certainty of their voting decision when given a choice between the two leaders. As additionally implied in the "martyrdom" hypothesis, subjects in the Unpopular Policy condition attributed a more altruistic motive for the target's policy selection than did subjects in the Popular Policy condition.

Contrary to expectations, those in the







Unpopular Policy condition did not attribute a stronger anti-labour attitude to the target leader, nor did they exhibit more certainty in choosing between the two political parties.

Regarding the latter of these failings, it may be the case that stronger inferences about the leaders affect the certainty of one's preference between the leaders, but do not affect the certainty of one's overall voting preference as reflected in the party choice. If this is true, it does not discredit the basic "martyrdom" hypothesis, but it does suggest a more complex relationship between candidate impression and voting preference.

However, it seems more likely that this lack of significant difference simply reflects the artificiality of the voting exercise in this experiment. That is, subjects may not have identified parties with leaders as closely here as they do in real election situations. Thus the transfer or generalization effect was not achieved.

The absence of significant differences between the policy context groups in estimates of the target's anti-labour or anti-strike attitude is difficult to explain. It may be that subjects in both groups are willing to accept the policy selection as an expression



of the target's personal attitude, but that they are willing to make additional inferences about the character of the target only when the selection involves probable negative consequences for the actor.

Our predictions from the "Eisenhower" hypothesis were similar to those tested above; we predicted that subjects informed of a prior achievement of a political leader would gain more information and make stronger inferences about the leader if the achievement were set in a nonpolitical context rather than in a political one. As in the first administration of this experiment, we found very little support for these hypotheses.

There were no significant Achievement main effects across the entire range of dependent variables. While there were a number of interaction effects, these seemed largely to reflect the differential impact of the Unpopular Policy selection in the Political and Nonpolitical Achievement conditions.

In our analysis of the results of the previous "Eisenhower" experiment, we suggested that the account of the target leader's nonpolitical achievement followed by his selection of an overtly "political" campaign policy may have created an ambivalent impression among subjects. We suggested that this



ambivalence effect might explain the relative lack of attributional distinctiveness in treatment group impressions of the target leader.

The relevant data in this experiment do not support our post hoc interpretation. Although the differences are in most cases not significant, the combination of nonpolitical achievement and "political" (popular) campaign policy tends to produce stronger, not weaker, attributions than the combination of political achievement and "political" campaign policy. Thus our findings in this experiment are quite different from those of the original "Eisenhower" experiment.

Careful examination of the interaction effects provides a possible interpretation for the pattern of findings in this experiment. Specifically, it may be that the Achievement context manipulation created unanticipated effects. It may be that the nonpolitical achiever was seen as a nonpolitical actor as well. That is, subjects may have seized upon the fact that he was a novice to politics, and may therefore have evaluated his actions at face value rather than against a set of political expectations.

This interpretation would account for the differential impact of the Policy manipulation in the







two Achievement conditions. In the Political Achievement condition, subjects would perceive the target as a "veteran of party politics", and evaluate his subsequent policy selection against the norms of the political role. Thus those exposed to the unpopular policy selection would tend to gain more information from the behaviour than those exposed to the popular policy selection.

In the Nonpolitical Achievement condition, however, subjects would tend to see the target as a newcomer to politics, and would tend to hold weaker expectations about his subsequent behaviour. As a consequence, we would not necessarily expect the unpopular policy selection to convey more information than the popular policy selection.

On the other hand, we might expect both Policy conditions in the Nonpolitical Achievement context to convey more information than the Popular Policy condition in the Political Achievement condition. That is, as in the first experiment reported in Chapter V, we would expect the popular policy selection in the Political Achievement condition to be discounted as a source of information, while both policy selections in the Nonpolitical Achievement condition would not necessarily be discounted. Although the differences



were seldom significant, we can see from the graphed interactions in this chapter that the differences are in the predicted direction.

If this interpretation is correct, we must conclude that the "Eisenhower" hypothesis has not been adequately tested here. To do so would require eliminating the Policy behavioural data altogether from the scenario, or would require altering the history of the target leader to ensure that he appears as a "veteran" to both groups.

However, this interpretation enhances the tenability of the "martyrdom" hypothesis for it leads us to seek evidence of the effect only in the Political Achievement condition. Considering both main and interaction effects, then, we can conclude that the hypothesis finds considerable support here.

It is not entirely clear why the results of this experiment differ from those reported in the previous chapter. In large part, they differ from those of the original "martyrdom" experiment only by degree. Thus the replication yields a much clearer pattern of findings.

Although we can only speculate about the reasons for this enhanced clarity, we did make a number of minor changes to increase the realism of the



hypothetical system. Among other things, we made minor changes to the target leader's descriptive profile and to the news item describing his policy platform. Thus the differences may be attributable to a more effective scenario and manipulation. On the other hand, they may be due to differences in the political interest of subjects in the two pools. We noted that subjects in the second administration expressed greater involvement in the situation, and that fewer of these people made incorrect leader-policy associations.

The differences between these results and the original "Eisenhower" experiment are more difficult to explain. On the surface at least, the differences in the scenarios used in the two administrations are not great enough to account for the differential impact of the Achievement context manipulations.

Two other possible reasons might be suggested. First, the differences may simply reflect differences in the subject pools - differences in political interest, political culture, or the political climate at the time of the administration. Second, the differences may be due to chance. We note that in neither experiment were the patterns consistently significant. In the replication, no Achievement context main effects were statistically significant, while in







the original experiment, the pattern of significant findings was not sufficiently consistent to permit an unequivocal conclusion.

### Notes

1. Computation of factor scores involved averaging subject ratings for all traits with a loading of at least .45 on the factor in question. The exception to this rule, as noted in the text, was on the third factor where the scales hard-soft and rugged-delicate were not included in this factor, despite their loadings above .45. Factor scale compositions are list below.

Dynamism factor composition  
powerful-powerless  
fast-slow  
bold-timid  
active-passive  
sharp-dull  
committed-uncommitted  
hard-soft  
rugged-delicate

Evaluative factor composition  
trustworthy-untrustworthy  
honest-dishonest  
good-bad  
sincere-insincere  
unselfish-selfish

Intenseness factor composition  
tense-relaxed  
emotional-unemotional



## CHAPTER VIII

### Summary and Conclusions

In the extant voting literature of recent years, researchers have consistently identified the candidate factor as a potent source of short-term variation in voting behaviour. Despite this attention, our understanding of the candidate's impact appears to be somewhat less than complete.

Specifically, prevailing political models of information processing fail to account for the origins of personal image content that is not related to the manifest political properties of the candidate, or to the voter's affective reaction to those properties.

In short, our models provide little guidance in understanding a Liberal supporter's view of Pierre Trudeau as arrogant and insincere, or a Conserative supporter's view of Joe Clark as weak and untrustworthy. Since these kinds of perceptions appear at times to play a significant role in determining voting behaviour, they warrant additional theoretical and empirical attention.

In this thesis, we have adopted a somewhat different theoretical approach to the problem of candidate image formation. Briefly summarized, we have conceived of image formation in terms of person



perception processes, and have drawn upon some of the relevant social psychological literature in this area to enhance our understanding of candidate perception.

On the one hand, the approach proposed here allows for so-called "perceiver-determined" aspects of the image. In the person perception literature, much attention has been given to the processes through which perceivers employ limited trait information about an actor as a basis for additional trait inferences. These theories of social stereotyping, and of implicit theories of personality would seem to be very useful for understanding the apparent organization of much image content around a number of salient socio-political properties of the candidate.

On the other hand, the approach suggests an account of inference processes that may help to explain the presence of apparently independent image content. Attribution theory in person perception suggests a means by which inferences about the character of an actor might be drawn from an analysis of the actor's behaviour.

In this thesis, we have employed attribution theory assumptions as the basis for our proposal regarding candidate image formation. Specifically, we have suggested that the individual voter seeks





information about the underlying dispositional nature of the candidate in order to comprehend a rather important causal agent within his political environment. While leader actions might serve as useful reflections of this dispositional nature, we have suggested that norms commonly associated with the political role would tend to render ambiguous any inferences drawn from such behavioural analyses.

This devaluation of behavioural data as a basis for character inferences may help to account for the apparent importance of the candidate's demographic and group associations as cue traits for the perceiver. By implication, it may help us to understand as well the conditions under which candidate behaviour may yield more useful character information. In general, we might expect the usefulness of the act to increase when the political norm of opportunism can be rejected as a plausible reason for the action.

The proposal has not been exhaustively tested in this thesis. Rather, our defence of its tenability has been based on two kinds of arguments.

First, we have attempted to show that the proposal is not inconsistent with reported findings in the current political literature. There is reasonably strong evidence that voters regard the personal



characteristics of leadership candidates as important considerations; there is convincing evidence, as well, that voters often rely on the demographic and group properties of candidates as bases for their character inferences.

To be sure, there is no comparable support in the literature for the core of the proposal pertaining to the parameters of behavioural analysis. Nevertheless, we have argued that there is some indirect or circumstantial support for this account. Moreover, we have tried to demonstrate that this account complements and, in some respects, parallels some recent theoretical developments in the voting literature.

Second, our empirical test of the proposal has centred almost exclusively on the tenability of two general hypotheses regarding the perceiver's analysis of political behaviour. We have tried to demonstrate, first, that conventional in-role behaviour is largely uninformative as a source of character inferences; second, we have attempted to show that out-of-role behaviour by a political actor is more informative in this regard than the same actor's corresponding in-role behaviour.

To test the first hypothesis, we designed an



experiment in which subjects read a news item reporting an individual's public address to a union gathering. We manipulated both the role of the speaker (political/nonpolitical), and the amount of behavioural data revealed about him (neutral/partisan behaviour).

As expected, we found that subjects exposed to the nonpolitical speaker were able to make better use of additional behavioural information than subjects exposed to the political speaker. That is, there were considerably more significant differences between the character profiles of the partisan and neutral groups within the nonpolitical speaker condition than there were between partisan and neutral groups within the political speaker condition.

However, it was not the case, as predicted, that those exposed to the political speaker entirely discounted the additional behavioural data. Apparently, the additional partisan behaviour did alter their impressions of the actor somewhat. This finding suggests that political behaviour can have an impact on impression formation even though it conforms largely with normative expectations. As discussed in Chapter III, a number of attribution researchers have noted a similar tendency for behaviour to engulf the field, regardless of constraints, in judgements of the actor's







attitudes.

Although the political behaviour was not entirely discounted, we regard the pattern of findings in this experiment to be generally supportive of our theoretical proposal. Besides the differential impact of the behaviour within the nonpolitical and the political speaker conditions, we found differences between the political and nonpolitical groups in their perceptions of the speaker's ingenuousness. Consistent with our assumption regarding opportunism as a political norm, subjects exposed to the speaker as a nonpolitician tended to see him as more ingenuous than those exposed to him as a politician.

This difference was replicated in subjects' comparisons of real political and nonpolitical Canadian public figures. Using judgements of sincerity and trustworthiness as reflective of ingenuousness, we found a highly consistent pattern of response in which the nonpolitical figures were invariably seen as relatively more ingenuous.

To test the second hypothesis, we designed two experiments, each manipulating the in or out-of-role context of a political action. In the "martyrdom" experiment, we attempted to show that an out-of-role policy selection by a political leader (unpopular



policy) would convey to subjects more dispositional information about the leader than an identical policy selection that was seen to be in-role (popular policy). In the "Eisenhower" experiment, we hypothesized that a prior public service accomplishment by a political leader would generate stronger dispositional inferences about him when the accomplishment was set at a time before his entry into politics (out-of-role achievement), rather than during his political career (in-role achievement).

In general, the results from the "martyrdom" experiment were suggestive only, and those from the "Eisenhower" experiment failed to support our hypotheses.

In the "martyrdom" experiment, our initial analysis revealed that the popular/unpopular context manipulation surrounding the target leader's policy selection had affected attributions of motivation for the selection, and had affected subjects' evaluations of the target leader. However, it did not affect the strength of inferences made, nor did it affect the causal importance ascribed to the target leader. Secondary analyses of target-nontarget leader differences in rating polarity and importance suggested that the impact of the manipulation was more clearly expressed in these comparative measures.



In the "Eisenhower" experiment, however, the few significant differences observed between the groups were opposite in direction to those predicted. Subjects exposed to the in-role political achievement gave the target a more positive evaluation and ascribed greater importance to him. All other differences were not significant.

Both experiments were replicated after minor changes had been made to enhance the effectiveness of the manipulations. The results of these replications were supportive of the "martyrdom" hypothesis, but not of the "Eisenhower" hypothesis.

In the "martyrdom" replication, it is clear that the out-of-role unpopular policy selection permitted subjects to make generally stronger inferences regarding the character and motivation of the target political leader. Some of these differences, however, were expressed jointly in ratings of both the target and nontarget leaders.

In the replication of the "Eisenhower" experiment, the impact of the achievement context manipulation, weak at best, was seen to depend on the popularity of the target's policy selection. This pattern of findings led us to question the validity of our manipulation in this case. Specifically, we







suggested that the achievement manipulation may have involved unanticipated effects regarding the political or nonpolitical role of the target. In this case, group differences could be attributed to more than the context of the target's previous accomplishments. They might be attributable as well to different perceptions associated with the target's apparent role.

Our experiments were designed primarily to examine the tenability of our operational assumptions in applying an attribution approach to political phenomena. Nevertheless, the findings might also be evaluated in terms of what they suggest about attribution theory in general.

First, we conclude that, for the most part, the experimental results lend additional credence to the discounting principle in attribution theory. In the first experiment, the design was such as to provide a fairly direct test of the principle. The findings from this research suggest that while the behaviour was not entirely discounted in the presence of a plausible external explanation, it seemed to yield fewer additional inferences about the actor than when the plausible external explanation was absent.

In the second experiments and their replications, the discounting principle was tested only



in a relative sense. That is, there was no control group in these experiments that did not receive the behavioural data. Evidence of relative discounting is found in comparisons of the inferences made by in and out-of-role behaviour groups.

In general, these experimental results are consistent with a discounting interpretation. In the "martyrdom" experiments, for which motivational perceptions are available, we found that the out-of-role behaviour led to a clearer perception of the actor's motivation for behaving, and led to stronger inferences generally about the character of the actor. Comparable data in the "Eisenhower" experiments regarding attributed motivation for the in and out-of-role achievements were not collected.

Our data also lend some support to the assumption implicit at least in the Jones and Davis model (1965) that a strong inference concerning the presence of a character trait enhances the causal significance associated with the actor.

In the latter four experiments, we found that group differences in attributed importance of the actor tended to mirror differences in the extremity of trait attributions made about him. In the original "martyrdom" and "Eisenhower" experiments, the linear



correlation between overall extremity and attributed causal importance was highly significant in the predicted direction ( $r=.39$ ,  $p<.001$ ). A similar relationship between these variables was observed for the two replications ( $r=.49$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

The correspondence model developed by Jones and Davis (1965) deals with the relationship between an act and a specific disposition of the actor. For the most part, we have not tested this model directly for to do so would require prior specification of the inferred causal dispositions. Since we were not usually in a position to make this kind of specific prediction, we chose to use as our primary dependent variables, global indices of information level.

Nevertheless, in three of the five experiments, there is at least one attribute for which we might make this kind of prediction. In the first experiment, we suggested five specific trait attributions that might be affected by the behaviour manipulation. At the very least, the correspondence model would lead us to expect fewer behaviour group differences in these attributions in the political role group, relative to the nonpolitical role group. While it is difficult to compare the magnitudes of behaviour group differences, the data presented previously in







Table 5.6 reveal virtually identical patterns of differences across all attributions but that concerning target partiality. That is, the impact of the behaviour manipulation on the correspondence of these inferences was not apparently less in the political role condition. While there are a number of reasons unrelated to the correspondence model that might account for this failed prediction, the fact remains that the correspondence model receives no direct support from this test.

In both of the "martyrdom" experiments, subjects were asked to estimate the target leader's "personal" attitude on the right to strike issue. Since the policy context manipulation pertained to this issue directly, we might predict a more correspondent inference concerning this attitude in each of the out-of-role contexts.

As reported in Chapters VI and VII, there were no significant group differences in this attitude attribution in either experiment. There were also no significant group differences when target-nontarget leader differences were compared. The magnitude of all group ratings on this variable suggest that, regardless of the popular or unpopular context of the selection, subjects perceived the anti-strike or anti-labour



policy as an expression of the leader's personal attitude.

While previous attitude attribution research might lead us to expect that subjects in the in-role condition would tend to make some inferences from the policy selection, we would not ordinarily expect such attributions to be proximate in magnitude to those of the out-of-role condition. Thus we must conclude again that the correspondence model receives no support from these direct tests.

Certainly, we do not claim that our efforts in this thesis have laid to rest the major issues regarding candidate image formation. Our claims are considerably more modest.

First, we believe that the person perception literature can tell us a good deal more about the dynamics of candidate image formation than we presently know. Indeed, the person perception approach appears to address directly some of the more pressing questions currently being asked by students of voting behaviour. Hopefully, this thesis represents a step toward the application of relevant theory to these concerns.

To this end, we have suggested an approach to the examination of image formation that allows for both



"perceiver-determined" and "stimulus-determined" aspects of the image. Although the proposal at this point is little more than a skeletal outline, it appears to conform generally to the contours of extant political findings, while probing into areas hitherto ignored in the traditional theoretical literature.

Secondly, we have discussed and attempted to apply one quite limited account of attribution processes to the perception of political candidates. The correspondence account of attribution, suggested by Jones and Davis (1965), numbers among its virtues both a theoretical simplicity, and an established body of relevant research. We believe that the account is highly relevant to the circumstances commonly surrounding the perception of political candidates.

However, its virtue of simplicity is also its limitation. The account is limited to the behavioural analysis of one action at one point in time. Certainly, not all of our perceptions of candidate behaviour are isolated in this manner. Subsequent theoretical development of our proposal must entail the use of more complex, but more flexible attribution models that encompass the analysis of multiple instances of behaviour. Kelley's recent discussion of causal schemata (1972) appears promising in this respect.







Finally, we have endeavoured to provide some empirical evidence of the tenability of this application. The experimental programme was designed to demonstrate the relevance of specific attribution principles to our understanding of perception patterns in the political environment. The choice of experimental design has permitted us to maintain a degree of control over information and context not possible in more natural observation situations.

While this choice of design has, we believe, enhanced the internal validity of our argument, we recognize that this quality has been bought at the price of some external validity. The generality of our findings are limited in two rather important respects.

First, as noted previously, the judgements of our subjects are based only on a very limited exposure to the political candidates. We require additional information regarding the impact of behaviour on judgements over a longer duration of exposure.

Second, our laboratory simulations were designed to avoid the intrusion of subjects' partisan dispositions into the judgemental task. Clearly, then, we require additional data gathered in circumstances where this variable is not controlled, before applying our findings to a real political system. Specifically,



we would want to assess the degree of "facilitative distortion" caused by partisan dispositions in judgements of various out-of-role political behaviours. While Jones and his colleagues have suggested that "facilitative distortion" in these circumstances is a function of the ambiguity of the behavioural analysis, additional research is required to understand the significance of this perceptual phenomenon in a political setting.

An area for future research that has been almost entirely ignored in the theoretical treatment here concerns the linkage between trait attribution and subsequent behaviour. That is, under what circumstances will the attribution of a quality to a candidate affect the perceiver's voting behaviour? In our empirical analysis, we included some data based on the vote certainty measures primarily as supplementary evidence of the impact of the manipulation.

As noted in the Introduction, we have intentionally excluded a theoretical consideration of the nature of this linkage because its adequate treatment would take us into quite different theoretical territory, and would require a good deal more theoretical attention than we would be able to give it. Nevertheless, we recognize that until this



linkage is specified, the underlying purpose for our efforts in this thesis remains unfulfilled.





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APPENDIX A

THE DISCOUNTING EXPERIMENT

DESCRIPTIVE MATERIALS AND QUESTIONNAIRE





Study # 107

The purpose of this study is to investigate how people form impressions of other people. There are two quite separate and unrelated parts to the study. The instructions for completing each part should be self-explanatory.

Proceed through this booklet one page at a time. Once you have completed a page, go on to the next one, but it is important that you do not leaf back and forth through the booklet as you work.

Please do not ask any questions and do not consult with your neighbours. We are not interested in your identity, so there is no need to write your name on the booklet. The success of this study depends heavily on your co-operation. Please be as honest and as conscientious as you can.



Part I

In this part of the study, we will present a news item describing a person with whom you are unfamiliar. Read the news item carefully several times, and attempt to form a mental picture of the individual involved. You may take as much time as you want.

Once you feel that you have formed the most complete impression possible from the news item, go on to the next page, but do not look back again. There we will ask you to describe the person on a set of rating scales. The scales take the following form:

Beautiful : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : Ugly

Not Confident : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : Very Confident

On the first scale in each pair, you are asked to rate the individual on the adjective dimension in question (in this case, Beautiful-Ugly). Place a checkmark in the scale interval that best reflects your mental picture of the individual.

On the second scale in each pair (Not Confident - Very Confident), you are asked to assess the confidence you would place in the accuracy of your descriptive judgement. Place a checkmark in the scale interval that best reflects your feeling of confidence in this judgement.

In the last section of Part I, we will ask you to answer some general background questions about the news item and about yourself.

You may proceed at your own speed, but it is important that you do not leave any questions blank.



(news item)

### BUTTE SPEAKS TO MINERS

Delegates to the Provincial Council of the Mine, Mineral and Smelter Workers were addressed last week by Mr. Kenneth Butte. Mr. Butte, a political candidate in the B. C. Federal riding of Kamloops-Cariboo, chose to speak to the gathering of union officials on the topic of industrial safety in the mines.

Among other things, Butte talked to delegates about recent technological advances in the development of "deep-pit" safety equipment. The safety issue is expected to be a major bone of contention in upcoming labour-management negotiations within the industry.

Mr. Butte has been a resident of British Columbia for the past twenty years. Over that time, he has followed closely the course of resource development in the province. He recently resigned his senior position with a private consulting firm advising government and industry to run full time in the election expected sometime this summer.





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## KENNETH BUTTE

SINCERE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : INSINCERE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

PASSIVE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ACTIVE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

POLITICAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : NONPOLITICAL

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

RUGGED : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : DELICATE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

FOOLISH : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : WISE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

RELAXED : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : TENSE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

ADVENTUROUS : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : CAUTIOUS

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

SMALL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : LARGE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

GOOD : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : BAD

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

HOT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : COLD

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT



KENNETH BUTTE

UNCOMMITTED : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : COMMITTED

NOT CONFIDENT :        :        :        :        :        : VERY CONFIDENT

BOLD : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : TIMID

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

RUTHLESS :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :    : HUMANE

NOT CONFIDENT :       :       :       :       :       : VERY CONFIDENT

STRAIGHTFORWARD : : : : : : : : : : : : : DEVIOUS

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

SHARP : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : DULL

NOT CONFIDENT :       :       :       :       :       : VERY CONFIDENT

WEAK : : : : : : : : : STRONG

NOT CONFIDENT :        :        :        :        :        : VERY CONFIDENT

TRUSTWORTHY : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : UNTRUSTWORTHY

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

PARTIAL : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : IMPARTIAL

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

HARD : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : SOFT

NOT CONFIDENT :        :        :        :        :        : VERY CONFIDENT

SLOW : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : FAST

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT



1. Concerning the union's demands for safer working conditions in the mines, what impression do you think Butte wanted to convey to his audience?

THAT HE HAD NO SYMPATHY : \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_: THAT HE HAD STRONG SYMPATHY FOR DEMANDS FOR DEMANDS

2. On the same issue of mine safety, how much sympathy do you think Butte actually has for the union demands?

NO SYMPATHY : : : : : : : : : STRONG SYMPATHY

3. Given Butte's position, and given the nature of his audience, to what extent was his speech consistent or inconsistent with what you might ordinarily expect?

[illegible]

Please answer the following questions about yourself.

Age (in years)

Sex.    Male            Female            (check one)

Faculty enrolled in at W. L. U. \_\_\_\_\_

Citizenship (a) Canadian  
(b) other (please specify)

University Education (check highest level completed)

Less than one year \_\_\_\_\_  
1 year of University \_\_\_\_\_  
2 years of University \_\_\_\_\_  
3 years of University \_\_\_\_\_  
4 years of University \_\_\_\_\_  
Post-Graduate Degree \_\_\_\_\_

How much interest do you have in politics generally? Check one of the following.

Very Interested \_\_\_\_\_

Somewhat interested \_\_\_\_\_

Not very interested \_\_\_\_\_

Not at all interested \_\_\_\_\_





## Part II

Very often, our exposure to another person is limited primarily to one role context (for example, as teacher, writer, politician or athlete). As a consequence, it is sometimes difficult to determine the true or core nature of the person - to separate the man from the role he is occupying.

In this part of the study, we will name a number of public figures in Canada. For each individual, we will ask you to describe as best you can your impression of the true nature of the person.

The method used here to record your impressions is similar to that used in Part I. Scales are presented in pairs. On the first scale in each pair, rate the individual on the adjective dimension indicated. On the second scale in each pair, assess your feeling of confidence in the accuracy of your judgement.

Work fairly quickly through this part, but be sure to complete all scales.



BOBBY ORR

BOBBY HULL

PIERRE BERTON

PIERRE TRUDEAU

JOE CLARK

ED BROADBENT

AS

A PERSON

BOLD : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : TIMID

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

UNTRUSTWORTHY : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : TRUSTWORTHY

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

SLOW : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : FAST

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

PARTIAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : IMPARTIAL

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

STRONG : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : WEAK

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

GOOD : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : BAD

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

PASSIVE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ACTIVE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

DELICATE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : RUGGED

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

SHARP : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : DULL

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT

SINCERE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : INSINCERE

NOT CONFIDENT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VERY CONFIDENT



Now we would like to ascertain your feelings about the three major political parties in Canada. Three scales are presented below. For each scale, please indicate with a checkmark in the appropriate interval how much closer you feel to one party rather than the other. Be sure to complete all three scales.

|               |  |                   |
|---------------|--|-------------------|
| LIBERAL PARTY |  | PROG CONSERVATIVE |
| OF CANADA     | : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : | PARTY OF CANADA   |

|                 |  |               |
|-----------------|--|---------------|
| NEW DEMOCRATIC  |  | LIBERAL PARTY |
| PARTY OF CANADA | : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : | OF CANADA     |

|                   |  |                 |
|-------------------|--|-----------------|
| PROG CONSERVATIVE |  | NEW DEMOCRATIC  |
| PARTY OF CANADA   | : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : | PARTY OF CANADA |

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS THAT YOU MAY HAVE ABOUT THIS STUDY>





APPENDIX B

THE MARTYRDOM AND EISENHOWER EXPERIMENTS

DESCRIPTIVE SCENARIOS



POLITICAL PERCEPTION STUDY - PART 1

The purpose of this study is to investigate how people form impressions of political systems, political organizations, and political leaders. To do this, we will ask you to "place" yourself in the imaginary political system that is described on the following pages. In that description, we will first provide you with some background information about the general characteristics of the country. We will then describe some recent events in the country, and talk about the persons and groups responsible for those events.

All aspects of this country are entirely fictitious. They have no counterparts in reality, nor is this relevant to the purposes of the study. We will not ask you to make comparisons between this fictitious country and any real systems with which you may be familiar.

You are asked to place yourself in this country in the role of citizen and observer. Absorb the contents of this booklet to gain a familiarity with your new surroundings. Although we anticipate that you will need about fifteen minutes for this part, you may have as much time as you wish to examine these passages. In completing this part, it is important that you reflect seriously on the mental pictures of the things and people you are reading about. We are primarily interested in your capacity to form impressions.

Once you feel sufficiently familiar with this new environment, close this booklet, set it permanently aside, and go on to the second booklet. The second booklet - Part 2 - will attempt to explore your impressions of the things talked about in the first. It is very important that you do not look back at the first booklet after you have opened the second one.

Both booklets are designed to <sup>be</sup> self-explanatory. Please do not ask any questions and do not consult with your neighbours. We are not concerned about your identity, so please do not write your name on either booklet. The success of this study depends heavily on your co-operation. Please be as honest and as conscientious as you can.





THE SITUATION

The country we are asking you to think about, called Scanlon, is an established member of the world community. Scanlon could be described as a developing industrial nation with a moderately diversified social structure. Politically, it has had a stable tradition of democratic government.

Like every country in this imaginary world, Scanlon is just now recovering from a devastating world crisis that has lasted for four years. During this crisis, the two political parties that have traditionally competed for power, co-operated in a non-partisan government to help the nation through its troubled times. With the passing of the crisis, however, the two parties have dissolved their temporary partnership to compete in the ordinary way.

The two parties, called the National and the Public Action parties, each achieved a share of success prior to the crisis. While neither party in the pre-crisis years adopted policies that would anger or alienate significant sectors of the society, each party has generally been thought to represent or sympathize with somewhat different political interests. The Public Action Party, for example, has usually received stronger financial and voting support from the urbanized industrial sectors of the nation. The National Party, on the other hand, has usually been stronger in the rural areas, and among the suburban middle classes. One could not say, however, that the party system has been sharply polarized along these lines. Both parties in election campaigns have tended to make general appeals to the nation as a whole, and vote switching from election to election has not been uncommon within the electorate. There is no reason to suspect that the recent crisis has altered any of these aspects of politics in Scanlon.

With the return to normal times and the calling of an election, both the National Party and the Public Action Party have held conventions to select their new political leaders for the upcoming election campaign. The conventions were competitive and colourful affairs, attracting considerable media coverage.





THE SITUATION

The country we are asking you to think about, called Scanlon, is an established member of the world community. Scanlon could be described as a developing industrial nation with a moderately diversified social structure. Politically, it has had a stable tradition of democratic government.

Like every country in this imaginary world, Scanlon is just now recovering from a devastating world crisis that has lasted for four years. During this crisis, the two political parties that have traditionally competed for power co-operated in a non-partisan government to help the nation through its troubled times. The non-partisan government was headed by a three man "Governing Triumvirate" comprised of one representative appointed by each of the political parties, and a third independent member chosen from the community at large. It is generally believed that the brilliant policies pursued by this "Governing Triumvirate" are the main reason Scanlon has been able to return to normal functioning faster than any other country in the world. With the recent return to normalcy, however, the non-partisan government has disbanded so that the two parties can compete in the ordinary way.

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At the National Party convention, Austen Reid defeated three other candidates to win the leadership of his party. At 47 years of age, Reid brings to the National Party leadership considerable practical experience gained from his business career, and more recently, from his civil service employment. Reid's victory at the convention surprised few political observers. It is generally acknowledged that his campaign for the leadership was the best organized and the most thorough of the four candidates. Reid has demonstrated from both his public addresses and from his private discussions, that he has the ability to communicate effectively with rank and file party members, and to "mend fences" within the National Party. Both Reid and the National Party are confident of success in the coming election.

The new leader of the Public Action Party - John Hampton-Jones - is a lawyer, aged 44, with a family background in manufacturing. Hampton-Jones is a party veteran of twenty years. For twelve of those years, he was an elected representative, and an acknowledged member of the "inner councils" of the Public Action Party. Although he is almost unknown outside of political circles, he is apparently well thought of and popular among party members. In addition, he was the candidate favoured by the executive at the leadership convention. Hampton-Jones is expected to be a valuable asset for the Public Action Party in the upcoming election. His performance at the convention greatly impressed those who watched him on television as well as those who observed him in person.





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The new leader of the Public Action Party - John Hampton-Jones - is a lawyer, aged 49, with a family background in manufacturing. A novice to party politics, Hampton-Jones first came to the nation's attention during the crisis period when he was appointed to the "Governing Triumvirate" as the independent member from the community at large. He is said to have served in that capacity with distinction. In fact, many knowledgeable observers feel that his contributions to policy were largely responsible for the impressive record of the crisis government. It is generally conceded that the Public Action Party was fortunate to recruit Hampton-Jones to their party and persuade him to run for the leadership. His performance during the crisis years and his personal popularity make him a valuable asset for the party in the coming election.





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The new leader of the Public Action Party - John Hampton-Jones - is a lawyer, aged 49, with a family background in manufacturing. A veteran of party politics for more than 20 years, Hampton-Jones first came to the nation's attention during the crisis period when he was appointed to the "Governing Triumvirate" as the Public Action Party's representative. He is said to have served in that capacity with distinction. In fact, many knowledgeable observers feel that his contributions to policy were largely responsible for the impressive record of the crisis government. It is generally conceded that the Public Action Party was fortunate to have such a man in their party primed and ready to lead them in this first election of the post-crisis period. His performance during the crisis and his personal popularity make him a valuable asset for the party in that election.



(news item)

August 23

## REID TO STIMULATE ECONOMY

The leader of the National Party, Austen Reid, launched his election campaign last night with a promise to attack the problem of unemployment within Scanlon's labour force.

Speaking in the Capital city, Mr. Reid told an audience of 3,500 that the country's present problems stemmed from "economic stagnation" caused by "the strangulation of government spending over the past few years." The cure, he said, must also be found in the public sector. If elected, he promised to stimulate the economy by initiating major government construction projects in cities across the country with unemployment problems. Reid stated that his party's proposed building program was designed primarily to ease the "tight money" situation presently discouraging needed expansion in the economy. Greater circulation of money, he said, would quickly generate jobs for those now out of work.

He added that the new facilities built through the program would permit government to provide faster and more efficient public services to citizens.

The National Party leader told reporters that his party's election campaign would focus on "this crucial issue of getting the economy going again." The building program, he said, was only the first of a series of measures designed to achieve this objective. Other programs would be presented over the course of the campaign.

\* \* \* \* \*





(news item)

August 23

## HAMPTON-JONES TO IMPOSE TRADE UNION CONTROLS

John Hampton-Jones, the leader of the Public Action Party, today criticized the country's labour leaders in his first major policy statement of the current election campaign. Addressing an audience of 4,000, Hampton-Jones warned of serious labour strife and the possibility of a crippled economy if the trade unions continue to push for substantial wage hikes in this immediate post-crisis period. "Responsible government," he said, "could not stand idly by and permit costly strikes to paralyse the still-fragile post-crisis economy." To counter this threat, the Public Action leader promised, if elected, to pass legislation binding labour and management to government-mediated arbitration procedures. He added that such measures could be relaxed gradually once the economy is "firmly back on its rails."

When polled for their reactions to the Public Action leader's speech, most political observers agreed that Hampton-Jones will get a sympathetic hearing from the voters with this hardline message to labour groups. This policy, they said, coincides with a rising sense of uneasiness and apprehension within the nation about the prospects of economic stability in the near future. Recent militant union demands, and the threat of disruptive strikes, have brought these sentiments to the surface. Thus it is quite possible that many voters will find Hampton-Jones' policy platform both reassuring and appealing.

The Public Action leader conceded to reporters that this might be the case. He added, however, that "labour-management relations will become the most important problem facing the nation in the next few years. The public should be made aware of this, and the government should be prepared to cope with it."

\* \* \* \* \*





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When polled for their reactions to the Public Action leader's speech, most political observers agreed that a campaign based on proposed anti-labour legislation could seriously endanger any chances of victory for Hampton-Jones in the coming election. Trade unions, they said, have anxiously awaited the end of the crisis to press their demands. Now that the end has come, they will fight any attempt to disarm their strike threat in the impending negotiations. With this platform, Hampton-Jones will face powerful opposition from this quarter.

The Public Action leader conceded to reporters that this might be the case. He added, however, that "labour-management relations will become the most important problem facing the nation in the next few years. The public should be made aware of this, and the government should be prepared to cope with it."

\* \* \* \* \*



## NEWS COMMENTARY

BY

ANTON FLETTNER

(October 3)

With the present election campaign drawing to a close, few political observers have so far ventured to predict a winner between Austen Reid's National Party and the Public Action Party led by John Hampton-Jones. Most commentators have been reluctant to stake their reputations on political weathervanes bred and nurtured on pre-crisis elections. To complicate matters, the voters as usual have given us little help. Pre-election polls have been so muddled with undecided voters that no one is attempting to predict even how close the election will be, let alone who will eventually win it.

The campaign itself has produced few surprises since the opening barrages by both leaders. Austen Reid for his part, has not wavered very much from his original platform to boost the economy through public spending programs. Although this is not the sort of platform to fire imaginations or start barroom brawls, it has the potential (and political virtue) of affecting large numbers of voting age citizens. Whether the public will respond to this diet of 'bread and butter' issues, however, is a question I will bravely defer until the polls close tomorrow evening.

Public Action leader John Hampton-Jones has been no less consistent than his opponent in this campaign. He told us in his opening address that the regulation of strikes and labour relations would head his list of legislative priorities. Since then, he has stumped the country from <sup>one</sup> end to the other attempting to pound home to voters the dangers that are involved if these measures are not adopted. At the beginning of the campaign, it was generally expected that Hampton-Jones would face sympathetic audiences with this message. While nothing has happened to alter this expectation, the reactions of Scanlon voters has always been difficult to gage, especially during election campaigns.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Page 6 - Eisenhower Experiment - Both Conditions)

(Page 6 - Martyrdom Experiment - Popular Policy Condition)





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\* \* \* \* \*





THIS COMPLETES PART I OF THE STUDY. IF THERE ARE SOME ASPECTS OF THE DESCRIPTIONS THAT YOU FEEL UNCERTAIN ABOUT, PLEASE TURN BACK TO THEM NOW AND REFRESH YOUR MEMORY. IF YOU FEEL SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION DESCRIBED HERE, GO ON TO PART II IN THE SECOND BOOKLET.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU DO NCT LOOK BACK TO PART I AFTER YOU HAVE OPENED THE PART II BOOKLET.



APPENDIX C

THE MARTYRDOM AND EISENHOWER EXPERIMENTS  
QUESTIONNAIRE



PART 2





Section 1

First we would like to gather some background information about you so that we can later assess the social composition of our sample.

1. Age \_\_\_\_\_ (in years)
2. Sex. Male \_\_\_\_\_ Female \_\_\_\_\_ (check one)
3. Faculty enrolled in at U. of A. \_\_\_\_\_
4. Primary Occupation. \_\_\_\_\_
5. Citizenship. (a) Canadian  
(b) Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
6. University Education (check highest level completed)

Less than one year \_\_\_\_\_  
 1 year of University \_\_\_\_\_  
 2 years of University \_\_\_\_\_  
 3 years of University \_\_\_\_\_  
 4 years of University \_\_\_\_\_  
 Post-Graduate Degree \_\_\_\_\_

7. How many courses, if any, have you completed in Political Science? In answering this question, count only the courses that you have completed. Also, let two half-year courses equal one full year courses, so that if you have completed one full year course and one half year course, your total would be  $1\frac{1}{2}$ .

Number of courses \_\_\_\_\_

8. How much interest do you have in politics generally? Check one of the following.

Very Interested \_\_\_\_\_  
 Somewhat interested \_\_\_\_\_  
 Not Very Interested \_\_\_\_\_  
 Not at all Interested \_\_\_\_\_



## Section B

The purpose of this section of the study is to measure the meanings you associate with some of the political objects you read about in Part 1. We will ask you to judge each of these objects against a series of descriptive scales. In making your rating of an object on these scales, we want your judgments to reflect an accurate impression of the object as you picture it.

At the top of each page of this section, you will find the name of a person, or of a political group. Below the name are a set of descriptive scales. You are asked to work down the page considering each scale as separate and independent of the rest. The general form of these scales is illustrated in the following example.

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

As you can see, the scale has nine intervals with opposite adjectives at the ends. To complete the scale, place a checkmark in the interval that best reflects your impression of the object (named at the top of each page) along the FAIR-UNFAIR dimension. If you picture the object in question as very closely related to one end of the scale, you should place your checkmark as follows:

FAIR :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

OR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : UNFAIR

If the object seems considerably related to one side as opposed to the other, then you should check as follows:

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

If the object to be rated seems only somewhat related to one end as opposed to the other end of the scale, then you should check as follows:

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

If the object to be rated seems only slightly related to one side as opposed to the other, then you should check as follows:

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

If the object to be rated seems equally related or associated with both sides of the scale, then you should check the middle interval.

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ :   /   : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR





IMPORTANT

1. Be sure to complete every scale. Do not omit any scales under any circumstances.
2. Place only one checkmark on any one scale.
3. Place the checkmark within intervals of the scale as shown in the examples, and not on the divider between intervals.
4. If a scale seems completely irrelevant or unrelated to an object such that you are unable to make any judgement at all, place a checkmark in the middle interval of the scale, and print the letters N.R. (for Not Relevant) in the margin beside the scale.
5. Make each judgement independently. Work quickly, and do not worry over particular judgements. It is your immediate "feelings" about the object that we want.

You are asked to complete sets of scales for each leader and each political party in this study, as well as the object "MOST POLITICAL LEADERS AS PERSONS". However, please note that you are asked on some pages to judge Hampton-Jones or Reid as political leaders, while on other pages, you are asked to judge them as a person. Therefore, be sure to read the top of each page carefully before proceeding to mark the scales on that page.





PUBLIC ACTION PARTY

HONEST : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : DISHONEST

SOFT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : HARD

UNEMOTIONAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : EMOTIONAL

NONCONFORMING : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : CONFORMING

RUGGED : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : DELICATE

UNTRUSTWORTHY : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : TRUSTWORTHY

ACTIVE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : PASSIVE

DISPENSABLE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : INDISPENSABLE

GOOD : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : BAD

RELAXED : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : TENSE



## PUBLIC ACTION PARTY

UNCOMMITTED : \_\_\_\_\_ : COMMITTED

ESSENTIAL : \_\_\_\_\_ : NONESSENTIAL

FAST : \_\_\_\_\_ : SLOW

SELFISH : \_\_\_\_\_ : UNSELFISH

POWERFUL : \_\_\_\_\_ : POWERLESS

INCONSEQUENTIAL : \_\_\_\_\_ : CONSEQUENTIAL

DULL : \_\_\_\_\_ : SHARP

SINCERE : \_\_\_\_\_ : INSINCERE

TIMID : \_\_\_\_\_ : BOLD

UNUSUAL : \_\_\_\_\_ : USUAL



Section C

Now we would like to ascertain how you, as a citizen of Scanlon, would vote in the election that has been called. On the scale below, we are asking you to indicate the likelihood of your voting either for the National Party or for the Public Action Party. Place a checkmark in the interval that best reflects your voting likelihood. The more certain you feel about voting for one party rather than the other, the closer your checkmark should be to the appropriate end of the scale. The less certain your choice is, the closer your checkmark should be to the centre interval of the scale.

*Do THIS SCALE*

EXTREMELY LIKELY

TO VOTE FOR THE  
PUBLIC ACTION PARTY

NOT SURE

EXTREMELY LIKELY

TO VOTE FOR THE  
NATIONAL PARTY

Some people tend to make their voting decision on the basis of the political figures involved, while others tend to make their decision on the basis of party. To get a better idea about the basis of your decision on the scale above, please complete the following vote likelihood scales as if each was a separate voting choice. For each scale, place a checkmark in the interval that best reflects the likelihood of your casting a vote for one object rather than the other.

VOTE

HAMPTON-JONES

NOT SURE

VOTE REID

VOTE PUBLIC

ACTION PARTY

NOT SURE

VOTE

HAMPTON-JONES

VOTE REID

NOT SURE

VOTE PUBLIC

ACTION PARTY

VOTE

HAMPTON-JONES

NOT SURE

VOTE

NATIONAL PARTY

VOTE

NATIONAL PARTY

NOT SURE

VOTE REID





Section D

1. When Reid and Hampton-Jones chose their policy platforms for this election campaign, which of the following two factors do you think was more important to each leader in determining his particular selection:

- to choose the best policy for the country  
or  
to choose a policy that was attractive to voters.

Consider each leader in turn, and indicate on the appropriate scale below which factor you think was more important to him in selecting his particular policy. If you feel that the leader in question considered both of these factors to be equally important in his selection, then you should check the centre interval of his scale. If you feel that one factor was more important to him than the other, you should check the interval on the appropriate side of the scale that best reflects the predominance of that factor. The more predominant the factor, the closer your check should be to the end of the scale. On the third scale in this set, would you indicate how you feel most politicians usually make this type of decision.

## AUSTEN REID

- |     |               |   |             |
|-----|---------------|---|-------------|
|     | CHOOSE POLICY |   | CHOOSE BEST |
| (a) | ATTRACTIVE TO | : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : | POLICY FOR  |
|     | VOTERS        |   | COUNTRY     |

## JOHN HAMPTON-JONES

- |     |               |   |             |
|-----|---------------|---|-------------|
|     | CHOOSE POLICY |   | CHOOSE BEST |
| (b) | ATTRACTIVE TO | : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : | POLICY FOR  |
|     | VOTERS        |   | COUNTRY     |

## MOST POLITICIANS

- |     |               |   |             |
|-----|---------------|---|-------------|
|     | CHOOSE POLICY |   | CHOOSE BEST |
| (c) | ATTRACTIVE TO | : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : | POLICY FOR  |
|     | VOTERS        |   | COUNTRY     |

2. From what you know of Hampton-Jones and Reid, how would you assess the personal attitude of each leader on the issue of a Trade Union's Right to Strike.

## AUSTEN REID

- |     |             |   |         |
|-----|-------------|---|---------|
| (a) | SYMPATHETIC | : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : | OPPOSED |
|-----|-------------|---|---------|

## JOHN HAMPTON-JONES

- |     |             |   |         |
|-----|-------------|---|---------|
| (b) | SYMPATHETIC | : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : | OPPOSED |
|-----|-------------|---|---------|



Section E

In this study, we have asked you to imagine yourself in a fictitious country observing aspects of that country's political system. We are aware, however, that this is often difficult to do. Because it is important to our study, we would ask you to answer the following two questions as honestly as possible.

First, how difficult was it for you to imagine yourself in the country described here? That is, could you estimate the degree of involvement that you were able to develop with the system itself and with the events and people in that system? Please indicate your estimated degree of involvement by placing a checkmark in the appropriate interval of the following scale.

|                       |                     |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| NO INVOLVEMENT        | GREAT INVOLVEMENT   |
| IN THE SYSTEM : _____ | IN THE SYSTEM _____ |

Secondly, to what extent did you find yourself projecting aspects of a real system (such as Canada or the United States) on the situation described in this study? That is, to what extent did your answers reflect your images of real parties and real leaders rather than merely the descriptions set out in this study? Please indicate on the scale below your feeling about the basis for your answers.

|   |  |
|---|--|
| ANSWERS BASED<br>LARGELY ON<br>REAL PEOPLE<br>AND PARTIES | ANSWERS BASED<br>ONLY ON IMAGES<br>OF IMAGINARY<br>SITUATION |
| : _____   | : _____  |

Please expand on these answers if you feel they are unclear at present. We would also welcome comments and suggestions about other aspects of the study. Please use the space below and the back of this page if necessary for your comments.

Thank you for your co-operation.





APPENDIX D

THE MARTYRDOM AND EISENHOWER REPLICATIONS  
DESCRIPTIVE SCENARIOS





POLITICAL PERCEPTION STUDY - PART I

The purpose of this study is to investigate how people form impressions of political systems, political organizations, and political leaders. To do this, we will ask you to "place" yourself in the imaginary political system that is described on the following pages. In that description, we will first provide you with some background information about the general characteristics of the country. We will then describe some recent events in the country, and talk about the persons and groups responsible for those events.

All aspects of this country are entirely fictitious. They have no counterparts in reality, nor is this relevant to the purposes of the study. We will not ask you to make comparisons between this fictitious country and any real systems with which you may be familiar.

You are asked to place yourself in this country in the role of citizen and observer. Absorb the contents of this booklet to gain a familiarity with your new surroundings. Although we anticipate that you will need about fifteen minutes for this part, you may have as much time as you wish to examine these passages. In completing this part, it is important that you reflect seriously on the mental pictures of the things and people you are reading about. We are primarily interested in your capacity to form impressions.

Once you feel sufficiently familiar with this new environment, close this booklet, set it permanently aside, and go on to the second booklet. The second booklet - Part 2 - will attempt to explore your impressions of the things talked about in the first. It is very important that you do not look back at the first booklet after you have opened the second one.

Both booklets are designed to be self-explanatory. Please do not ask any questions and do not consult with your neighbours. We are not concerned about your identity, so please do not write your name on either booklet. The success of this study depends heavily on your co-operation. Please be as honest and as conscientious as you can.



THE SITUATION

The country we are asking you to think about, called Scanlon, is an established member of the world community. Scanlon could be described as a developing industrial nation with a moderately diversified social structure. Politically, it has had a stable tradition of democratic government.

Like every country in this imaginary world, Scanlon is just now recovering from a devastating world crisis that has lasted for four years. During this crisis, the two political parties that have traditionally competed for power, co-operated in a non-partisan government to help the nation through its troubled times. With the passing of the crisis, however, the two parties have dissolved their temporary partnership to compete in the ordinary way.

The two parties, called the National and the Public parties, each achieved a share of success prior to the crisis. While neither party in the pre-crisis years adopted policies that would anger or alienate significant sectors of the society, each party has generally been thought to represent or sympathize with somewhat different political interests. The National Party, for example, has usually received stronger financial and voting support from the urbanized industrial sectors of the nation. The Public Party, on the other hand, has usually been stronger in the rural areas, and among the suburban middle classes. One could not say, however, that the party system has been sharply polarized along these lines. Both parties in election campaigns have tended to make general appeals to the nation as a whole, and vote switching from election to election has not been uncommon within the electorate. There is no reason to suspect that the recent crisis has altered any of these aspects of politics in Scanlon.

With the return to normal times and the calling of an election, both the National Party and the Public Party have held conventions to select their new political leaders for the upcoming election campaign. The conventions were competitive and colourful affairs, attracting considerable media coverage.





At the National Party convention, Austen Reid defeated three other candidates to win the leadership of his party. At 47 years of age, Reid brings to the National Party leadership considerable practical experience gained in city politics, and more recently, as a National Party organizer. Reid's victory at the convention surprised few political observers. It is generally acknowledged that his campaign for the leadership was the best organized and the most thorough of the four candidates. In both public and private forums, Reid has demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively with rank and file party members, and to "mend fences" within the National Party. Both Reid and the National Party are confident of success in the coming election.

The new leader of the Public Party - John Hampton - is an economist, aged 49, with a family background in manufacturing. A long time economic advisor to the party and an elected representative, Hampton first gained national prominence during the crisis period when he was appointed to represent the Public Party in the coalition government. His contributions during that period have been well-publicized. In fact, many have cited his economic policies and judgement as the major reason for the success of the crisis government. Public Party officials believe that Hampton's proven leadership abilities and political experience with the party will be a definite asset in the coming election.





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The new leader of the Public Party - John Hampton - is an economist, aged 49, with a family background in manufacturing. A successful economic consultant, with no previous political ties, Hampton first gained national prominence during the crisis period when he emerged as the chief economic advisor to the coalition government. His contributions during that period have been well-publicized. In fact, many have cited his economic policies and judgement as the major reason for the success of the crisis government. Public Party officials have worked for the past several months to persuade Hampton to join their party and accept the leadership. They feel confident that his personal reputation will be a definite asset in the coming election.



(news item)

August 23

## REID TO STIMULATE ECONOMY

The leader of the National Party, Austen Reid, launched his election campaign last night with a promise to attack the problem of unemployment within Scanlon's labour force.

Speaking in the Capital city, Mr. Reid told an audience of 3,500 that the country's present problems stemmed from "economic stagnation" caused by "the strangulation of government spending over the past few years." The cure, he said, must also be found in the public sector. If elected, he promised to stimulate the economy by initiating major government construction projects in cities across the country with unemployment problems. Reid stated that his party's proposed building program was designed primarily to ease the "tight money" situation presently discouraging needed expansion in the economy. Greater circulation of money, he said, would quickly generate jobs for those now out of work.

He added that the new facilities built through the program would permit government to provide faster and more efficient public services to citizens.

The National Party leader told reporters that his party's election campaign would focus on "this crucial issue of getting the economy going again." The building program, he said, was only the first of a series of measures designed to achieve this objective. Other programs would be presented over the course of the campaign.

\*\*\*\*\*



August 23

## HAMPTON TO IMPOSE TRADE UNION CONTROLS

John Hampton, the new leader of the Public Party, today lashed out at the country's labour leaders in his first major policy statement of the current election campaign. Addressing an audience of 4,000, Hampton accused labour leaders of "pushing the nation to the brink of disaster with uncompromising wage demands" and threats of strike action. "The next government," he said, "must be firm in meeting this threat to prevent costly strikes from paralysing our fragile post-crisis economy." The Public Party leader promised if elected to provide this leadership with legislation binding labour and management to government arbitration. "I will stand or fall on this issue," he stated.

When polled for their reactions to the Public Party leader's speech, most political observers agreed that Hampton's hardline message to labour would probably gain him the support of important sectors of the electorate. These observers noted that prominent spokesmen from several quarters had been calling for just such a policy for the past few months. Their probable endorsement of Hampton's platform could have a significant influence on the outcome of this election.

The Public Party leader conceded to reporters that his adoption of this policy might have such positive electoral implications. He added, however, that "labour-management relations will dominate the politics of this nation for the next few years. The public should know now where their next government will stand on this matter."

\*\*\*\*\*





(news item)

August 23

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When polled for their reactions to the Public Party leader's speech, most political observers agreed that Hampton's hardline message to labour could seriously hurt his chances in the coming election. These observers noted that trade unions have anxiously awaited the end of the crisis period to press their demands. Now that the end has come, they would actively oppose a candidate who proposed to disarm their strike threat in the impending wage negotiations.

The Public Party leader conceded to reporters that his adoption of this policy might have such negative electoral implications. He added, however, that "labour-management relations will dominate the politics of this nation for the next few years. The public should know now where their next government will stand on this matter."

\*\*\*\*\*



## NEWS COMMENTARY

BY

ANTON FLETTNER

(October 3)

With the present election campaign drawing to a close, few political observers have so far ventured to predict a winner between Austen Reid's National Party and the Public Party led by John Hampton. Most commentators have been reluctant to stake their reputations on political weathervanes bred and nurtured on pre-crisis elections. To complicate matters, the voters as usual have given us little help. Pre-election polls have been so muddled with undecided voters that no one is attempting to predict even how close the election will be, let alone who will eventually win it.

The campaign itself has produced few surprises since the opening barrages by both leaders. Austen Reid for his part, has not wavered very much from his original platform to boost the economy through public spending programs. Although this is not the sort of platform to fire imaginations or start barroom brawls, it has the potential (and political virtue) of affecting large numbers of voting age citizens. Whether the public will respond to this diet of 'bread and butter' issues, however, is a question I will bravely defer until the polls close tomorrow evening.

Public Party leader John Hampton has been no less consistent than his opponent in this campaign. He told us in his opening address that the regulation of strikes and labour relations would head his list of legislative priorities. Since then, he has stumped the country from one end to the other attempting to pound home to voters the dangers that are involved if these measures are not adopted. At the beginning of the campaign, it was generally expected that Hampton would face sympathetic audiences with this message. While nothing has happened to alter this expectation, the reactions of Scanlon voters have always been difficult to gage, especially during election campaigns.

\*\*\*\*\*



## NEWS COMMENTARY

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(October 3)

With the present election campaign drawing to a close, few political observers have so far ventured to predict a winner between Austen Reid's National Party and the Public Party led by John Hampton. Most commentators have been reluctant to stake their reputations on political weathervanes bred and nurtured on pre-crisis elections. To complicate matters, the voters as usual have given us little help. Pre-election polls have been so muddled with undecided voters that no one is attempting to predict even how close the election will be, let alone who will eventually win it.

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\*\*\*\*\*







THIS COMPLETES PART I OF THE STUDY. PLEASE TURN BACK TO THOSE ASPECTS OF THE DESCRIPTIONS THAT YOU FEEL UNCERTAIN ABOUT TO REFRESH YOUR MEMORY. WHEN YOU FEEL SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION DESCRIBED HERE, GO ON TO PART II IN THE SECOND BOOKLET.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU DO NOT LOOK BACK TO PART I AFTER YOU HAVE OPENED THE PART II BOOKLET.



APPENDIX E

THE MARTYRDOM AND EISENHOWER REPLICATIONS  
QUESTIONNAIRE



PART 2





## Section A

In this section of the study, we are interested in your impressions of several of the political objects discussed in Part I. To tap your impressions, we will ask you to judge each of these objects against a set of descriptive scales.

At the top of each page of this section, you will find the name of a person, or of a political group. Below the name are a set of descriptive scales. You are asked to work down the page considering each scale as separate and independent of the rest. The general form of these scales is illustrated below. As you can see, the scale has nine intervals with opposite adjectives at the ends. To complete the scale, place a checkmark in the interval that best reflects your impression of the object (named at the top of the page) along the FAIR-UNFAIR dimension. If you picture the object in question as very closely related to one end of the scale, you should place your checkmark as follows:

FAIR : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR  
OR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : UNFAIR

If the object seems considerably related to one side or the other, check as follows

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR  
OR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

If the object seems only somewhat related to one side or the other, check as follows:

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR  
OR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

If the object seems only slightly related to one side or the other, check as follows:

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR  
OR

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

If the object seems equally related or associated with both sides of the scale, then you should check the middle interval of the scale.

FAIR : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : ✓ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNFAIR

1. Be sure to complete every scale. Do not omit any under any circumstances.
2. Place only one checkmark on any one scale.
3. Place the checkmark within intervals of the scale as shown in the examples, and not on the divider between intervals.
4. If a scale seems completely irrelevant or unrelated to an object such that you are unable to make any judgement at all, place a checkmark in the middle interval of the scale and print the letters N. R. (for Not Relevant) in the margin beside the scale.
5. Make each judgement independently; work quickly and do not worry over particular judgements. It is your immediate "feelings" about the object that we want.



MOST POLITICIANS

JOHN HAMPTON

HONEST : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : DISHONEST

SOFT : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : HARD

UNEMOTIONAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : EMOTIONAL

NONCONFORMING : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : CONFORMING

RUGGED : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : DELICATE

UNTRUSTWORTHY : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : TRUSTWORTHY

ACTIVE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : PASSIVE

DISPENSABLE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : INDISPENSABLE

GOOD : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : BAD

RELAXED : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : TENSE



UNCOMMITTED : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : COMMITTED

ESSENTIAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : NONESSENTIAL

FAST : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : SLOW

SELFISH : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : UNSELFISH

POWERFUL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : POWERLESS

INCONSEQUENTIAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : CONSEQUENTIAL

DULL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : SHARP

SINCERE : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : INSINCERE

TIMID : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : BOLD

UNUSUAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : USUAL





1. Age (in years)

2. Sex.      Male              Female              (check one)

3. Faculty enrolled in at W.L.U.

4. Citizenship. (a) Canadian

(b) Other (please specify)

5. University Education (check highest level completed)

Less than one year

1 year of University

2 years of University

3 years of University

4 years of University

Post-Graduate Degree

6. How much interest do you have in politics generally? Check one of the following.

Very interested

Somewhat interested

Not very interested

Not at all interested

## Section C

Now we would like to know how you would vote in this Scanlon election. On the scale below, indicate the certainty with which you would vote for one party rather than the other. The more certain you feel about your preference, the closer your checkmark should be to the appropriate end of the scale.

CERTAIN TO

VOTE PUBLIC: \_\_\_\_\_ : VOTE NATIONAL  
PARTY PARTY

CERTAIN TO

VOTE NATIONAL  
PARTY



Section D

Some people tend to make their voting decision on the basis of the political leaders involved, while others tend to make their decision on the basis of party. To get a better idea of the basis of your preference above, consider each of the following pairs of objects as a separate choice, and indicate the degree of certainly with which you would vote for one object rather than the other.

VOTE HAMPTON : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VOTE REID

VOTE PUBLIC  
PARTY : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VOTE HAMPTON

VOTE REID : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VOTE PUBLIC  
PARTY

VOTE HAMPTON : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VOTE NATIONAL  
PARTY

VOTE NATIONAL : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : VOTE REID  
PARTY

Section E.

From what you know of Hampton and Reid, how would you assess the personal attitude of each leader on the issue of a Trade Union's Right to Strike.

## AUSTEN REID

(a) SYMPATHETIC : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : OPPOSED

## JOHN HAMPTON

(b) SYMPATHETIC : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_ : OPPOSED



Section F

1. When Reid and Hampton chose their policy platforms for this election campaign, which of the following two factors do you think was more important to each leader in determining his particular selection:

to choose the best policy for the country

or

to choose a policy that was attractive to voters.

Consider each leader in turn, and indicate on the appropriate scale below which factor you think was more important to him in selecting his particular policy. If you feel that the leader in question considered both of these factors to be equally important in his selection, then you should check the centre interval of his scale. If you feel that one factor was more important to him than the other, you should check the interval on the appropriate side of the scale that best reflects the predominance of that factor.

## AUSTEN REID

- (a) CHOOSE POLICY ATTRACTIVE TO: \_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_ CHOOSE BEST POLICY FOR COUNTRY VOTERS

## JOHN HAMPTON

- (b) CHOOSE POLICY ATTRACTIVE TO: \_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_ CHOOSE BEST POLICY FOR COUNTRY VOTERS

## MOST POLITICIANS

- (c) CHOOSE POLICY ATTRACTIVE TO: \_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_\_ CHOOSE BEST POLICY FOR COUNTRY VOTERS

Section G

In this study we have asked you to imagine yourself in a fictitious country observing aspects of that country's political system. We are aware, however, that this is often difficult to do. Because it is important to our study, we would ask you to answer the following two questions as honestly as possible.

First, how difficult was it for you to imagine yourself in the country





described here? That is, could you estimate on the following scale the degree of involvement that you were able to develop with the system itself and with the events and people in that system?

|                |  |                              |
|----------------|--|------------------------------|
| NO INVOLVEMENT |  | GREAT                        |
| IN THE SYSTEM  | :____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: | INVOLVEMENT IN<br>THE SYSTEM |

Secondly, to what extent did you find yourself projecting aspects of a real system (such as Canada or the United States) on the situation described in this study? That is, to what extent did your answers reflect your images of real parties and real leaders rather than merely the descriptions set out in this study?

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| ANSWERS BASED<br>LARGELY ON<br>REAL PEOPLE<br>AND PARTIES | :____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: | ANSWERS BASED<br>ONLY ON IMAGES<br>OF IMAGINARY<br>SITUATION |
|---|--|--|

#### Section H

From what you know of Hampton and Reid, to what degree was each man politically active in the past. Indicate your assessment on the following scales.

#### AUSTEN REID

|            |  |             |
|------------|--|-------------|
| NOT ACTIVE | :____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: | VERY ACTIVE |
|------------|--|-------------|

#### JOHN HAMPTON

|            |  |             |
|------------|--|-------------|
| NOT ACTIVE | :____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____:____: | VERY ACTIVE |
|------------|--|-------------|

We would welcome comments and suggestions about other aspects of the study. Please use the space below and the back of this page if necessary for your comments.

Thank you for your co-operation.



APPENDIX F

SUMMARY CELL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE  
"MARTYRDOM" AND "EISENHOWER" REPLICATIONS



Table F.1. Summary of Individual Cell Means and Standard Deviations from "Martyrdom" and "Eisenhower" 2 x 2 Factorial Design.

| Dependent Measures                             | Cell I                                     |           | Cell II                                       |           | Cell III                                   |           | Cell IV   |           |
|--|--|-----------|---|-----------|--|-----------|---|-----------|
|  | Popular Policy<br>Political<br>Achievement | N<br>(25) | Popular Policy<br>Nonpolitical<br>Achievement | N<br>(25) | Popular Policy<br>Political<br>Achievement | N<br>(25) | Unpopular Policy<br>Nonpolitical<br>Achievement | N<br>(24) |
| Target Leader Ratings (1)                      |  |           |   |           |  |           |   |           |
| Evaluative Dimension                           | $\bar{X}$ 3.64<br>SD 1.56                  |           | 3.40<br>.96                                   |           | 3.36<br>1.63                               |           | 3.67<br>1.21                                    |           |
| Dynamism Dimension                             | $\bar{X}$ 3.04<br>SD .77                   |           | 2.62<br>1.10                                  |           | 2.60<br>1.17                               |           | 2.91<br>1.06                                    |           |
| Intenseness Dimension                          | $\bar{X}$ 4.00<br>SD 1.74                  |           | 3.78<br>1.79                                  |           | 3.32<br>1.74                               |           | 4.16<br>1.71                                    |           |
| Target-Nontarget Differences<br>in Ratings (2) |  |           |   |           |  |           |   |           |
| Evaluative Dimension                           | $\bar{X}$ .59<br>SD 1.74                   |           | .30<br>1.36                                   |           | .86<br>2.53                                |           | .68<br>2.11                                     |           |
| Dynamism Dimension                             | $\bar{X}$ .92<br>SD 1.62                   |           | 1.49<br>1.83                                  |           | 1.90<br>1.91                               |           | 1.71<br>1.82                                    |           |
| Intenseness Dimension                          | $\bar{X}$ 1.44<br>SD 2.22                  |           | 1.82<br>2.59                                  |           | 2.58<br>2.15                               |           | 1.66<br>2.66                                    |           |
| Target Leader Rating Polarity (3)              |  |           |   |           |  |           |   |           |
| Evaluative Dimension                           | $\bar{X}$ 2.94<br>SD .99                   |           | 2.88<br>.68                                   |           | 3.39<br>.79                                |           | 2.86<br>.77                                     |           |
| Dynamism Dimension                             | $\bar{X}$ 3.08<br>SD .61                   |           | 3.32<br>.60                                   |           | 3.50<br>.59                                |           | 3.15<br>.65                                     |           |
| Intenseness Dimension                          | $\bar{X}$ 3.12<br>SD 3.13                  |           | 3.34<br>3.30                                  |           | 3.32<br>3.61                               |           | 3.04<br>3.14                                    |           |
| Overall Profile                                | $\bar{X}$ .78<br>SD                        |           | .64   |           | .61  |           | .69   |           |





| Dependent Measures   | Cell I                                     |      | Cell II                                       |      | Cell III                                     |      | Cell IV   |      |
|--|--|------|---|------|--|------|---|------|
|  | Popular Policy<br>Political<br>Achievement | (25) | Popular Policy<br>Nonpolitical<br>Achievement | (25) | Unpopular Policy<br>Political<br>Achievement | (25) | Unpopular Policy<br>Nonpolitical<br>Achievement | (24) |
| N  |  |      |   |      |  |      |   |      |
| Target-Nontarget Differences<br>in Rating Polarity (4)<br>Evaluative Dimension | $\bar{X}$                                  | .26  | .14   | .55  | .25  |      |   |      |
|  | SD   | .90  | .89   | 1.03 | 1.03   |      |   |      |
|  | $\bar{X}$                                  | .22  | .65   | 1.14 | .83  |      |   |      |
|  | SD   | .83  | .82   | 1.11 | .95  |      |   |      |
|  | $\bar{X}$                                  | .12  | .62   | .38  | .18  |      |   |      |
| Intenseness Dimension  | SD   | 1.21 | .86   | 1.39 | .79  |      |   |      |
|  | $\bar{X}$                                  | .15  | .45   | .75  | .44  |      |   |      |
| Overall Profile Polarity   | SD   | .63  | .56   | .73  | .70  |      |   |      |
|  |  |      |   |      |  |      |   |      |
| Target Importance (1)  | $\bar{X}$                                  | 4.11 | 3.92  | 3.64 | 3.81   |      |   |      |
|  | SD   | 1.33 | 1.18  | 1.14 | 1.45   |      |   |      |
|  | $\bar{X}$                                  | .79  | 1.27  | 1.82 | 1.60   |      |   |      |
| Target-Nontarget<br>Differences in Polarity (2)                                | SD   | 2.04 | 1.39  | 1.79 | 1.70   |      |   |      |
|  |  |      |   |      |  |      |   |      |
| Polarity of Target Policy<br>Motivation (3)                                    | $\bar{X}$                                  | 2.96 | 3.08  | 4.00 | 3.72   |      |   |      |
|  | SD   | 1.40 | 1.15  | .77  | 1.17   |      |   |      |
| Polarity of Target-Nontarget<br>Differences in Policy<br>Motivation (4)        | $\bar{X}$                                  | -    | -1.38   | .56  | .64  |      |   |      |
|  | SD   | 1.90 | 1.94  | 1.28 | .90  |      |   |      |
|  |  |      |   |      |  |      |   |      |
| Nature of Target Policy<br>Motivation (5)                                      | $\bar{X}$                                  | 6.08 | 5.72  | 7.12 | 7.48   |      |   |      |
|  | SD   | 2.22 | 2.30  | 2.30 | 1.64   |      |   |      |
| Nature of Target-Nontarget<br>Differences in Motivation (6)                    | $\bar{X}$                                  | 2.44 | 1.12  | 3.48 | 4.44   |      |   |      |
|  | SD   | 3.79 | 4.88  | 4.58 | 2.97   |      |   |      |



| Dependent Measures  | Cell I                                     |      | Cell II                                       |      | Cell III                                     |      | Cell IV   |      |
|---|--|------|---|------|--|------|---|------|
|   | Popular Policy<br>Political<br>Achievement | (25) | Popular Policy<br>Nonpolitical<br>Achievement | (25) | Unpopular Policy<br>Political<br>Achievement | (25) | Unpopular Policy<br>Nonpolitical<br>Achievement | (24) |
| Target Anti-Labour<br>Attitude (7)                          | N  | 7.77 | 8.17  | 7.84 | 8.00   |      |   |      |
|   | $\bar{X}$                                  | 1.66 | .96   | 1.95 | 1.04   |      |   |      |
|   | SD   |      |   |      |  |      |   |      |
| Target-Nontarget Differences<br>in Anti-Labour Attitude (8) | $\bar{X}$                                  | 4.00 | 3.72  | 4.80 | 4.68   |      |   |      |
|   | SD   | 2.83 | 2.75  | 2.65 | 2.27   |      |   |      |
| Vote Certainty Between Parties (9)                          | $\bar{X}$                                  | 3.42 | 3.44  | 3.58 | 3.56   |      |   |      |
|   | SD   | .93  | 1.12  | 1.14 | 1.08   |      |   |      |
| Vote Certainty Between Leaders (9)                          | $\bar{X}$                                  | 2.96 | 3.56  | 4.04 | 3.52   |      |   |      |
|   | SD   | 1.04 | .96   | .89  | 1.12   |      |   |      |



Notes for Table F.1.

- (1) Mean scores for the Target Leader Ratings may range between 1-9, where the lower score indicates a more positive evaluation, greater dynamism, greater intenseness, or greater attributed importance.
- (2) Mean scores for the Target-Nontarget Differences in Rating may range between -8 and +8 where a positive score reflects greater positive evaluation, greater dynamism and greater intenseness of the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
- (3) Mean polarity scores for the Target Leader may range between 1-5 where the higher score reflects greater polarity.
- (4) Mean scores for Target-Nontarget Differences in Polarity may range between -4 and +4 where a positive score indicates greater polarity for the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
- (5) Mean scores for Policy Motivation may range between 1-9, where the higher score reflects greater weight on the altruistic motive, and the lower score indicates greater weight on the "political" motive.
- (6) Mean differences in Motivational Attribution between Target and Nontarget may range between -8 and +8, where a positive score reflects greater altruism attributed to the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
- (7) Mean attitude scores for the Target Leader may range between 1-9, where the higher score reflects a stronger attributed Anti-Labour attitude.
- (8) Mean differences in attitude scores between the Target and Nontarget Leader may range between -8 and +8, where a positive score reflects a stronger Anti-Labour attitude attributed to the Target Leader, relative to the Nontarget Leader.
- (9) Mean Vote Certainty scores may range between 1-5, where the higher score indicates greater certainty of decision.







**B30223**